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AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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STRATEGIC WEAPONS

PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL

By William C. Foster

THE central fact today in the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union is that progress in technology has made it both necessary and possible to place restraints on the nuclear arms race. The technological stars and planets are now in favorable conjunction, so to speak—and they will not stay that way for long.

In considering the strategic situation in which we find ourselves, it may be useful to recall briefly some of the ways in which we got where we are. In 1961, the Soviets had a small number of ICBMs. We in the United States did not know whether they planned to keep things that way or to deploy a greater number; so we went ahead on the assumption that they would deploy a greater number. We undertook a very sizeable build-up of Minutemen and Polaris forces. We thus ended up with a considerably larger arsenal of missiles and warheads than we actually required. But then the Soviets also began an extensive deployment—probably in response to our efforts—and so they have been catching up in ICBMs, and have begun to build up their force of Polaris-type missile submarines.

Today we still have a considerably larger number of deliverable nuclear warheads than they have; but either side, experts agree, could probably inflict 100 million casualties on the other, even after absorbing a first strike. This mutual balance of deterrence is perhaps not the happiest situation one might imagine, but it has afforded a certain stability thus far.

Another factor in today's equation is the design of our weapons. On the whole, the strategic arsenals of both sides have in recent years become increasingly invulnerable, nonprovocative,

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geared to a second strike. Their design has thus tended to minimize factors which could give either side an incentive to strike first. Needless to say, this has considerably enhanced the stability of the situation.

However, several of the weapons systems now being contemplated for deployment in the next few years could increase the risk of war by enhancing the temptation to strike first during a crisis situation.

The Soviets, for example, have been testing a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). This weapon differs from a "normal" ICBM chiefly in that it travels at a lower altitude and can take a longer and supposedly less detectable route to its target, via the Southern Hemisphere. Because the FOBS is likely to have a smaller payload and less accuracy than a corresponding ICBM, it will not materially strengthen the Soviet Union's second-strike capability. Its main purpose would appear to be for use in a surprise first strike against soft targets, such as strategic bomber airfields. Thus, a large-scale FOBS deployment would clearly be in violation of a fundamental "rule," which has been tacitly observed in recent years, against the development of weapons which might appear to increase directly the incentive to strike first.

Another weapons system that would be inconsistent with that fundamental rule is a large-scale Ballistic Missile Defense system (BMD). A BMD system, if presumed to be effective by its possessor, might incline him to calculate that he could launch a massive counter-force strike against enemy land-based strategic forces and then defend himself against unacceptable losses from the enemy's retaliatory attack.

Thus a large-scale BMD, by permitting its possessor to perceive an enhanced potential for a first strike, could increase his incentive to strike first in a crisis situation. At the same time a power confronting an adversary with a large-scale BMD might in a crisis situation feel impelled to strike first because a sudden, massive first strike with unimpaired offensive forces would have a better chance of penetrating missile defenses than would a retaliatory strike with a partially destroyed offensive force.

The MIRV or Multiple Individually-Targeted Re-Entry Vehicle, which makes it possible for a missile to deliver separate warheads to several widely separated targets, is another complicating development in nuclear technology. If, in addition to pos-

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sessing large-scale BMD systems, both sides also possessed large-scale MIRV systems—such as the United States and presumably the Soviets have been developing—there could be an additional incentive to strike first in a crisis situation. The rationale for this is simple enough. Suppose, for example, that a large portion of each side's ICBM force had, let us say, 5 MIRV warheads in each missile. Then the side which strikes first could hope, at least in theory, to destroy up to 25 enemy warheads (in 5 enemy missiles) with each of its attacking missiles. Clearly, this could be viewed as a reason for wishing to strike first.

In all of these examples, the unfortunate thing is that even if we considered the new threats to be imagined rather than real, or possible rather than sure, we still could not dismiss them; for we must also take into account how the other side might react in a crisis. Then, too, there is the obvious corollary to a first-strike incentive: the side which feels that the other may have an incentive to strike first automatically has an incentive to do so itself—that is, to preëmpt.

These are some of the reasons which argue in favor of negotiating in the context of the present strategic confrontation, rather than waiting for the arms race to move up another step or two. And there is yet another consideration which should be mentioned: we are in the relatively fortunate position at the present time where each side has fairly complete information on the size and capabilities of its adversary's strategic forces. Thus the implications of an agreement not to increase such forces on either side would now be relatively simple to calculate.

If either or both sides were to deploy new advanced weapons systems, however, the new uncertainties added to the equation would make the negotiation of an agreement more complicated and difficult. The deployment of extensive ballistic missile defenses by either side, for example, would raise apprehensions on the other side as to the adequacy of its offensive forces to penetrate such defenses so as to maintain deterrence.

Another example: Although the fixed land-based missiles now deployed are relatively easy to detect, if mobile land-based missiles were deployed, an agreement fixing their number would be difficult to verify even with highly intrusive inspections, such as the Soviets have always rejected. Similarly, it would be difficult if not impossible to differentiate between single-warhead missiles and MIRVs without close and intrusive inspection. Thus

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it is important that we try to negotiate a halt in the strategic arms race before the task becomes far more difficult than it is now.

II

Our strategic confrontation with the Soviet Union, together with the prospect of negotiations, has given rise to what appears, at least on the surface, to be a kind of polarization into two schools of thought—one maintaining that we should negotiate only from a position of strategic "superiority;" the other maintaining that negotiations can take place only in a condition of "parity," since the other side would certainly be unwilling to negotiate from a position of inferiority.

This so-called controversy is a great oversimplification of the issue, in addition to resembling somewhat an obscure theological discussion. It is difficult to imagine what strategic posture we could assume which could change the basic technological facts with which we have to contend. The United States has more deliverable warheads than the Soviets have; and most people would doubtless describe this as "superiority." On the other hand, the Soviets presumably consider that they also have "superiority" in some areas which they think important. It seems doubtful, in any case, that they would be willing to negotiate if they were not satisfied that they had an adequate deterrent capability.

But whatever index of strategic nuclear power is used, it would seem rather fruitless for either side to claim superiority when, no matter what it does, the other side will still have the capability to inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage. It would seem equally futile to seek a degree of superiority in an attempt to neutralize the adversary's retaliatory capability when he will surely seek to counter each increment in our strategic capability. Paying close attention to the meaning of words, therefore, it is encouraging that President Nixon has adopted the word "sufficiency" of weaponry to describe the requirements of deterrence. In the absence of an effective curb on arms growth on both sides, we will have to continue to build weapons in order to insure that we maintain a "sufficiency." If, however, we can persuade the other side to halt with us at a level of "mutual sufficiency"—seemingly the only basis on which an arms agreement can be reached—it would be folly for us both to continue to add arms

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merely to maintain the presumed balance at ever higher levels.

While a mutually acceptable U.S.-Soviet agreement to limit the strategic arms race will not be easy to achieve, clearly it should be technically possible. We have made very extensive studies and other preparations for the strategic talks. It may not be possible, in the beginning, to achieve as comprehensive—and thus as complicated—limitations on weapons systems as were envisioned in the so-called "Freeze" proposal which the United States advanced in 1964. It will probably be necessary to move step-by-step, starting with the more essential elements and moving from these to other elements in national strategic arsenals. But this may also be the best way to proceed, for one of the things we have learned after many years in arms-control negotiations is that one of the worst enemies of progress is the tendency to seek overly complex solutions.

In considering any arms-control proposal, it is necessary to assure that the associated verification system is adequate to protect U.S. national security interests. Such verification capabilities may be provided by so-called "national means" alone—*i.e.* means which do not involve agreed physical access to another state's territory—or by national means in combination with some direct inspection. Obviously, the scope of the proposed arms-control agreement would depend in some degree upon the extent to which we could rely on our "national means" or could obtain any necessary additional assurance in the form of direct inspections. While it can be stated as a general rule that the really comprehensive agreements which one might envision would necessitate direct inspections, our verification capabilities using "national means" alone are considerably greater than it has been possible, so far, to reveal.

At the same time, it may be useful to recall that it has been the policy of the United States to undertake arms-control agreements only as fast as this could be done without adversely affecting national security. Reliance has not been placed on trust. Indeed, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) was established in order to promote national security. Its enabling legislation states that the "formulation and implementation of United States arms control and disarmament policy in a manner which will promote the national security can best be insured by a central organization charged by statute with primary responsibility for this field." ACDA's role in promoting

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national security was referred to in the following terms by President Nixon in an address delivered last October 26: "Our Department of Defense and our Arms Control and Disarmament Agency share the same objective—the enhancement of our national security. Their perspectives, while different, are complementary." Proceeding from the basic approach outlined in its enabling legislation, the Agency discusses all arms-control proposals—before submitting them to the President—with the Committee of Principals, consisting of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of ACDA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, as appropriate, six other top-level officials concerned with national security; and it is only with direct Presidential approval that the proposals are carried into international negotiations. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency also benefits from the advice of a group of our country's leading citizens—members of its General Advisory Committee—who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. In addition, of course, there are frequent consultations with committees and individual members of the Congress.

In the final analysis, the decision whether to negotiate a given arms-control agreement boils down to weighing the risks of undertaking it against the risks of not undertaking it. And as in other cases, this applies to the projected bilateral strategic arms discussions with the Soviets.

While considerations of national security naturally require first emphasis as reasons for wishing to halt the arms race, the picture is not complete unless one also considers its economic aspect. There are estimates, for example, that a large anti-Soviet BMD system, a new air-defense system, a fleet of new manned bombers and new land- and sea-based missile systems—all of which have been suggested—would cost in the next decade more than $100 billion over current spending levels. We all know from experience, moreover, that when long-term projects are undertaken for the development and deployment of sophisticated weapons systems, the final figure is apt to bear little resemblance to the first estimate. To cite one example: In 1960, Air Force officials estimated the costs to develop and produce a force of ICBMs at $3.3 million per missile. But by the time deployment of the first generation of ICBMs (Minuteman I) was completed in mid-1965, the cost had jumped to almost $8.75 million per missile. Consider also the case of the so-called "thin"

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BMD system. Somewhat over a year ago the Defense Department estimated that the investment cost of the Sentinel BMD system would be $5 billion. Current Army estimates are already 10 percent over that, or $5.5 billion. By the time further expenses for research and development during deployment are added, together with operations and maintenance costs of one kind and another, the bill for this same Sentinel system over the next ten years is likely to be $10 billion or more. This is in addition to the almost $4 billion already spent on research and development. (Ten billion dollars, incidentally, would pay for about 600 thousand housing units.)

Technical and economic factors thus appear not only to argue strongly in favor of arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union, but also to augur rather well for their success, since those factors are likely to affect Soviet policy considerations as well as our own. Needless to say, however, there are many political and human factors which have to be taken into account.

III

Soviet foreign and domestic policies during the past half-century have frequently left Western observers in a state of shock and dismay. And yet, it is the Soviet Government in the first instance with which we must do business.

Of course, the Soviet Union has not been spared from the influence of those conflicting forces operating to bring about change in all areas of the world. In recent times there have been some reforms, opening chinks in that closed Soviet society which was created over the years at such cost in manpower, human dignity and international prestige. And today, as never before, there are outspoken liberal-minded men and women in the Soviet Union whose dedication to the improvement of their society would do honor to any country. At the same time, the brutal Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia serves as evidence that change, while inevitable in the long run, can be delayed by government leaders concerned to preserve their power base. And while there is a school of thought which believes that the suppression of Czechoslovakia will of itself precipitate a liberalization in the Soviet Union which otherwise might have taken another generation or so, it might also have the opposite effect. Indeed, it would seem realistic to assume that, if only for internal reasons, the Soviet Government will maintain an extremely

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tight rein over its people and retain an antagonistic and distrustful attitude toward the United States for a long time to come.

Despite the many divergent interests of the United States and the Soviet Union, however, there appears to be no question that the Soviets have come to see that we do have a considerable ground of common interest in arms control. There is nothing altruistic in their approach to these matters: their willingness to discuss arms control has been forced upon them by the strategic, technological and economic facts of life. For those who would like to think in terms of a longer and more optimistic perspective, however, it should be pointed out that arms control can also be a major road toward the kinds of changes we would like to see in the Soviet Union. International exchanges and agreements with the Soviet Union—while they may exacerbate the fears of orthodox elements and thus even have a negative effect in the short run—tend undoubtedly over the long run to strengthen the hand of the more pragmatic and open-minded elements. And arms control is perhaps the field in which we can make the strongest appeal to these latter—because of the dangers and costs involved in the arms race, and because of the resultant dramatic nature of substantive arms-control agreements. As an additional favorable augury, we have encountered over the past few years an increasingly sophisticated knowledge of arms control among Soviet negotiators.

Many people have the impression that dealing with the Soviets is like dealing with creatures from another planet. That has not been the experience of this observer. On the whole they have shown much the same personal reactions as Westerners. Moreover, they respect candor about basic conditions which cannot be waived in a negotiation—just as they respect those who keep their confidences. Their long tradition of secrecy makes it difficult for them to express their true thoughts early in the game, and negotiating with them is correspondingly difficult and slow. But if the negotiator is sure of his ground and can show clearly that there are sufficient elements of mutual interest, it is possible ultimately to reach agreement with them.

On the American side, there is of course a considerable mistrust of the Soviet Union; and it is therefore all the more essential that we base our arms-control proposals not on trust but on adequate verification. Moreover, there are strong pressures on our Government to deploy new weapons systems as soon as it

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becomes technologically feasible to do so. On the other hand there have been quite positive developments which augur well for public support of arms-control negotiations. To begin with, since last July—when the Non-Proliferation Treaty was opened for signature, and when President Johnson first announced the Soviet expression of willingness to hold strategic arms-limitation talks—there has been a marked upsurge of public interest in arms control. Opinion surveys have indicated, moreover, that not even the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, with all its negative effects on international relations, has dampened this interest and support for arms-control negotiations. With few exceptions, American editorial opinion similarly has continued to show strong support both for ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and for the strategic missile talks. It should be noted that international opinion, also, has continued to urge that the missile talks begin. This was reflected in the overwhelming vote for a U.N. resolution to this effect during the last session of the General Assembly. The tally was a resounding 97–0, with 5 abstentions.

Perhaps the greatest asset which the United States has enjoyed in the arms-control field has been an essentially bipartisan approach to the subject. All American administrations, Republican and Democratic, since the Second World War have made significant contributions to arms control. Historians may say that there have been certain inconsistencies in our policies, or that at times we have groped our way along too slowly—which perhaps is not surprising, given the magnitude of the problem. But the U.S. Government has accepted its essential responsibility to keep trying; and the progress achieved thus far could not have been realized without this continuity of effort.

It was this bipartisan support which led to the creation of the world's first arms control and disarmament agency. While in the beginning some skepticism was voiced as to what an agency of the sort could accomplish, ACDA has now proven itself, as appears to be recognized not only in the United States but also by foreign governments. This is a matter of more than personal satisfaction to this writer. For just as ACDA has already been instrumental in bringing to fruition a number of extremely important arms-control agreements, so, I believe, it is pursuing the only realistic road toward further enhancement of our security and well-being.

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STRATEGIC WEAPONS

SECURITY THROUGH LIMITATIONS

By Harold Brown

IN military and technical terms, we can envisage agreements to limit strategic arms which would be sufficiently verifiable to be enforceable and which would enhance both the security of the United States and the security of the Soviet Union. On-site inspection is no longer the immovable roadblock that it has been in the past. Unilateral means of verification, available to both sides, provide forms of inspection as effective for some purposes as on-the-ground surveys.

It remains true that weapons have certain important characteristics that cannot be limited effectively by agreement without disclosures which go beyond what can be obtained unilaterally. And, without such inspection, there would be a greater possibility that we would have to withdraw from an agreement because of uncertainty about weapons improvements by the other side. But these reservations need not block the negotiation of a useful treaty that would increase our national security.

Strategic arms limitations could produce extra bonuses in addition to improved military security—among them the possibility of increasing the resources available for other purposes, of increasing East-West coöperation and of adopting additional arms-control measures. For the present I will leave to others the discussion of these latter hopes, prospects and advantages, as well as the problems of negotiating arms-limitation agreements, and concentrate on what I see as the most critical objective: increased security in a nuclear world.

Exactly how can we judge whether a particular agreement to limit strategic weapons would contribute to the security of the United States? In general, there are three principal goals to be taken into account in considering any strategic policy:

(1) To deter a deliberate nuclear attack by maintaining military forces that could survive such an attack and still inflict an unacceptable level of damage on the attacker, providing thereby a high degree of assurance that no country would decide to attack.

(2) To have the means to limit casualties to some degree in

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the event of an "irrational" war, or a limited accidental launching of weapons, or a so-called "third-country" attack—that is, an attack by a nuclear power other than one of the two nuclear superpowers.

(3) To have the power to initiate strategic war while limiting one's own casualties to an "acceptable" level—a potential overwhelming first strike.

At the present time both the United States and the Soviet Union have the capability to deter strategic war, and both also have some small capability to limit casualties in an irrational or accidental war. To say that both can deter, however, is tantamount to saying that neither has the capacity to make an overwhelming first strike.

A carefully designed agreement to limit strategic weapons could help to preserve deterrence on both sides. It could also provide both sides with some ability to limit damage in case of irrational or accidental war. But in order to be acceptable an agreement could not permit one side to achieve the capacity for an overwhelming first strike, since this would be incompatible with the other side's requirement to be able to deter such an attack. Hence the third objective above is inconsistent with an effort to reach agreement on strategic arms control. An agreement should be such as to help ensure that if one side strikes first it will not gain, and preferably will lose, in relative military strength.

The maintenance of such a relationship depends on the weapon characteristics of the force structure on each side. Let us take as an example the use of missiles, each with a single warhead, to attack an equal number of hardened missile sites on the other side. Since missile reliability is less than 100 percent, not every attacking missile would destroy a missile. Such an attack would therefore reduce the number of missiles available to the attacker by more than the number of missiles lost by the defender.

Some insist that deterrence is not enough, and that the United States must have both the capability to deter Soviet attack and, if necessary, to launch an overwhelming first strike against the Soviet Union—that is, a strike which would effectively disarm it. In my judgment, this is not feasible, even if the policy were one we wished to adopt. An overwhelming first strike cannot be attained against a nation which has the technical and economic

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resources of the Soviet Union and plans its forces intelligently. The Soviets can put forth the necessary effort to prevent our achieving a first-strike capability—and there is no doubt that they would do so.

If we reject the pursuit of a first-strike capability, then an agreement to limit strategic weapons is compatible with our security. Of course, this works both ways. If there is to be an agreement, the Soviets must also be willing to give up the first-strike goal. Our clear intention to prevent its achievement should persuade them.

It follows, then, that our principal criterion for judging an agreement to limit strategic arms should be whether the resulting balance of forces assures us of possessing as much or more certainty of deterrence as we would have in its absence. We should compare the more likely, as well as the worst, possibilities with and without an agreement. The Soviets might make clandestine improvements under the protection of an agreement. But it seems at least as likely that, in the absence of an agreement, they might make a sudden massive effort to tilt the balance in their favor. If the agreement gives the United States a higher deterrent capability as compared with the likely evolution of forces in the absence of agreement, it is a positive gain for American security even in strictly military terms.

An agreement which meets this basic criterion could still provide some limitation of damage in case of accidental or irrational war, and a substantial limitation of damage from attacks by third countries. There will be no real threat from third countries such as Communist China until the mid-1970s, and negotiated limitations could still permit measures—*e.g.* a modest level of anti-ballistic missile defense—to counter such a threat. In addition, we should weigh any agreement in terms of its effect on factors involved in actually fighting a war if deterrence should fail—the ability of forces to survive, accuracy of delivery, damage assessment, command and control. These factors include the capability and flexibility of surviving forces.

II

Having concluded that the principal objective of a strategic arms-limitation agreement should be the maintenance of deterrence, we must examine in detail the meaning of deterrence in order to judge the effect of relative weapon capabilities. The suc-

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cess or failure of the U.S. deterrent ultimately depends on the judgment of Soviet leaders—that is to say, on their view of what the world would be like for them and for us after any attack which they might conceivably contemplate. To be realistic, we must assume a serious confrontation, such as a European crisis in which each side considered its vital interests involved. In that case, Soviet leaders might be willing to accept heavy casualties and industrial damage at home, if they thought the United States would cease to exist while the U.S.S.R. could successfully recover and ultimately use its surviving nuclear forces to dominate the European industrial complex.

Deterrence requires the maintenance of retaliatory forces which can destroy any attacker, together with defensive measures to complicate the enemy's attack problem and to protect our missiles from destruction before they can be launched. The would-be attacker must be convinced that his own country will suffer unacceptable damage, but his conception of what is unacceptable will vary with the nature of what may be gained in terms of conquest and power. The Soviets are likely to be thoroughly deterred if they are convinced that, after a Soviet first strike and U.S. retaliation, the military balance would be against them and ratios of surviving population and industry would not be adverse to the United States.

The relation between defensive and offensive systems is of critical importance in determining the probable outcome of strategic war. An attacker aiming at a first strike would coördinate the use of all his weapons to increase the probability of avoiding retaliation. He would try to penetrate our defenses and destroy enough of our weapons so that his own defenses could handle the disorganized remainder of our retaliatory capability.

Unfortunately, a side which engaged in a first strike could manœuvre so as to have the advantage of surprise, and would try to bring offensive and defensive forces to peak effectiveness simultaneously. We therefore cannot afford to rely on a single retaliatory system to preserve deterrence; that would make the first-strike problem too simple for the attacker, since he could concentrate both his offensive and defensive efforts against one type of retaliatory weapon and would have a much better chance of achieving increased effectiveness. To avoid this danger, we maintain a mix of land-based missiles, sea-based missiles and bombers. The Soviets would have to attack each in a different

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way and would require two completely different defensive systems to deal with our surviving missiles and bombers.

At the present time, the United States has an excellent capability to deter. Our retaliatory forces are so well protected that anyone seeking a first strike would need many more weapons than we maintain. Our measures for survival include warning radars, interceptor aircraft, hardened missile silos, dispersed Polaris submarines and the alert status of our bombers. If the Soviets should attack today, they would expend their weapons without disarming ours. We would be left with relatively stronger forces and our society would suffer less damage than we could inflict in return. The Soviet missile force is not accurate enough nor has it enough re-entry vehicles to attack our land-based missiles effectively; Soviet anti-submarine forces are not good enough to destroy many of our Polaris submarines; and our alert bombers have enough warning to escape destruction on the ground. Soviet air defenses are large, but not effective enough to deal with our alert bombers, and the Soviet's anti-missile system has as yet so few interceptors that even if each one were to kill a U.S. missile the overall effect would be small.

We have striven to avoid any gap in our defenses that would permit even a single element of our forces to be largely destroyed before it could be launched. Even as the Soviets developed a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) that could bypass our older warning systems because it has a low trajectory, we quickly deployed over-the-horizon radars, previously developed, that could detect an FOBS launch and provide adequate warning. As the Soviets have increased the number and effectiveness of their missiles, we have begun development of "harder" silos that can withstand much closer nuclear explosions and an anti-missile system that can be used for local defense of our missile fields, if necessary.

In addition to protecting against destruction of our weapons before launch, we have improved our offensive systems so that our surviving warheads would not be neutralized by improved Soviet defenses. As the Soviets have installed their Anti-Ballistic Missile system (ABM), we have added penetration aids and are developing multiple warheads. As the Soviets have worked on more effective air defenses, we have begun development of the SRAM air-to-surface missile, and have continued preliminary work on the aircraft technology needed for a new heavy bomber

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and on penetration aids suitable for both current and future bombers.

The United States can continue to be confident of maintaining deterrence in the face of Soviet weapon improvements, but some risk always exists that we may let our deterrent capability decline as a result of not acting quickly enough or wisely. For their part, the Soviets would also have to take continuing measures to protect their forces, for although we deploy no purely first-strike weapons, some of our second-strike improvements would also have possible first-strike capabilities. In such a race, each weapon in our complex mix of weapons would have to be improved to stay ahead of the potential threat.

In particular, the deployment of extensive anti-ballistic missile systems for the defense of cities and of highly accurate multiple warhead systems would at the very least introduce uncertainties resulting from differing estimates of their effectiveness. The decrease in the stability of deterrence that would result is a matter of considerable concern and provides a strong argument for limiting such deployments before they occur.

III

As is apparent from this analysis of deterrence, we need to take a new road to reach a stable situation. We need an effective agreement to limit strategic weapons. If we assume that the Soviets are, or can be, convinced of the futility of seeking a first-strike capability, then it is worth examining the possibility of strategic arms limitations. An agreement to that effect need not foreclose all improvements. Both effective limitations and certain allowable force improvements can proceed with a common aim of maintaining stability as well as preserving the survivability and effectiveness of deterrent forces.

At the present time, the strategic forces of both sides are roughly comparable in the sense that both can deter attack and neither side can launch an overwhelming first strike. Both sides have an adequate second-strike capability. That is to say, the second strike has superiority over the first strike.

In number of ICBMs, the Soviets are approaching equality with our own forces of 1,054 and, since they have more large missiles, they can deliver a greater total payload. This greater payload could be important if used for multiple warheads, though we believe that we are well ahead in multiple-warhead

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development. They also have some 700 medium-range missiles capable of attacking our NATO allies and our forces overseas. But we retain the advantage in submarine ballistic missiles, with 656 to the Soviet total of around 100. In heavy bombers we are ahead by some 600 to 150, but they also have some 600 medium bombers that could be used on one-way overflights. However, even with Soviet medium bombers included, we retain the advantage in terms of bomber payload. Neither side is yet deploying an extensive ballistic missile defense and neither can defend its cities against an all-out bomber attack with nuclear weapons.

An agreement to limit strategic forces would have to continue to preserve mutual deterrence. It would have to provide for force structures that would make it impractical for either side to approach a first-strike capability, either by altering forces covered by the agreement or by increasing forces not so covered. Ideally, each improvement in forces which might increase the first-strike threat would be prevented by some sort of arms-control agreement. Of course, some limitations will be more important than others, and some will be more feasible because they can be verified without arranging intensive inspection.

Perhaps the most destabilizing threat to mutual deterrence would be the deployment of a large Soviet ABM system. It now seems likely that an ABM system could prove quite effective in the absence of extensive countermeasures by the offensive forces of the other side. ABM weapons have been designed with long range and a large kill radius. Depending on radar coverage, a single ABM site might be able to defend a circular area 800 miles in diameter against small numbers of the present generation of missiles. An ABM system would have even greater effectiveness in support of a first strike, since the retaliatory missiles, already reduced in number, might not achieve the degree of coordination needed to saturate the system.

Though we have already developed penetration aids for our missiles, the creation of an extensive Soviet ABM system would require us to deploy larger numbers of re-entry vehicles than presently programmed in order to make certain that enough of our missiles would get through. We could accomplish this by building more land-based or sea-based missiles, putting larger missiles in present silos, subdividing payloads into even smaller re-entry vehicles, or by various combinations of these measures.

In view of the explosive sort of interaction between a large

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ABM system and the missile payload required for deterrence, an agreement limiting the ABM defense of cities would make a major contribution to preserving deterrence. Offensive capabilities are so far ahead of the defense that a limit of 100 or even 1000 ABMs would help preserve this advantage. Yet a limited ABM system would still be of value in dealing with any accidental or third-country launch of a small number of missiles.

A related problem is the possibility of numerous Multiple Individually Targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). Accurate MIRVs would tend to lessen the chance of land-based missiles surviving an attack, since one first-strike missile with accurate MIRVs could destroy several deterrent missiles in their silos. Defensive measures that could be taken to preserve deterrence in the face of MIRVs would be further hardening of silos or local ABM defense of silos. Harder missile silos would require the attacker to expend several warheads to destroy one missile in its silo, thus helping to counterbalance the effect of MIRV. And local ABM defense of silos would also increase the number of warheads needed by the attacker. Missile defense could be designed so as to protect only silos or population centers as well (though this clearly creates a problem in connection with the extent of the ABM limitation). Such a distinction could be worked out in principle; negotiating it would be another matter.

Clearly an agreement to ban the deployment of MIRVs would be desirable in order to forestall erosion of the capability to deter. But the agreement *should* allow multiple re-entry vehicles that are *not* capable of being individually guided. Since these lack the required accuracy to destroy the opponent's missile silos, they would not threaten his deterrent—but they would be essential for penetrating an expanded ABM system and would thus contribute to deterrence. Unfortunately, a check on deployment of different types of payload clearly requires on-site inspection of a very obtrusive kind.

Nevertheless, it is possible that even without on-site inspection we can tell enough about each other's missiles to obtain reasonable assurance. This is so because the probable number of warheads per missile is proportionate to the payload of that missile, and payload, in turn, is directly related to the gross volume, which we may be able to determine unilaterally. Thus, a ceiling on numbers and sizes of missiles could also limit MIRVs to a number less than that needed for an effective first strike, and yet

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permit enough re-entry vehicles to penetrate missile defenses—as required for deterrence. The size of the missile force and its general characteristics can probably be monitored satisfactorily without on-site inspection.

It is clear, then, that a limit on missile payload would require a carefully related agreement on ABM systems, if deterrence is to be preserved. Similarly, if defenses against the bomber could be frozen or slowed up by agreement, bomber forces could also be limited. However, the latter agreement is likely to be very complex.

IV

The foregoing considerations suggest a number of possible limitations which would enhance our security. In my view, the essence of a useful agreement would be a fixed limit on both ABMs and the number and size of offensive missiles.

The exact number of ABMs that could be permitted would depend on the importance given to limiting damage in situations other than an all-out nuclear exchange. An ABM limit of 100 would protect against small accidental strikes, but might not be adequate against, for instance, the ICBM forces which Communist China is expected to have available in the late 1970s. An ABM limit of some 1000 weapons would be much more satisfactory from the viewpoint of defense against third-country attacks, but that size might begin to threaten the stability of U.S.-Soviet deterrence, since it might give the attacker the capacity to eliminate most of the retaliatory weapons that would survive a first strike employing improved MIRV technology. Thus, perhaps a figure between 100 and 1000 weapons should be considered.

An agreement setting an ABM limit for city defense (as opposed to missile-site defense) in the neighborhood of several hundred launchers, and a limit on numbers of offensive missiles at levels currently deployed or under construction, would ensure that, at least until the middle 1970s, each side would have enough surviving missiles to penetrate the opponent's ABM system in a second strike. It would also be necessary to ban completely any mobile land-based missiles, since they would make it easier to conceal illicit increases in a missile force. A subsequent agreement should then be worked out to limit the size of missiles and thus prevent the unlimited growth of the MIRV threat through development of larger and larger missiles.

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Our capability to deter would be more certain if there were such an agreement; without one, the uncertainties multiply. The larger the Soviet missile force, the larger will be the probable error in our estimate of the Soviet MIRV threat. Similarly, the larger the Soviet ABM system, the more uncertainties we will have about its effectiveness. And the combination of an uncontrolled MIRV threat and a massive ABM system would work together to produce a geometric increase in our uncertainty. Thus, an agreement to limit these weapons would increase our confidence in deterrence and would therefore be in our interest in strictly military terms—even apart from conserving resources.

It is imperative, however, that we avoid looking on a strategic arms-limitation agreement as a panacea for our national security problem. It may help to maintain deterrence, but many dangers would remain. War could still occur by escalation from lower levels of conflict or as a result of accidental or irrational actions. New technology and presently inconceivable weapon systems may be devised to threaten such security as is provided by deterrence. Further, many serious problems present themselves in implementing an agreement effectively.

In considering the type of agreement which I judge to be preferable, two specific problems of this sort will have to be explored in considerable technical detail. Whether they can be solved in the negotiating process is an open question. One is control of the MIRV threat through inspection or through limiting missile payload (already discussed briefly). A second is that of a possible upgrading of air-defense systems which have or could be given some anti-ballistic missile capability.

An example of the latter problem concerns the Soviet "Tallinn" air-defense system. If the extensive Tallinn system were given the missile and radar capability to perform as an ABM defense, we would be seriously concerned, regardless of whether our forces were limited by an agreement. Our intelligence should provide warning of major missile or radar improvements, and we would have to take action to ensure that our missiles could penetrate the new Soviet defenses. This would probably mean the end of any agreement limiting our offensive forces. Therefore, in order to attain a lasting treaty we might need an understanding on exactly what sort of improvements would or would not be allowed. We might also require some form of relatively simple on-site inspection to ensure compliance.

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In the area of other possible weapon improvements, we must be sure that the agreement does not prohibit activities necessary to maintain deterrence. An agreement will reduce the danger of significant improvements by the other side, but will not eliminate it entirely. All deterrence systems tend to obsolesce. Thus, the increasing accuracy and miniaturization of missile warheads reduce the survivability of missiles in silos; improved anti-submarine warfare techniques have the same effect on Polaris; improved FOBS or submarine-launched missiles lessen the effectiveness of the bomber; and new ABM or anti-aircraft techniques might seriously affect weapons penetration—all without an increase in the quantity of weapons.

Treaty limitations should be designed to control the first-strike threat, but they should not inhibit the countermeasures which must be taken against gradual improvements in the other side's forces or against illicit improvements contrary to the agreement. The problem is complicated by the fine line between first-strike and second-strike capabilities. MIRVs provide both, while multiple warheads that are not individually guided add chiefly to second-strike capacity. Extensive ABM weapons for defense of populations contribute to the first, while ABM weapons to defend silos contribute only to the second; increased missile payloads provide both, while the increased hardening of silos is useful chiefly to protect a second-strike capability. Provisions for point defense of missiles and increased hardening of silos would not contribute to first-strike capabilities, but would allow us to preserve deterrence in the face of qualitative improvements in MIRV and ABM systems.

A properly designed agreement to limit strategic forces can better insure the security of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Our task in negotiating such an agreement should be eased by the growing realization on both sides that a first-strike capability will not be permitted to develop regardless of the effort and treasure expended for that purpose.

The peaceful needs of society are too great to waste the world's wealth on a useless competition in strategic weapons. But the outlook for ending this competition depends on the choices, attitudes and actions of both the Soviet Union and ourselves—not on us alone.

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STRATEGIC WEAPONS

THE CASE FOR MISSILE DEFENSE

By D. G. Brennan

THE subject of defense against ballistic missiles probably occupies a unique position among strategic issues of the nuclear era. It has been more intensely debated in the United States than any other weapon system selected for deployment, such as the air-defense system or Polaris or Minuteman, or than any arms-control measure adopted to date, including the ban on nuclear tests. In fact, the decision to deploy such defenses may well be more important than any other single decision so far made concerning our strategic nuclear forces. Most of the published articles relating to defense against ballistic missiles (BMD for short; sometimes, but not here, denoted ABM) have opposed deployment of missile defense by the United States.[1] This is odd, in view of the fact that, at least through 1968, the Administration and Congress both clearly supported American deployment of BMD, and that most senior American academic strategists and many prominent advocates of arms control favor deployment at least under some conditions. The doubts increasingly expressed in the Congress in early 1969 may well result from the highly one-sided literature on the subject.

The present article is an attempt to clarify some of the reasons why many analysts think it entirely reasonable to favor American deployment. It will concentrate on considerations relating to an American BMD system intended to have substantial effectiveness against major Soviet attacks, rather than on a so-called "light" or "thin" system intended to be effective only against Chinese or other marginal attacks. The system now being deployed—the Sentinel—has been identified as an anti-Chinese system, but much of the support (both inside and outside the Government) for the Sentinel decision came from those who believed that the system would eventually have significant capability against large Soviet attacks. It seems very likely (and de-

[1] Including three recent articles in *Foreign Affairs:* J. I. Coffey, "The Anti-Ballistic Missile Debate," April 1967; Robert L. Rothstein, "The ABM, Proliferation and International Stability," April 1968; and Carl Kaysen, "Keeping the Strategic Balance," July 1968. An important exception is Charles M. Herzfeld, "Ballistic Missile Defense and National Security," *Annals of the N.Y. Academy of Sciences,* November 22, 1965, p. 119–125.

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sirable) that whatever system finally emerges will eventually have such a capability, and therefore it seems appropriate to concentrate here on the actual policy issues this prospect presents.

II

In an important sense, the key issues in the debate about BMD are not technical. Within the community of people who have carried out the BMD development, certain estimates have been made as to the plausible range of technical and economic effectiveness of systems that can be achieved in the near future. These estimates are subject to some controversy, yet even if the uncertainty and controversy concerning these estimates were wholly removed, most of the articulate critics of BMD would remain critical: their objections are rooted in other concerns. Nevertheless, technical issues are vital to the debate, since most of the support for BMD deployment depends on the fact that a defense of substantial effectiveness is judged to be feasible.

The most common way of characterizing the effect of a BMD system is to estimate the number of lives it might save in various specified circumstances. In a table of such estimates given in McNamara's 1968 posture statement,[2] it was indicated that there could be 120 million American fatalities in certain possible wars of the mid-1970s if no significant BMD were deployed. Assuming opposing forces and attacks of the same strength, it was indicated that BMD systems costing from $10 to $20 billion could reduce American fatalities to between 10 and 40 million, depending on the level of the defense and the details of the war. Damage to production and transportation resources would, of course, be similarly reduced, a result that could not be achieved with economically feasible civil-defense shelter programs. Thus, such a defense might change the postwar situation from one in which over half the U.S. population was gone, and recovery in any time period would be problematical, to one in which perhaps 90 percent survived and economic recovery might be achieved within five to ten years. This difference would be enormous.

It is this possible difference that constitutes the major reason for deploying heavy defenses. In effect, procuring such defenses is like buying "insurance" that would limit the consequences of

[2] The main published sources of information for use in considering the prevailing technical estimates are the unclassified "posture statements" issued annually in recent years by the Secretary of Defense, especially those issued by McNamara in 1967 and 1968, although some supplementary information has been contained in Government hearings and speeches.

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a war; the outcome would still be a disaster, but probably one of a very different order than would result from having the same offensive forces expended in a war with no missile defense.

It is possible that a BMD system might perform in an actual war much less well than expected, because of some unforeseen technical failure; it is, however, about equally likely that the opposing offensive forces will perform much less well than expected, which is to say that the defenses may perform much better than expected. (Critics of BMD are prone to emphasize the first of these points much more than the second.)

Of course, the U.S. defense might have to face a larger offensive force than the Soviets would have created if the U.S. defense did not exist. In other words, the Soviets could increase their offensive force so as to nullify, partly or wholly, the U.S. defense. Whether or not they seem likely to try to do so, it is important to consider how difficult it would be to achieve. This is one of the important technical characteristics of offense-defense interactions.

A useful way of characterizing the degree of difficulty is with a parameter called the "cost exchange ratio," defined as follows. The United States might deploy a particular defense system at a particular cost. It would generally be feasible for the Soviets to add an increment to their strategic offensive forces that would offset or nullify the opposing defense, and this increment of offense would also have a particular cost. The relation between the cost of the offsetting increment of offense and the cost of the defense is called the "cost exchange ratio." Thus, relatively ineffective defenses would have a relatively low cost exchange ratio, while a defense system that was relatively difficult to penetrate would have a relatively high ratio.

Several years ago, it was widely believed that missile defenses were easy to penetrate—so easy that offensive increments costing only one or a few percent of the cost of the opposing defense would serve to nullify it. In recent years, however, it has become apparent that cheap forms of decoys and other penetration aids cannot be relied upon to nullify modern defense techniques. A good defense can be overcome, but it is difficult. This is reflected in the fact that cost exchange ratios for a good defense are now believed to be in the region of one to one—perhaps one-third or two, but not one-tenth or ten. Thus, it is about as expensive to nullify a good defense as to build it.

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Some specific examples were provided in the 1967 posture statement. Two postulated defense systems were considered, one costing $10 billion and the other $20 billion. Under the conditions of a hypothetical war in which U.S. fatalities were estimated to be 100 million without any missile defenses, these BMD systems reduced the fatalities to 30 million and 20 million, respectively, if the Soviets did not change their offensive forces in reaction to the defenses. If the Soviets added an increment to their offensive forces costing one-quarter as much as the American BMD, they could raise American fatalities to 40 million; if they spent one-half of the cost of the defenses, they could raise the level to 60 million; and if they spent as much as the full cost of the defense, the fatalities would rise to 90 million. To raise the level of fatalities back up to the undefended level (100 million) —the usual criterion of offsetting a defense—would require an increment in the Soviet expenditure that would exceed the cost of the defense. These calculations assumed that the Soviets had advanced technology for their offensive forces and made effective use of it. Since these estimates were published by Secretary McNamara, who was a strong critic of missile defenses, it can be assumed that they are not biased in favor of missile defenses.

Although McNamara published information showing that exchange ratios were about unity as far back as January 1967, and although information to this effect was known in the Government for perhaps two or three years before that, many critics of missile defenses continue to assert that it is cheaper to offset defenses than to build them. For example, Carl Kaysen, in his recent article in this journal, said: "Were we to deploy much stronger and more costly defenses [than the initial Sentinel program] it would remain within the Soviet capability to counter them by corresponding increases in the size of their offensive deployments—*which could probably be made at significantly less cost than that of our increased defenses*" (emphasis added). If "counter" means "wholly or largely offset," as is usual and as Kaysen's context suggests, there is no objective basis for the italicized statement, and there has not been for some few years.[8]

Many critics of BMD have questioned the estimate of the cost. McNamara, in speaking about the $20 billion program, several

[8] Other examples of mistaken reference to exchange ratios are found in the much-cited article in *Scientific American*, March 1968, by Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe, and in the *Look* article by Jerome B. Wiesner, November 28, 1967.

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times referred to the fact that many weapon systems proved to cost twice as much as originally estimated, as indeed they have, and suggested that this program would more likely cost $40 billion when completed. Some journalists and others have in turn doubled McNamara's estimate once again, and one can find articles and newspaper editorials referring to BMD systems alleged to cost $80 to $100 billion. It is difficult to escape the feeling that these latter estimates are made purely for their political effect and have no significant basis in reality. At the time official estimates were worked out, missile defense systems had been much more extensively studied than many of the weapon systems whose early cost estimates proved much too low.

Obviously the relationship between cost and performance of systems as large and complex as those considered here cannot be specified in advance with anything like precision. This should not obscure the fact that the range receiving major consideration or advocacy is, say, $8 to $20 billion. For some perspective on this range of costs, it is instructive to consider that the United States has spent perhaps $50 billion on air defense since World War II.[4] We are currently still spending about $2 billion per year on air defense. And, while estimates of its effectiveness are not publicly available, it is a good bet that the current air-defense system is and has been less important as insurance for the country than the major proposed BMD systems would be.

Will our estimates of cost effectiveness stand up when we get to the mid-1970s? A question in this form does not admit an unequivocal answer; one cannot say with confidence whether inventions not yet made or developments not yet realized will favor the offense or the defense, although there are some reasons for thinking the trend will continue to favor the defense. But a parallel may be useful. We have fairly high confidence that the Polaris submarine force is a reasonably secure component of our strategic offensive forces. The main reason for this confidence resides in the fact that we have conducted a major research and development program—on the order of $500 million per year—in anti-submarine warfare for many years, and no cheap and reliable way of attacking such submarines has been found. A similar statement is beginning to be true in relation to BMD:

[4] Herbert Roback, Staff Administrator of the Military Operations Subcommittee, U.S. House of Representatives, in E. P. Wigner, Editor, "Who Speaks for Civil Defense?" New York: Scribner, 1968, p. 95.

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for several years, we have conducted a major research and development program—on the order of $350 million per year—in means of penetrating missile defenses, and no cheap and reliable method has been found. This does not guarantee that one cannot be found, and it does not say that expensive ways of penetrating are not known—as are expensive ways of attacking Polaris submarines. But it does suggest that the technical prospects for missile offense-defense interactions are likely to prove acceptably stable, and in particular should be a great deal better than the early estimates of air defense proved.

It is worth noting that a BMD system may possibly have important effects even if it later failed to perform as expected in a war. If the Soviets were to react to a U.S. defense by fitting their existing missile force with decoys and other penetration aids, without a major increase in the number of rockets, they would reduce the total payload available for warheads, and thereby reduce the potential damage the U.S. might incur in a war even if the defense failed utterly. This effect, which is known in the trade as "virtual attrition" and is often encountered in defensive systems of other kinds, is likely to be quite modest. A more important possibility is that a U.S. defense would induce the Soviets to re-target their offensive force; they might concentrate most or all of their offensive missiles (apart from those used for missile bases or other military targets) on the largest cities to be sure of destroying them, and leave unattacked many medium and small cities. Or they might attack only undefended areas, and leave aside most or all the largest (defended) cities. In either case, the mere presence of the defense could result in saving many millions of lives whether it "worked" or not.

There are three other positive reasons for favoring BMD deployment. First, the time may soon arrive, if it is not already here, when there will be some possibility of attacks of anonymous or disguised origin. Since these would not be subject to standard threats of deterrence, active defenses may be the primary protection against them. Second, the possibility of a purely accidental launch of some part of the Soviet force is probably very remote, but the possibility of an unauthorized launch, especially during an intense crisis, may not be so remote and should be protected against. Even a modest defense might be very effective against such an attack; this has been one of the arguments used—rightly, I believe—in support of the current Sentinel program.

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Third, missile defenses (even light defenses) would considerably complicate the planning of an attacker who hoped to penetrate them; this phenomenon seems likely to serve as an additional "firebreak" to the initiation of a strategic nuclear war.

III

One of the main areas of concern to critics of missile defense has to do with its impact on fundamentals of deterrence. The problem has often been related to what McNamara termed "Assured Destruction," defined by him in his 1968 posture statement as "an ability to inflict at all times and under all foreseeable conditions an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors—even after absorbing a surprise attack." McNamara recognized that what constituted "an unacceptable degree of damage" was not subject to precise specification, and in spelling out this requirement, he said: "In the case of the Soviet Union, I would judge that a capability on our part to destroy, say, one-fifth to one-fourth of her population [*i.e.* about 50 million Russians] and one-half of her industrial capacity would serve as an effective deterrent."

Because McNamara came to regard the ability to destroy 50 million Russians as the keystone of Western security, he viewed Soviet deployment of BMD as a potential threat to that security, and intended to nullify any Soviet defenses with added U.S. offensive forces. He also appeared to believe, and frequently asserted, that the Soviets had a similar requirement for an Assured Destruction capacity, and that any U.S. interference with this requirement would in all likelihood only cause the Soviets to increase their offensive forces. It appears that this perception was at the core of McNamara's opposition to BMD deployment, as it was for many other opponents of missile defenses. The U.S. strategic posture that has evolved from this perception in recent years has been aptly dubbed "Assured Vulnerability" by Steuart Pittman.[5]

Although there were many criticisms made of the "massive retaliation" policy when it was adopted in the early 1950s, there were few if any criticisms to the effect that the U.S. threat was inadequately deterring. Yet it is doubtful if the Soviet fatalities that our force could then have produced would have exceeded a

[5] Steuart Pittman, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense, "Government and Civil Defense," in Wigner, *op. cit.*

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few million. And this was the Soviet Union of Stalin, believed to have a six-million-man army, a Soviet Union which had only recently subjugated Eastern Europe, and which was believed to have instigated or at least approved the Korean War. Not even the recent Czech invasion makes the Soviet Union of today seem nearly as threatening.

Of course, when major direct Soviet attacks on the United States became possible, the structure of the situation changed considerably. It might then have become possible for the Soviets to have eliminated the United States as a fighting society, and thereby to secure Europe and eliminate their principal opponent at one blow. Thus, many strategists judged that there were two reinforcing reasons why it was appropriate to react to this possibility with a large strategic threat to deter it. This was the fundamental driving force behind the evolution in the late 1950s and early 1960s of a U.S. strategic threat measured in thousands of megatons—a deterrent threat for which Assured Destruction was indeed the correct phrase.

It is clear from the origin of this perfectly reasonable logic that, to the extent the maximum possible Soviet motivation for such an attack might have been reduced, or to the extent the U.S. motivation to deter it might have been reduced, the scale of the retaliatory threat might have been reduced in some corresponding degree. It is this linkage that appears to have been wholly overlooked. Instead, we preferred to fix once and for all some intended level of Assured Destruction believed capable of deterring the Soviets from any actions whatever. There are a number of problems resulting from such a posture, of which the most immediate for our purposes is that it tends to make it difficult for us to limit damage to *ourselves—i.e.* it tends to force *us* into a posture of Assured Vulnerability.

In particular, a determination to maintain a strong capability for Assured Destruction led McNamara in 1967–68 to respond to incipient Soviet missile defenses by scheduling an increase in our offensive forces, and the theory that the Soviets would do likewise led him to oppose American deployment of an anti-Soviet BMD system. In view of the effectiveness of modern defense, we might better use the U.S. resources committed to increasing our offensive forces to increase our defenses instead. By thus reducing the Soviet threat, rather than increasing our own, we could reduce both the extent to which the Soviets might gain

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by attacking us, and the extent to which we are intensely motivated to deter the attack.

Consider a situation in which Soviet and American offensive forces are fixed at similar unchanging levels on each side, and in which both the United States and the Soviet Union are building comparable levels of defenses. If the American and Soviet defenses are both "light," then our BMD would not much diminish Soviet ability to destroy us, but then Soviet BMD would not much reduce the effectiveness of our assured-destruction forces either; if both American and Soviet defenses are "heavy," then our assured-destruction forces would be significantly degraded, but so too would the capability of the Soviets to eliminate the United States as a fighting society.

This points to the following formulation of a reasonable requirement for a conservative American strategic posture: Following any plausibly feasible strategic attack by the Soviet Union, the United States should have the capacity to inflict as much or more total damage (of similar kind) on the Soviet Union as the Soviets had inflicted and could still inflict on the United States. (This principle implies that the strategic offensive forces must be quite well protected, which appears to be feasible.) In short, we should have a reliable capability to do at least as badly unto the Soviets as they had done or could do unto us. The Soviets could not achieve a significant military advantage by a strategic attack, and an irrational, coercive or punitive attack—whether large or small—would risk bringing as much or more destruction on the Soviets as they could or did bring on us. This would make the initiation of nuclear blackmail unattractive to any reasonable decision-maker at any effective level of strategic forces.

Let us note explicitly that this posture does not imply that a U.S. capability to destroy 50 or 74 or 100 million Russians is a fundamental requirement of nature, without regard to the circumstances. It indicates that both the United States and the Soviet Union might reasonably engage in some measures to limit the possible damage of a war without necessarily impairing American security in the process. Such measures might include, for instance, direct reduction of strategic offensive forces by agreement—or deployment of defenses with or without explicit agreement. It is interesting that the United States has, in fact, proposed direct reductions in strategic offensive forces. Now, if

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certain necessary requirements are met, as they can be, a symmetric increase in active defenses deployed by each of the superpowers would have approximately the same kind of potential impact on possible war outcomes that percentage cuts in offensive forces would have.

One may ask: If BMD deployed by both superpowers would have roughly the same effect on possible war outcomes as direct reductions in offensive forces would have, why not simply reduce the latter, and save the money and trouble of BMD? The answer is that in some circumstances one might, but the circumstances are not those now prevailing. To reduce U.S. and Soviet offensive forces to a level where the possible casualties on each side (without defenses) would not exceed, say, 20 million, is likely to be acceptable to the United States only with a degree of inspection that is most unlikely to be acceptable to the Soviets. In other words, offensive-force cuts on such a scale do not now seem politically feasible, whereas BMD deployment is entirely feasible and, rather than increasing U.S. needs for inspection of Soviet offensive forces, might actually reduce our dependence on such information. This effect, indeed, would facilitate later direct reductions in offensive forces.

From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, the strategic postures of the superpowers were dominated by the logic that, since we could not defend, we had to deter. This position, for which there was originally ample justification, now seems to be interpreted in some minds—chiefly certain American ones—to mean that, since we must deter, we cannot defend. This should count as the non sequitur of the decade.

IV

The final major concern of critics of missile defense is that it will lead to an arms race or complicate arms-control problems. The kind of arms race usually envisaged is an offense-defense race in which, say, the United States procures some missile defenses and the Soviet Union then feels obliged to respond by increasing its offensive forces sufficiently to nullify the defense. This increase in Soviet offensive capability might in turn motivate the United States to increase its defense capability still further, and so on. For example, McNamara said in his 1967 posture statement: *"It is the virtual certainty that the Soviets will act to maintain their deterrent which casts such grave doubts on the*

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advisability of our deploying the NIKE-X system for the protection of our cities against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack they could launch in the 1970s. In all probability, all we would accomplish would be to increase greatly both their defense expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to either side." (The whole of this passage is underscored in the original.) If arms races of this kind occur, it will not be in response to some fundamental law of nature, but will result from interactions between achievable technology and prevailing attitudes and budgets. Each of these factors is of importance.

It is useful to discuss this problem in terms of the concept of cost exchange ratios. If cost exchange ratios were as low as 1:100, there would be little doubt that, within the present political environment, a defense system deployed by one superpower would be nullified by the other. For example, if the Soviets built, say, a $20 billion system, and if it could be neutralized at a cost of only $200 million, there would scarcely be any debate about the matter within the U.S. bureaucracy, the Congress or the public; the Defense Department would simply go ahead and neutralize the Soviet defense. On the other hand, if cost exchange ratios were in the neighborhood of 100:1, there would again be little debate: defense would reign supreme, and deterrence would rest on very different threats and counter-threats than those that loom as dominant today. In this case, to nullify a $20 billion Soviet defense would cost the United States $2,000 billion. The expenditure of such a sum is not, of course, a realistic possibility, and the United States would instead be building its own defense—about which there would be little controversy, and which the Soviets could not offset either. In both cases, technology would dominate prevailing attitudes.

In the actual world, with cost exchange ratios near unity, the attitudes prevailing are not driven by the technology toward either deterrence or defense, but may (and do) go in either direction. It is much more a matter of preference and conscious decision whether we and the Soviets wish to spend our strategic-force budgets chiefly to increase the level of "hostages" on the other side or to decrease our own. Thus, whether we are to have an offense-defense arms race depends in the first instance on whether or not Soviet and American attitudes are lined up the same way. If both governments are willing to accept a high level of hostages on each side, with modest or no defenses, there will

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be no great pressures for an offense-defense race; the same will be true if both are willing to live with substantial defenses and relatively low levels of hostages, with little or no attempt on either side to offset the defense of the other. But if one side attempts by defensive measures to reduce its own hostages below the level demanded by the other, or attempts to increase the hostages of the other above a level the other considers acceptable in the circumstances, and especially if both happen together in any combination, the resulting pressures for an arms race may well be limited almost entirely by budgetary forces.

The fact that these issues are importantly influenced by attitudes is not always clearly recognized. There is, however, something of a "fashion" in some circles against interfering with the so-called requirements for Assured Destruction on either side, especially when (almost only when) the interference comes from missile defense. But, as I have argued earlier, maintaining very high levels of possible damage to the Soviets does not seem to be a requirement of U.S. security in circumstances where we can correspondingly limit damage to ourselves, and appreciation of this seems likely to prove dominant in formulating U.S. policy in the future.

Soviet attitudes seem much less mixed than ours; they are much more friendly to the deployment of defenses. In particular, contrary to many statements by American critics, it appears that the Soviets are not significantly antagonized by the prospect of American missile defense. The Soviets have never been bashful about making political and diplomatic statements designed to deter American military programs they did not like; for example, they have recently made public statements opposing the operation of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean and the operation of nuclear-armed bomber forces on air-alert. It would be remarkable in the extreme if the Soviets had the attitudes attributed to them by McNamara and others and yet did absolutely nothing to discourage U.S. defenses. The fact is, however, that there seems to be no reliable report of a single instance of a Soviet attempt to deter our BMD by statements indicating they would increase their offensive forces in response.

On the contrary, there have been many statements by individual Russians at both official and unofficial levels, both impromptu and carefully considered, pointing in a quite different direction. In a press conference in London on February 9, 1967,

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Premier Kosygin was asked: "Do you believe it is possible to agree on the moratorium on the [deployment] of an anti-missile defense system [a then-current American proposal] and if possible on what condition?" He replied in part:

> I believe that defensive systems, which prevent attack, are not the cause of the arms race, but constitute a factor preventing the death of people. Some argue like this: What is cheaper, to have offensive weapons which can destroy towns and whole states or to have defensive weapons which can prevent this destruction? At present the theory is current somewhere that the system which is cheaper should be developed. Such so-called theoreticians argue as to the cost of killing a man—$500,000 or $100,000. Maybe an anti-missile system is more expensive than an offensive system, but it is designed not to kill people but to preserve human lives. I understand that I do not reply to the question I was asked, but you can draw yourselves the appropriate conclusions.

Indeed, one can.

A detailed rebuttal to the standard arguments against BMD was given by the late Soviet military publicist Major-General N. I. Talensky in the quasi-official Soviet journal *International Affairs* in October 1964. Many other contacts with Russians at official and unofficial levels, including several meetings I personally have had the chance to observe, illustrate that the attitude exemplified by the Kosygin quotation is very widely held in the Soviet Union, while the attitude held by American critics of BMD with regard to the alleged importance of maintaining high hostage levels seems not to be held at all. The only criticisms of BMD that have been expressed by any Russians, so far as I am aware, have come from a few scientists who have been skeptical of the effectiveness of defenses and therefore regarded them as wasteful of resources. It is probably significant that these scientists seem not closely associated with current Soviet weapon programs; I believe it likely that they are following the lead of some of their Western friends and counterparts, but even these Russian critics seem not to share in the theoretical opposition to BMD.

One additional bit of evidence is worth mentioning. After the announced decision in September 1967 to deploy the Sentinel BMD system, the United States came under attack from some of our allies and neutral friends, especially from several countries participating in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee then meeting in Geneva, which complained that the American deployment decision would be bad for the incipient

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nonproliferation treaty and would only heighten the arms race. There was one country that came to our assistance, holding that the decision would not harm the prospects for the nonproliferation treaty: that country was the Soviet Union. So far as I am aware, this is the only case on record in which the Soviet Union has defended us diplomatically against our friends and allies. This is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that the Soviets did not, then or since, believe that the Sentinel system was intended only for Chinese attacks.

Some American critics of BMD have described these Soviet attitudes as "unsophisticated," and have argued that the Soviets will "get over it," and come to respond to an American defense as McNamara predicted even if they are not yet committed to it. It is true that strenuous efforts to "educate" the Soviets have been made by McNamara and others, and one cannot say with certainty that these efforts will fail; it would not be the first time that the Soviets lost their senses over some issue just as we were coming to ours.[6] But their present views should not be denigrated; it seems to me, and to many other Western strategists, that the defense-oriented philosophy exhibited by the Soviets makes good sense. In fundamental matters of deterrence and defense, I should say that we in the United States might better acquire some "education" from the Soviets.

In view of the fact that Soviet attitudes already seem to favor defenses, and that American attitudes, while currently mixed, *ought* to favor defenses, the obvious way of trying to improve prevailing strategic postures through arms-control arrangements is to limit offensive forces primarily, and to limit defenses only secondarily, if at all. This is exactly the reverse of the order of priorities frequently suggested in the United States in the past few years. It is, however, more in keeping with the traditional aims of arms control. The primary objectives of arms control have often been stated to be reduction of the likelihood of war or mitigation of its consequences if it occurs. It seems to me highly probable that deployment of missile defenses will contribute to both of these objectives, while abstaining from defenses will likely contribute to neither. If the deployments are managed with at least modest intelligence on both sides, there need not be an arms race nor appreciably higher expenditures.

[6] Since it will be clear that I am critical of McNamara's handling of BMD, I should mention that I still believe he was the greatest Secretary of Defense the United States has had.

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A major objection to a posture with a heavy component of defense is that the Soviets might find some way of attacking our offensive forces with sufficient effectiveness so that their defenses could intercept most or all of our remaining offensive forces. By striking first, they might escape relatively unscathed —which, if true, could motivate the initiation of a first strike in an intense crisis. Obviously no one could give an absolute guarantee that such a weakness could not occur. Major studies of BMD performance do not show a dramatic dependence on who strikes first, so this concern has no current substantial basis; it is rather an apprehension about some future possible vulnerability that might occur. It would require a vulnerability in our offensive forces of the kind that people have been trying to prevent for years. If the United States, through BMD, provides added protection to its offensive forces, there would seem to be no reason whatever for believing that heavy defenses on both sides would leave us more vulnerable to this type of problem than we are at present.

In fact, such vulnerabilities might be reduced. There are risks in any strategy and our offensive forces of the present and of the recent past may well have had important vulnerabilities, including undetected ones. For example, Senator Henry Jackson, in a Senate speech of last September, discussed electromagnetic-pulse phenomena from nuclear bursts in terms that suggest these phenomena are a continuing source of concern for the security of our offensive forces. A potential vulnerability of a different type might have threatened our land-based missiles if the Soviets had developed multiple, independently targeted reëntry vehicles (MIRV) before we had understood the concept ourselves. In view of these and other vulnerabilities of major or potentially major concern, it is not at all obvious, to say the least, that a posture of pure deterrence, based wholly on offensive forces, would be more secure against unpleasant surprises (such as a suddenly discovered, extreme vulnerability to a first strike) than postures with heavy emphasis on defense. Even if there were some added risk associated with the defensive posture, this would have to be weighed against the possibility that the defense might save 50 or 80 million Americans in the event of a major war, and make possible much more rapid economic recovery.

There is also a line of argument which is sometimes summarized by saying that, in matters of defense, one cannot be "a

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little bit pregnant"—that is, that public and other pressures for "more" will lead to a defensive arms race. Our experience in both air defense and civil defense is so much against this idea that it should be dismissed without further discussion. Similarly, it is sometimes said that the American public would not tolerate any inequalities in local defense effectiveness. We have had a major air-defense system with substantial inequalities for perhaps 15 years, and scarcely anyone other than experts associated with the system is even sure whether his own home city *has* a local defense, much less how it compares to those of other cities. The degree of awareness of these matters that has prevailed in the past in the general public is reflected in a public-opinion poll conducted in 1964 which found that two-thirds of the U.S. public believed we had a BMD system all deployed and ready for action.

Space has not permitted here a discussion of several other problem areas sometimes associated with missile defense, such as the implications of an American BMD for the Western Alliance, or the frequently repeated assertion (which I believe is false) that BMD would require as a prerequisite a major expansion of civil-defense programs. Several scholars have, however, studied these problems, and I believe it is fair to say that, on examination, they seem even less likely to prove troublesome than the problems already considered.

It appears to many that achievable defenses could reduce potential American fatalities by many tens of millions, and greatly improve the prospects for postwar economic recovery—and do this without substantially increasing traditional strategic budgets, and without provoking a major new arms race. If the American public and their leaders come to this view, they are most unlikely to judge that pursuit of Assured Vulnerability is a proper objective of the Department of Defense.

The defense rests.

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CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

By John K. Fairbank

THE American breakthrough in studies of Communist China during the last decade, despite all the difficulties of study from a distance, has given us a new capacity to appraise Peking's shifts of current policy. At the same time, our very success in understanding short-term developments tends to foreshorten our perspective, as though Chairman Mao's new China were actually as new as he so fervently exhorts it to be. If we ask the long-term question—What is China's tradition in foreign policy?—our query may provoke two counter-questions: Did the Chinese empire ever have a conscious foreign policy? Even if it did, hasn't Mao's revolution wiped out any surviving tradition?

To answer these questions is easy in theory, difficult in practice. Theoretically, since China has had two millennia of foreign relations (the longest record of any organized state), her behavior must have shown uniformities—attitudes, customs and, in effect, policies. In fact, however, the Chinese empire had no foreign office, and the dynastic record of "foreign policy" is fragmented under topics like border control, frontier trade, punitive expeditions, tribute embassies, imperial benevolence to foreign rulers and the like, so that it has seldom been pulled together and studied as an intelligible whole.

Again, one may theorize that Maoism is only the latest effort to meet China's problems of national order and people's livelihood on Chinese soil: the scene, the wherewithal, even the issues are largely inherited, and the violent shrillness of Mao's attack on Chinese tradition indicates to us how difficult he has found it to break free of that tradition. But for this very reason we cannot in practice look to Maoism for a realistic definition of China's foreign policy interests and aims over the centuries. Most of the record is simply condemned and brushed aside, except as parts of it may fit into current polemics. If Peking's foreign relations have left a still potent tradition, we have to discover it ourselves.

To deal with a major power without regard for its history, and

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especially its tradition in foreign policy, is truly to be flying blind. The fact that in the case of China we have flown blind and still survived does not guarantee our future. Even with us, tradition provides the base-line for foreign policy and even the most novel of our policies has points of reference in the past. Washington's farewell address, the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door may lie well back in our tradition, but they are part of the historical matrix of our thinking. Stereotypes like the freedom of the seas and most-favored-nation treatment form part of our foreign policy repertoire. Has China inherited no comparable repertoire? No stock of shibboleths that spring to mind? No classic models of success and failure in foreign affairs? No foreign policy truisms bequeathed to posterity?

The danger in flying blind, ignorant of an antagonist's inherited style and propensities in making war and peace, lies in our resulting lack of objectivity. Not sensing the values and modes of *his* culture, we impute to him those of *our* culture. To North Viet Nam, for example, we offer a rational choice, the carrot of billion-dollar economic development or the stick of limited-war bombing, and then we are frustrated to find Hanoi thinking in terms of either-or, we-or-they absolutes rather than hurting-or-not-hurting calculations of material interest. We bomb to parley. They resolve to outlast us. We state our case in time-tested (though culture-bound) terms of self-determination, collective security, *pacta sunt servanda,* and other solid concepts from our own tradition. Hanoi denies them all. Eventually we realize we are fighting on a cultural frontier, the frontier in fact of the Chinese culture area.

No one, I hope, will suggest that tradition governs Peking's foreign policy today (however much it may seem at times to govern ours). It is stale and unprofitable to argue for continuity against discontinuity, and equally so to argue the reverse. Continuity and discontinuity are with us every day, in our personal lives as much as in great events. They coexist as constant aspects of change, the new and the old intertwined, however we may define and perceive them. History alone, therefore, cannot give us an image of current reality; yet to imagine Peking acting completely free of history would be the height of unrealism. Tradition is one ingredient in China's foreign policy today, but it seems to be the missing ingredient in our effort to understand that policy. Our difficulty is the very practical one that we are

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ignorant of the Chinese tradition, and no one article, book, specialist or school of thought can adequately up-date us; yet the effort must be made.

Great traditions have to be seen first in their context of world history. China has been the great hold-over, the one ancient empire that, largely because of its isolation in the Far East, survived into the twentieth century. Its anachronistic tardiness in modernizing has now intensified the stress of China's revolution —there is so much to change and do in order to catch up. At the same time the great tradition is hardly out of sight around the corner, back no farther than grandfather's day. No wonder Mao's generation, who were born under the last Son of Heaven, have violently denounced it. We do not know how far Chinese communism, like other great revolutions, will see a post-revolutionary swing back to certain earlier norms. Granted that many changes are irreversible, still many old wines may prove palatable in the new bottles. A new Chinese order that from 1860 to 1960 has learned much and rejected much from Britain, Japan, the United States and Russia in succession is likely to create its new synthesis and national style by salvaging what it can (perhaps too much) from its own rich tradition. As Peking's communism shakes down into its distinctively Sinified version, foreign offices dealing with it will need to know more of the history of China's foreign relations.

Let us analyze three major traditions: the strategic primacy of Inner Asia, the disesteem of sea power, the doctrine of China's superiority, and then ask what remains of these traditions today.[1]

I. THE STRATEGIC PRIMACY OF INNER ASIA

The fulcrum of ancient China's foreign relations, even before the first unification of 221 BC was the irreparable difference between the Chinese who tilled their fields within the Great Wall rainfall boundary and the tribal nomads of Inner Asia who pastured their flocks and herds beyond it. Climate and terrain sustained these two ways of life as irreducibly separate but interacting entities for over two thousand years down to the nineteenth

[1] This article is indebted to the recent volume edited by me, "The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations" (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), especially to the articles therein by Professors Wang Gungwu of the Australian National University at Canberra, Suzuki Chusei of Aichi University at Toyohashi, and Joseph Fletcher and Benjamin Schwartz, both of Harvard. For data on the Sung and Ming navies I am indebted to Professor J. P. Lo of the University of California at Davis.

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century. China of course developed nearly all the population, wealth and higher civilization in the area, but meanwhile Inner Asia never ceased to play a vital military-strategic role on her continental frontier. China's maritime frontier occasionally produced rebels and sea-raiders but no major invasion ever came by sea. In contrast, Inner Asia produced mounted archers raised in the saddle, under tribal leaders who periodically united for invasion. The nomad cavalry invasions of North China grew more powerful and irresistible century by century. Early invaders were absorbed into border states. Later they set up Sino-barbarian dynasties—first along the Great Wall (the Liao dynasty of the Khitan Mongols 907–1125), then in North China (the Chin dynasty of the Jurchen 1125–1222) and finally over the whole country (the Yuan dynasty of the Mongols 1279–1368, and the Ch'ing dynasty of the Manchus 1644–1911). Sparsely populated Inner Asia—the arc running from Tibet and Sinkiang around to Mongolia and Manchuria—thus became a strategic component of an East Asian empire that centered on China but in the last thousand years has been ruled half the time by non-Chinese emperors.

The first aim of China's traditional foreign policy has therefore been defense against Inner Asia or, preferably, control over it. Chinese rulers of the Ming (1368–1644), after they expelled the Mongols, remained obsessed with the Mongol problem. But Inner Asian invaders, once in power, faced it too. Thus the Manchus were first vitally concerned with the Eastern Mongols and eventually with the Western Mongols. The great strategic feat of their Ch'ing dynasty was to conquer and finally incorporate the whole of Inner Asia within the East Asian empire: the Manchus kept Manchuria as a homeland preserve; they took over Eastern Mongolia through early alliances, and gradually dominated Tibet through expeditions of 1720, 1728 and 1750. This was a strategic move so that Peking could control the Buddhist Church under the Dalai Lama at Lhasa, through which in turn Mongol life could be stabilized. The capstone of imperial control was laid through the final destruction of the rebellious Western Mongols in Ili in the 1750s, and the establishment of Ch'ing rule over the Turkestan oases to the south.

Thus Inner Asia took strategic precedence over the nascent maritime threat from Portuguese, Dutch or British warships at Canton, Macao, Amoy, Ningpo or elsewhere on the China coast.

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Even after the Opium War and the Anglo-French war of 1858–60, Ch'ing strategic thinking saw the Inner Asian frontier as more vital than the maritime frontier. When Li Hung-chang in 1875 wanted to build naval strength against Japan's influence in Korea, Tso Tsung-t'ang wanted instead to finance his expedition to defeat rebels and keep Russia out of Ili, three thousand miles to the west. The Court decided in favor of Tso and Ili, as against Li Hung-chang and the Japanese menace.

The People's Republic during its twenty years in power has consciously expanded the Han-Chinese nation to fill out (except in Outer Mongolia) the old area of the Ch'ing East Asian empire. Chinese farming colonies have changed the population balance in Sinkiang and Tibet. Like military colonies of old and criminals banished to the frontier, contingents of young people and refractory intellectuals have been shipped out to populate and develop Inner Asia. Chiang Kai-shek agrees with Mao Tse-tung that Outer Mongolia should be part of this Chinese national realm inherited from the Ch'ing empire. Plainly, Communist China's early turning inward away from the sea, trying to reduce the prominence of the greatest ex-treaty port, Shanghai, and cut down China's dependence on maritime trade with the West, was no new thought but followed an ancient pattern. So does her present-day concern for her land frontier—the world's longest—with the U.S.S.R. and Outer Mongolia.

II. THE DISESTEEM OF SEA POWER

By the time China's original river valley civilization had expanded southward to the seacoast, the Yangtze delta and Canton, the empire's institutional mold had long since set. Rulers and their scholar-bureaucrats looked upon merchants as dangerous parasites, as fair game to squeeze for profit, the lowest of the four occupational classes. Confucian philosophers pointed out that scholar-officials, farmers and artisans labored with mind or muscle but merchants only moved things about. Maritime traders were even more shady characters, sailing about with no fixed abode, out of administrative control. Until the eighth century, although maritime trade of course developed, there was no sanction, much less a policy, for China's expansion overseas.

As the tribal invaders from Inner Asia set up their Sino-barbarian dynasties in North China, the Chinese dynasty of the Southern Sung (1127–1279) became more interested in foreign

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trade revenues. By this time China's silks, porcelains, lacquerware, teas and other superlative products were being eagerly sought in the first great oceanic commerce of world history, that between the Near East and the Far East through South and Southeast Asia. Arabs, Persians, Indians, Chinese, Koreans and eventually Japanese joined in this commercial revolution centuries before the Europeans broke into it. Sea trade gave the Southern Sung not only revenue but a merchant fleet capable of being used for naval power. There ensued, from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries, a competition within the Chinese state between the new sea power and the older land power, with fateful results.

Hard pressed from the north, the Southern Sung began to develop maritime policies. Against the Mongol conquest during the thirteenth century, they (the Southern Sung) relied heavily on their naval forces on the Yangtze. The Mongols did not achieve victory until they had bought over many Chinese merchant vessels and created a fleet of their own of several hundred sail. In the end, the Mongols' Yuan dynasty inherited much of the Sung fleets. They provided the wherewithal for the spectacular maritime assaults upon Japan in 1274 and 1281 and the even more distant attack upon Java in 1292. Thus in the late thirteenth century the overflow of the Mongol conquest sent Chinese fighting ships into Southeast Asia and even the Indian Ocean. Mongol envoys reached Ceylon and South India by sea. In the 1280s ten small states on the coasts of southern India, Sumatra and the Malay peninsula sent tribute to the Yuan court at Peking.

This accumulated maritime experience helps explain China's amazing naval feats, once the Mongols had been driven out. At its height in the early decades of the fifteenth century, the Ming navy had coastal guard fleets that cruised out to sea, naval bases with large garrisons on coastal islands, and a system of communication by means of dispatch boats and beacon fires. Each major province had a fleet of several hundred ships. War junks carried primitive explosives in the form of grenades and rockets, making use of China's invention, gunpowder. Big warships carried up to four hundred men. Ships were built with as many as four decks and a dozen watertight compartments and were sometimes four hundred feet in length. Captains of this period had well-proved capacities for seamanship and navigation. They used detailed sailing directions as well as the compass, another Chinese invention.

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Ming China's naval capability was most clearly demonstrated in the seven great voyages captained by the court eunuch, Cheng Ho, and others in the period 1405–1433. Carrying as many as 28,000 men in 62 vessels, these fleets all went to India. Two of them reached Aden, and three sent Chinese vessels all the way to Hormuz on the Persian Gulf. They also touched the coast of Africa. In 22 years the Yung-lo emperor sent out 48 missions, nearly all headed by court eunuchs as his personal agents. They arranged for fifty new places to become his tributaries. Tribute missions went back to China from Hormuz and the African coast four times and from Bengal eleven times.

Patently, Ming China was a naval power capable of dominating Southeast Asia a full century before the Portuguese arrived there. Compare China and Europe as of about 1430: the exploring ships of Prince Henry the Navigator had not yet even reached the bulge of West Africa at Cape Verde and neither Columbus, da Gama nor Albuquerque had yet been born. China was superior in size and wealth, in many lines of technology and in the art of bureaucratic government. Her demonstrated seapower in the Indian Ocean was a natural expression of all-around capacity at home. Yet after the 1430s her maritime expansion ceased. What went wrong?

The simplest explanation is that China's long development had already reached its height and maturity on a self-contained and stabilized basis, while Europe's great expansion was just getting started along the far more dynamic lines of national competition, religious zeal, government support of overseas trade, and adventurous individual enterprise, none of which was so prominent in the Chinese scene. Even more simply, China remained self-sufficient and land-based while Europe became acquisitive and seafaring.

Without pretending to put all this world history in a nutshell, let us note one fact that pulled Ming China back from maritime expansion—the continued menace of Mongol power in Inner Asia. In the very years when the Yung-lo emperor was sending out the first six fleets, he was obliged to lead five enormous military expeditions out into Mongolia. He took along cannon to reduce Mongol strongholds and great squadrons of cavalry. The expedition of 1422 used a host of 235,000 who needed a supply train of 117,000 carts. Even so, the enemy escaped westward and China's Mongol problem thereafter increased. By 1449, Ming

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vitality was on the ebb after less than a century of power; when Mongol invaders captured the emperor himself, Ming dominance of East Asia was permanently damaged. All capacity for maritime expansion had thenceforth to be sacrificed to self-defense at home. By the time the Portuguese arrived in 1513, the great Ming voyages had been all but forgotten, for scholar-officials, jealous of the eunuchs' power, had actually suppressed the record. The overriding demands of land power had eclipsed China's potential but superficial sea power.

After 1644 China's new Manchu rulers, intent on building their continental empire, ignored the sea. To suppress Ming remnants they even applied tactics once used by the Ming to discourage Japanese pirates: the Ch'ing shut down maritime trade, evacuated coastal islands and moved the coastal population ten miles inland behind a patrolled barrier. One could hardly be more anti-maritime.

To be sure, British gunboats after 1839 inspired an effort to buy and build a modern Chinese steam navy. Indeed, four navies were begun, based on Tientsin, Shanghai, Foochow and Canton. But the French destroyed the Foochow fleet in a few minutes in 1884. The Japanese destroyed the northern fleet in 1894–95. China's potential sea power was eclipsed again and has not reemerged. Peking's submarine fleet, reportedly being built today, seems hardly more than a defensive force.

III. THE DOCTRINE OF CHINA'S SUPERIORITY

Since ancient China began as a culture island, it quite naturally considered itself superior to the less cultured peoples roundabout, whom it gradually absorbed and assimilated. The striking fact is not that China's universal kingship originally claimed to be superior, but that this claim could have been so thoroughly institutionalized and preserved as the official myth of the state for more than two thousand years.

The central problem was how to make superiority credible at times of military inferiority—a trick that any foreign office would like to master. Of course, China's predominance in size, population, settled wealth and literate culture gave her a constant advantage both over the Inner Asian nomads who lacked urban culture and over the small satellite states of the Chinese culture area. Even so, a considerable rationale and supporting practices had to be developed.

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The emperors of the Han (202 BC–220 AD) subscribed in theory to the Confucian doctrine of rule-by-virtue. As the "Analects" said: "If distant people are not obedient to China, Chinese rulers should win them over by cultivating their own refinement and virtue": by his own supremely cultivated and sage-like example, the emperor would command respect and allegiance. Unfortunately, this basic tenet of the Confucian faith, like modern political doctrines, worked best within the confines of the culture, among the indoctrinated, and was not efficacious across the cultural gap in Inner Asia.

During most of four hundred years the Han court faced the warlike Hsiung-nu, ancestors of the Huns, along the Great Wall boundary. They were bested at times by Chinese arms but did not respond to Confucian preachings of "civility and etiquette." At other times the Hsiung-nu defeated the Han, who then had to buy them off with money and goods plus an imperial princess or two. Then the Han emperor might have to accept the egalitarian brother-to-brother relationship with the Hsiung-nu chieftain. But however bitter the facts, the Chinese court consistently rectified the record by using tributary terminology, preserving the written tradition of Chinese supremacy.

The myth of the emperor's superiority beyond the Wall was part of the Confucian ideology by which he ruled within it. People who had once been brought to accept the Confucian teachings of the primacy of social order, hierarchic status and the duty of obedience, could be more easily controlled from the top down. The trick was therefore to bring foreign rulers to participate in the Confucian network of "civility and etiquette." This was done most notably at New Year's in the rituals of the state cult of imperial Confucianism. After the emperor had kowtowed to Heaven, tribute-bearing envoys of lesser rulers kowtowed to the Son of Heaven. By the time T'ang armies of the seventh century had pacified East Asia in all four directions, dynastic historians solemnly concluded that peoples inside and outside the empire had all submitted because of the imperial virtue, or *te,* the power that Confucianism attributed to the superior man's edifying example.

This theory uniting Chinese power with Chinese culture was shattered by the Mongol conquest, for it was a triumph of naked power without any pretensions to culture. All three Sino-barbarian dynasties—Liao, Chin and Yuan—now had to be ac-

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cepted as legitimate and their histories compiled in the traditional terminology, but historians avoided comment on how they had achieved the imperial power. It remained for the Ming, after expelling the Mongols, to prove anew that the Son of Heaven's universal kingship, his all-compelling virtue, emanated from a fusion of power and culture, force in reserve plus right conduct in practice.

The first Ming emperor, a man of enormous vitality, sent envoys to all known rulers, announcing that he viewed them all with impartial benevolence (*i-shih t'ung-jen*) and included them within the bounds of civilization (*shih wu-wai*). His successor, the Yung-lo emperor, with his great maritime expeditions pushed this idea of inclusiveness to the limit. He not only conferred Chinese titles and seals and the use of the Chinese calendar on tributary foreign rulers in the usual fashion, in some cases—Korea, Viet Nam, Malacca, Brunei, Japan, Cochin in South India—he even decreed sacrifices to the divinities of their mountains and rivers, which might therefore be added to the map of China, or else he enfeoffed their mountains, a ceremony which brought them in a cosmic sense within the Chinese realm. While I hesitate to interpret the full significance of such literary deeds, they suggest that the Yung-lo emperor, following out the principles of impartiality and inclusiveness, was laying the theoretical foundations for a world order emanating from China.

It is equally noteworthy that after 1433 the Ming bureaucracy, ever jealous of the very personal role of eunuchs, failed to carry forward Yung-lo's expansive, eunuch-led beginnings overseas. After 1644, when the Manchu conquest repeated the Mongol disaster in less drastic form, the Chinese bureaucracy soon cooperated in the Manchus' Sinification, so that in the end power and culture remained united under the Ch'ing dynasty.

Thus the doctrine of the emperor's superiority, symbolized in tributary ritual, had many uses. When force was available, it rested on force; when Chinese power was lacking, it could rest on the retrospect or prospect of Chinese power; or it could rest solely on the lure of trade. If foreign rulers were within reach, the Son of Heaven could legitimize them, protect them, honor them, pay them or punish them, all within a context of benevolent admonition or righteous wrath from the apex of the human pyramid. Within the Chinese culture area, toward North Viet Nam (Chinese Annam), Korea, the island kingdom of Liu-ch'iu

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(Ryukyu), and Japan, his supremacy was sanctioned by the whole Confucian civilization in which they participated. Among the pastoral and increasingly Buddhistic peoples of Tibet and Mongolia it was sanctioned by his patronage of the Dalai Lama. Among the Islamic traders of the Middle East and the Turkestan oases, it rested on the emperor's control of trade.

Word spread all across Asia that the lucrative foreign trade at Peking was utilized for politics, and so any merchant could trade with China by becoming or claiming to be a tribute-bearer. Joseph Fletcher has described how the Central Asian trade with China was funneled through the tribute channel. When every merchant to Peking had to enroll as a "vassal," this "left Central Asian trade in Central Asian hands but under imperial control. . . . For Central Asia, relations with China meant trade; for China, the basis of trade was tribute." This point remained true right down to New Year's 1795 when the last Dutch embassy kowtowed at Peking so vigorously in hopes of trade concessions. Most of their kowtows were performed along the main axis of the great capital, where today China's rulers stand with foreign guests atop the Gate of Heavenly Peace to watch the celebration of the new order's birthday on October First.

Few on either side were fooled by this Chinese use of material means to buy political prestige—foreign profit, Chinese face—but the institution of China's universal kingship was thereby preserved in ceremonial form. The political theory of the Son of Heaven's superiority over foreigners, in short, was part and parcel of the power structure of the Chinese state. Supreme within his empire, he claimed never to have dealt with equals outside it, and this helped him remain supreme within it.

Historians today are actively showing up this claim: Yung-lo of the Ming actually wrote to the Central Asian ruler Shahrukh as an equal in 1418; the Ch'ing treaty of Nerchinsk with Russia was on equal terms in 1689; Manchu envoys performed the kowtow in Moscow and St. Petersburg in 1731–32; and the Ch'ing emperor addressed the ruler of Kokand as "my son"—*i.e.* not as a vassal—after 1759. Meanwhile, Peking between 1663 and 1866 solemnly sent eight missions to invest the kings of Liu-ch'iu as loyal tributaries, although the lords of Satsuma had made Liu-ch'iu their vassal and controlled it behind the scenes ever since 1609. None of these anomalies, however, was publicized in China.

Today Mao extols egalitarian struggle, not hierarchic har-

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mony. He uses a language of all-out revolutionary militancy, not "civility and etiquette." But the ancient idea of China's central superiority flourishes under his care. As in former times, the doctrine can be used to abet power abroad or equally well to substitute for it.

IV. WHAT REMAINS OF THESE TRADITIONS TODAY?

Six decades of change in the nineteenth century and six in the twentieth have destroyed China's inherited order and created an unprecedentedly new one, yet those who see China as broken loose from her old moorings and adrift on the flood of revolution are using an inapt metaphor. One can better say the old structure collapsed, its foundations washed out, new plans were imported and rebuilding is under way, but the site is recognizably the same, the sense of identity remains and continuities as usual reappear, mixed in with discontinuities.

First, as to China's feeling of superiority. Her dimensions in time and space so far outstrip all other countries in sheer size of population and time-span of organized government—a contemporary of ancient Rome, bigger than ever and still vital among us—that intense national pride was to be expected. But history has compounded this self-esteem. To begin with, China was creatively self-sufficient and never a borrower on any scale until very recently. Buddhism was borrowed, to be sure, but quite early, and it was soon Sinified in the process while it also declined in the land of its origin and had an independent development in China. Second, the tribute system saw to it that foreign contact generally seemed to reinforce the idea of Chinese supremacy. Outsiders were welcomed at court and recorded for posterity only when they accepted the forms of the system. Thus the Chinese people were insulated and seldom even heard of a ruler who was equal to the Son of Heaven. Third, the classical education in the imperial Confucian orthodoxy year after year indoctrinated China's literate élite in a philosophical-religious ethnocentrism that went so much deeper than "nationalism" that we need another word for it entirely. The "national-culturalism" that has been inherited by Chinese patriots of today is roughly equivalent to an amalgam of modern Europe's notions of Christianity, the classical tradition, individualism and nationalism, all combined. Fourth, this whole package of Sinocentrism—of society-and-state, learning-and-politics, culture-and-power, inte-

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grated in the Chinese Way—has remained to this day walled off in East Asia behind the barrier of the Chinese writing system, through which foreign ideas filter only at the cost of Sinification. (The social influence of Chinese writing is a topic still awaiting intelligent study. Its effect is still so profound that Sinologists are almost incapable of recognizing it.) Students of other cultures can of course chip away at this thesis of Sinocentrism by citing similar aspects of "centrism" elsewhere in history, but they cannot point to any of comparable magnitude.

The tradition of Chinese superiority has now been hyperactivated, both by a new consciousness of the past century's humiliations and by the peptic euphoria of revolutionary leadership. It will confront us for a long time to come.

It follows that policies of "bringing China into the world," getting the Chinese to "take their place in the international order," may be a long time getting results. "Containment without isolation," our recent effort to improve on mere "containment" (itself of dubious value from the beginning when applied to China), has a spotty future. Whenever we try to negotiate China's participation in international arrangements, whether journalistic, tourist, commercial, scientific or nuclear, she will retain a bargaining advantage because of her size and self-sufficiency, and also because of her implacable self-esteem. We shall continue to meet righteous vituperation, arrogant incivility. In the end, we outsiders will probably have to make many more adjustments to China's demands than we now contemplate.

Second, as to the aborted tradition of Chinese sea power, I suppose that nuclear power now has the symbolic and potentially strategic value that the nascent Chinese navy once had. After all, the gunboat appeared on the China coast in 1840 as the decisive weapon of its day. Japan later responded to the Western impact by building a battle fleet, and China began to do the same. Missiles are today's rough equivalent, at least in prestige and in military theorizing. The real question here is whether modern China, having failed to develop naval power when it counted, will now succeed in creating the diversified armaments of a first-class power of the late twentieth century, nuclear missiles and all. This protean question we cannot answer here except to appraise how far China's tradition may make for expansion.

On this point one can only state personal impressions: (1)

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China's bureaucrats through the centuries have shown much interest in taxes but little interest in religious proselytism or individual adventure abroad and not much faith in the expansion of commercial enterprise. Missions, exploration and trade, three of the main engines of European expansion, have not bulked large in China's values. (2) Despite Mao's best efforts at "permanent revolution" against any ruling class, China will have to remain some kind of bureaucratic state, essentially inward-looking (because of the sheer mass and growing complexity of the body politic) and concerned with social order more than mere growth. Even at the recent apogee of revolutionary ardor under Mao, "politics in command" has put order above growth, orthodoxy above production.

"Expansion" of course does not occur everywhere the same, like gravity, but only in certain areas, with certain aims and means. Within the Chinese culture area, the formula of Korean or Vietnamese local autonomy and China's cultural superiority has long been acknowledged on both sides. For example, after North Viet Nam had been ruled by China from 111 BC to 965 AD, there were major invasions from China half a dozen times, but each time, even after Ming government had lasted twenty years, China found it preferable to give up local control and accept tribute relations instead. "Tribute" of course did not mean a European-type feudal vassalage with economic payments and military support, and patriots today who mark Southeast Asia on a map as formerly part of the Chinese empire are asserting nonsense. Today's equivalent of tribute is more political-ideological than military-administrative.

In the Inner Asian area, which is now part of the Chinese national realm, expansion has already occurred, most notoriously in the case of Tibet. When Britain decided, after the Younghusband expedition of 1904, not to assume a protectorate over Tibet, it was kept out of Russian hands by recognizing it as part of China, and on that basis the Tibetan state and people have now been swallowed by the Han. Outer Mongolia, on the other hand, with Russian protection has avoided this fate in power politics.

Meanwhile in the third sector of Inner Asia, the Turkic and other ethnic minorities of Sinkiang (Uighur, Kirghiz, Kazakh, etc.) now find themselves subordinated on a frontier of Chinese development, facing a rival Soviet communism across the border. If it is true as many believe that Peking today accords strategic

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primacy to Sino-Soviet relations on their long frontier, this Chinese concern with Inner Asia should not surprise anyone.

For us, China's possible expansion into Southeast Asia is now of chief concern. But Communist China's westward movement of today follows a more ancient precedent and is more feasible than would be a Chinese southward movement. Central Asia has seen Chinese armies and garrisons in successive eras of Chinese vigor ever since the Han, and no modern non-Chinese nations have grown up there. To be sure, the Moslem rebellions of the nineteenth century all showed latent anti-Chinese potentialities. But they were never realized and have now been smothered.

In contrast, Ch'ing invasions of South or Southeast Asia by land (Nepal 1792; North Burma 1766–70; and North Viet Nam 1788–89) were not attempts at conquest but merely over-the-border chastisements to reëstablish the proper order in tributary capitals. There is even less tradition of Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia by sea. The Mongols' warlike expedition to Java in 1392 was almost the first and last major attempt at maritime conquest from China. The Ming fleets under the eunuch admiral Cheng Ho, seeking tribute, not conquest, might have led on into colonialism, but they were never followed up. Western shippers and planters facilitated the nineteenth-century migration of Chinese coolie labor but the response of the Ch'ing government was simply to renew its ban on Chinese going abroad. Consequently, overseas Chinese communities in Manila, Cholon, Bangkok, Singapore or Batavia were on their own and never expected or received Chinese government acknowledgment or support until the very last years of the dynasty. The fears of the late 1940s that the overseas Chinese would serve as Mao's fifth column have not been borne out. In country after country of Southeast Asia, nationalism has proved itself a barrier to Chinese expansion, both in theory and in practice, and not least in North Viet Nam.

One may conclude that the best way to stimulate Chinese expansion is for us to mount an over-fearful and over-active preparation against it. History suggests that China has her own continental realm, a big one; that Chinese power is still inveterately land-based and bureaucratic, not maritime and commercial; and that we are likely to see emerging from China roughly the amount of expansion that we provoke.

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THE GREEN REVOLUTION: CORNUCOPIA OR PANDORA'S BOX?

By Clifton R. Wharton, Jr.

THE application of science and technology to traditional agriculture has begun to produce dramatic results, above all in Asia. The rapid expansion of certain food grains in the developing world is being particularly widely heralded, and justly so, as the "Green Revolution." The discussion of the phenomenon tends to cluster around two views. On the one hand, some observers now believe that the race between food and population is over, that the new agricultural technology constitutes a cornucopia for the developing world, and that victory is in sight in the "War on Hunger." Others see this development as opening a Pandora's box; its very success will produce a number of new problems which are far more subtle and difficult than those faced during the development of the new technology. It is important to give careful attention and critical analysis to both interpretations in order to be optimistic about the promise of the Green Revolution where justified, and at the same time to prepare for the problems that are now emerging. The Green Revolution offers an unparalleled opportunity to break the chains of rural poverty in important parts of the world. Success will depend upon how well the opportunity is handled and upon how alert we are to the inherent consequences.

It is now generally known that major technological breakthroughs in food production are believed to have lifted the spectre of famine in the immediate future and to have postponed the prospect of Malthusian population disaster. Startling developments have been accomplished in wheat, rice and corn—major food staples in much of the developing world. The possibilities for doubling or even tripling production are based upon new high-yield varieties coupled with adequate supplies of water, fertilizer, pesticides and modern equipment. Overnight, the image of agriculture in the developing countries has changed from that of an economic backwater to that of a major potential contributor to overall development. The new varieties are rapidly spreading both within countries and across national boundaries. A recent estimate of the International Agricultural Devel-

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opment Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture reveals that in Asia alone the estimated acreage planted with these new high-yield varieties rose from 200 acres in 1964–65 to 20 million in 1967–68. Traditional food-importing nations like the Philippines and Pakistan are becoming self-sufficient and have the prospect of becoming net food exporters.

It will be no easy task to achieve the potential increased production offered by the new technology, particularly when it involves millions upon millions of diverse farms and farmers scattered over the countryside. If the increased production is in fact obtained, this will automatically produce a whole new set of second-generation problems which must be faced if development is to be sustained and accelerated. Therefore, two considerations need to be borne in mind. First, there is reason to believe that the further spread of new varieties will not be as fast as early successes might suggest. Second, the new problems arising out of the spread of the new technology, whatever its speed, need to be foreseen and acted upon now. The probable developments in each case have the greatest significance for economic growth and for the conduct of international relations.

II

The reasons for believing that the new technology will not in fact spread nearly as widely or as rapidly as supposed and predicted include, first, the fact that the availability of irrigated land imposes at least a short-run limit to the spread of the new high-yield varieties. Most of these require irrigation and careful water control throughout the growing cycle. In most Asian countries about one-fourth to one-half of the rice lands are irrigated; the remainder are dependent upon monsoons and seasonal rains. The speed with which additional land can be converted to the new technology depends on the rapidity with which new irrigation facilities can be constructed; and here the high capital costs are likely to be a retarding factor.

Large-scale irrigation projects can seriously strain the investment capacity of developing nations. For example, the massive Mekong River development scheme, involving Laos, Cambodia, Viet Nam and Thailand, has been estimated to require a capital investment over the next 20 years of about $2 billion, roughly 35 percent of the annual national income of the four countries involved and exceeding the annual net new investment of all the

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countries of Southeast Asia combined. Further, significant additional costs are involved in converting existing irrigation systems to the requirements of modern agriculture. Many of the old gravity irrigation systems were not designed to provide the sophisticated water controls demanded by the new varieties. (For example, each plot must be controlled separately throughout the growing season.)

Second, there are doubts about the ability of existing markets to handle the increased product. Storage facilities and transport are inadequate and crop grading often deficient. Not only must the marketing system be expanded to handle a larger output; there also is an increased need for farm supplies and equipment. Fertilizers, pesticides and insecticides must be available in the right quantities, at the right times, and in the right places. Given the inadequacy of the agricultural infrastructure, the need to expand and modernize marketing systems is likely to reduce the pace of the Revolution.

Because many of the new varieties, especially rice, do not appeal to the tastes of most consumers, it is difficult to calculate the size of the market. Some argue that until newer varieties which are closer to popular tastes are developed, the market will be limited.

Third, the adoption of the new technology is likely to be much slower where the crop is a basic food staple, grown by a farmer for family consumption. Such farmers are understandably reluctant to experiment with the very survival of their families. Peasant producers are obviously far more numerous in the developing world than are commercial farmers and the task of converting them to a more modern technology is considerably more difficult. So far, spectacular results have been achieved primarily among the relatively large commercial farmers. Some semi-subsistence farmers have begun to grow the new varieties, but the rate at which they adopt them may be slower.

Fourth, farmers must learn new farming skills and expertise of a higher order than was needed in traditional methods of cultivation. The new agronomic requirements are quite different as regards planting dates and planting depths; fertilizer rates and timing; insecticide, pesticide and fungicide applications; watering and many others. Unless appropriate extension measures are taken to educate farmers with respect to these new farming complexities the higher yields will not be obtained.

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Fifth, many of the new varieties are non-photosensitive and the shorter term will allow two or three crops per year instead of one. Multiple cropping is good, but there may be difficulties if the new harvest comes during the wet season without provision having been made for mechanical drying of the crop to replace the traditional sun drying. In addition, there may be resistance if the new harvest pattern conflicts with religious or traditional holidays which have grown up around the customary agricultural cycles.

Sixth, failure to make significant institutional reforms may well be a handicap. There is evidence in several Latin American countries that a failure to make needed changes in policies now detrimental to agriculture, or a reluctance to effectuate the institutional reforms required to give real economic incentives to small farmers and tenants, has been primarily responsible for the very slow spread of Mexico's success with new varieties of wheat and corn to its neighbors to the south.

From all this one may deduce that the "first" or "early" adopters of the new technology will be in regions which are already more advanced, literate, responsive and progressive and which have better soil, better water management, closer access to roads and markets—in sum, the wealthier, more modern farmers. For them, it is easier to adopt the new higher-yield varieties since the financial risk is less and they already have better managerial skills. When they do adopt them, the doubling and trebling of yields mean a corresponding increase in their incomes. One indication of this is the large number of new private farm-management consultant firms in the Philippines which are advising large landlords on the use of the new seed varieties and making handsome profits out of their share of the increased output.

As a result of different rates in the diffusion of the new technology, the richer farmers will become richer. In fact, it may be possible that the more progressive farmers will capture food markets previously served by the smaller semi-subsistence producer. In India, only 20 percent of the total area planted to wheat in 1967–68 consisted of the new dwarf wheats, but they contributed 34 percent of the total production. Such a development could well lead to a net reduction in the income of the smaller, poorer and less venturesome farmers. This raises massive problems of welfare and equity. If only a small fraction of

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the rural population moves into the modern century while the bulk remains behind, or perhaps even goes backward, the situation will be highly explosive. For example, Tanjore district in Madras, India, has been one of the prize areas where the new high-yield varieties have been successfully promoted. Yet one day last December, 43 persons were killed in a clash there between the landlords and their landless workers, who felt that they were not receiving their proper share of the increased prosperity brought by the Green Revolution.

III

Other experts argue that the new technology's stimulus to production and income cannot be stemmed. It is true that the rapidity with which the new seed varieties have spread in country after country belies the customary view of an inert, unresponsive peasantry. In 1965, India began a program of high-yield varieties which set a goal of 32.5 million acres by 1970–71; last year's crop season saw 18 million acres already planted, which contributed to the most successful year in recent Indian agricultural history (some 100 million tons of food grains, 11 million over the previous record year of 1964–65). Self-sufficiency in food grains is predicted in three or four years. Other countries are experiencing similar situations where the demand for the new seeds is outstripping the available supplies and black markets are even developing in seeds and fertilizer.

Nevertheless, if we assume that the new varieties will continue to live up to expectations and spread rapidly and widely, the increased production will in turn lead to a new set of difficulties. First, large tracts planted in one of the new varieties may be susceptible to disease and infestation which could cause massive losses. Heretofore, reliance upon seed selected by individual farmers meant that neighboring farms growing the same crop usually planted two or more different varieties or strains. This heterogeneity provided a built-in protection against widespread plant diseases, since not all varieties are equally susceptible. But where a single variety is introduced, covering large contiguous areas, the dangers of pathologic susceptibility are multiplied. For example, the new wheat introduced from Mexico into the Indo-Gangetic belt in India and Pakistan has involved a small range of genotypes—and the same has been true in Iran, Turkey and certain Middle Eastern countries. Any change in the spectrum

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of races of wheat rust in any of these countries could threaten the wheat crop on a massive scale, since it would involve the entire area.

Two steps are necessary to avoid these dangers: first, a diversified breeding program which can continually produce new varieties; second, an able and well-organized plant protection service which can quickly identify dangerous outbreaks and initiate prompt steps to combat them. Both activities must rely primarily upon national organizations rather than the regional or international ones. Both demand a skilled, well-trained staff. Some nations have recognized these dangers and are taking steps to meet them, but others still have not been made sufficiently aware. Aid givers—public and private—who are responsible for promoting the new varieties bear an equal responsibility to promote indigenous research and plant protection services. The outbreak of any major disease which wipes out the harvest of thousands of farmers is far more likely to be blamed on the producers and spreaders of the miracle seed than on Fate. Agricultural development could be set back several decades.

Second, it is vitally important to expand the entire complex of services and industries required to achieve the higher production. Any government or foreign-aid agency which distributes the "miracle" seed but fails to provide the insecticide and fertilizer in the appropriate quantities when and where needed is courting political disaster; unless these inputs are available and used, some local, traditional varieties will outyield the new ones. A seed industry, agricultural chemical plants, processing and storage firms, factories producing hand sprayers, dusters, water pumps and engines—these are just a few of the agriculturally related industries which must develop if the Revolution is to take hold.

The skills and the capital needed cannot be provided solely by the public sector. Private capital must also be utilized. In a few countries the spread of the new technologies has already forced an abrupt departure from the previous practice of having government agencies serve as the major or sole distributor of the required inputs. Private industry, especially American, has stepped in to provide a new, more dynamic pattern of distribution. In the Philippines, for example, ESSO has become a major distributor of fertilizer and agricultural chemicals. Frequently, such ventures have involved links with local firms. In India, the

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International Minerals and Chemicals Corporation, with the Standard Oil Company of California, built a fertilizer plant with a yearly capacity of 365,000 tons; the U.S. firms provide the management but control is held by an Indian firm. Storage silos, seed multiplication firms and even integrated farm-to-retail firms are just a few of the activities where private U.S. resources are being harnessed to serve the Green Revolution.

Equally important are the increased farm services which are required, particularly agricultural credit. For example, from studies conducted at the International Rice Research Institute, it is estimated that whereas the total cash costs of production for the average Filipino rice farmer using traditional methods and varieties is about $20 per hectare, the cost rises to $220 when the new, high-yielding IR-8 is grown. Although the yield may increase threefold, leading to a net return four times greater than with traditional varieties, the farmer must have access to substantially greater credit to finance his operations. Especially for the poorer farmers with low cash reserves, who may want to adopt the new varieties, the village moneylender and merchant will not be adequate unless they in turn have access to additional funds. Indeed, the Green Revolution must be accompanied both by an increase in the amount of credit available and by the expansion and modernization of credit institutions and mechanisms. Tapping the capital markets in the modern urban sector must be encouraged, and ways must be found at the village level to mobilize local capital, especially the increased savings which are possible from higher farm incomes. The Green Revolution will generate increased cash which, if properly marshalled, can contribute to capital formation and agricultural progress.

Third, much more attention must be devoted to marketing the increased output. Where there has been semi-subsistence agriculture, the impact of the new technology upon the *marketed* product is even greater than on total production. If the crop is a food staple and if the peasant farm family traditionally consumes some 70 to 80 percent of its total product each year, a doubling of output does not lead to a doubling in the amount retained for family consumption. Some modest increase in consumption is likely, but the bulk of the increased production will enter the market. Thus a doubling in yields in a semi-subsistence agriculture usually leads to much more than a doubling of the amount sold.

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The impact of this explosive increase upon the traditional marketing network and storage capacity can be calamitous. The case of India is illustrative. During the past crop year, India experienced a marvelous increase in food-grain production, but the marketing network and storage facilities were not prepared to cope with it. The result can be seen in the mountains of food-grain stored in schools and in the open air under conditions which are apt to reduce if not negate the gains. The food-deficit psychology which underlies the failure of planners and policy-makers to anticipate these results is not limited to the developing nations. Aid givers were equally surprised. Strangely, the lessons of the Indian experience do not yet seem to have affected the thinking and planning of other nations which are promoting the new technology.

Fourth, the slowness with which the food-deficit psychology dies also has an important consequence in terms of government pricing policies. The fact that agriculture, even semi-subsistence agriculture, does respond to price, is only gradually becoming accepted. But the shock which quantum jumps in food production may have on domestic prices has not been sufficiently appreciated. The downward pressure on prices, especially where transport is deficient and storage is inadequate, may in fact be so severe as to have a disincentive effect upon producers. Unless adequate attention is given to developing a sound pricing policy to prevent excessive dampening of incentives, the spread of the new technology may in fact be cut short before any "takeoff" has occurred. Premature discouragement could produce a reversion leading to a slowing up in food production or even a rejection of the new technology.

It has been amply demonstrated throughout the world that peasant and subsistence farmers are responsive to favorable prices, provided the return is real and they receive the benefit. For example, from 1951–53 through 1961–63, the farmers of Thailand in response to favorable prices increased their exports of corn at an average annual compounded rate of 35.8 percent; casava, 25.0 percent; and kenaf, 43.8 percent. Filipino farmers responded to a governmental price-support program for tobacco by changing from native to Virginia tobacco and then booming production from 3 million kilos in 1954 to over 30 million kilos in 1962. The list of crops where peasant farmers have responded to favorable prices is large—rubber, oil palm, coffee, jute, wheat,

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barley, sorghum, millet, gram, cotton. Thus, if the full potential offered by the new technology is to be realized, every effort must be made to insure that there is in fact a significant return to the producer and that the rapid rise in output does not lead to a counter-productive slump in prices.

Fifth, the goals of increased food production are frequently couched in terms of some desirable, minimal standards of nutrition. Such nutritional goals are commendable, but they can be attained only by individuals who have the income with which to purchase the better diet. Effective demand for food depends upon both the income of the demanders and the price of the food. If the increased production leads to lower costs and prices, then consumers will be able to increase their food purchases and hopefully to raise their levels of nutrition. Equally important is the need to increase incomes so that the greater production entering the market can be purchased. The food problem in a developing world is both a problem of production and supply and a problem of demand and income. Unless the higher levels of effective demand materialize, the prospect will be market gluts, price depression and, in certain cases, shifts by the farmers away from the higher-yielding varieties. Hence, every effort must be made both to reduce the unit costs of the increased food output and to augment the incomes of consumers who purchase food; otherwise, the second bowl of rice will not be bought —despite the technical feasibility of producing it.

Sixth, one of the major avowed aims of most nations which are eagerly promoting the Green Revolution is to achieve self-sufficiency in food production. In Southeast Asia, for example, the Philippines already claims to have become self-sufficient. Malaysia predicts that she will be self-sufficient by 1971; Indonesia by 1973. Some believe that these target dates are overly optimistic. But if the rice-deficit nations of the region such as Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines eventually become self-sufficient by successfully adopting the new technology, what will happen to the rice-surplus nations like Burma and Thailand whose economies are heavily dependent upon rice export? To whom will they sell their rice? Self-sufficiency will not only be detrimental to the rice-exporting nations, but will reduce one of the few areas of economic interdependence in the region. Unless action is taken in advance to offset the predictable impact of the new technology, hopes of promoting regional economic inte-

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gration will be substantially reduced. Whether or not one agrees with the goal of self-sufficiency for these nations, the policies have been adopted and will be pursued. Many developing nations spend some 30 percent of their foreign exchange on food imports and wish to eliminate this drain as well as the irritation of chronic deficits in domestic production. We should anticipate the predictable consequences of these policies—in this case major economic dislocations in trade—so that we can be equally ready with developmental efforts or foreign assistance to reduce the dimensions of the problem. Unless the exporting nations take immediate stock of their prospects and seek to diversify their agriculture, the impact of such trade distortions could have major consequences for their economies and pace of development.

Seventh, a critical question is whether these technological developments are a "once-and-for-all" phenomenon. How likely is it that new technological improvement will continue to be made? The application of science to agriculture over the last 300 years has resulted in a tenfold increase in yield per acre on the best farmed lands in the temperate zone. This expansion is what led to the production controls introduced by the surplus nations, such as the United States, to keep demand and supply in reasonable balance. Today's Green Revolution is the result of a similar application of science to agriculture in the developing world. But it should be noted that the institutionalized application of science is largely concentrated at present in food crops. Before World War II, primary attention in agricultural research in the developing world was devoted to the major crops —rubber in Malaysia, sugar in the Philippines, coffee in Kenya, palm oil in Nigeria, coffee in Brazil, bananas in Honduras. Staple food crops were either ignored or received scant attention. Thus the successes of the recent application of science to peasant agriculture could be interpreted as an exploitation of a "technical gap" in food crops left by years of neglect. If current developments merely represent a "catching-up," then as soon as population overtakes current developments, we are back to "square one."

Much will depend upon whether or not the necessary manpower is trained in each country to provide a continuing human resource which can produce a constant stream of new technology. The manpower trained in the Rockefeller Foundation's Mexican

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program has always been a greater contribution, in my view, than the new varieties. Successful adoption should not deflect attention from the importance and role of continuous agricultural research. The development of indigenous competence to engage in agricultural research is critical and becomes even more critical as the new varieties are adopted. The target should be not *a* new technology but ever-new technology, and this requires skilled manpower.

These are only a few of the possible consequences of the successful spread of the new technology. There are several broader consequences and issues which can be raised only as questions in this brief presentation:

To what extent will the diffusion of the new technology accentuate the displacement of rural people and heighten the pace of migration to the cities? If higher yields per acre, multiple cropping plus mechanization, force surplus manpower out of agriculture, what are the prospects for increased employment in industry and services to absorb this manpower?

For the average developing nation the Green Revolution means that instead of devoting two-thirds to three-fourths of its agricultural resources to food production, these resources may now be shifted to other higher paying crops. The question then becomes, what crops and for what markets?

If agriculture becomes more modern, dynamic and wealthy, will the non-agricultural sector allow agriculture to retain a significant share of this increased income or merely follow the previous patterns of taxing agriculture for non-agricultural development?

What will be the political significance of these changes if successful adoption of the new technology leads to an economically invigorated and strengthened rural population—almost invariably a large majority in developing nations? Will rural-based political parties and movements emerge to alter the recent dominance of urban centers?

What will be the global effect of a food explosion in the tropical and sub-tropical world? Will such developments lead to an improved reallocation of productive specialization among the developed and developing world, or will nationalistic trade barriers continue to flout natural comparative advantages?

One final danger lies in assuming that there is no longer an urgent need for measures to reduce rates of population growth.

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Quite the contrary. While the new developments are a splendid gift of time to allow a holding operation, effective population measures continue to be essential. Whether one assumes a growth rate of 2.5 or 3 percent, the inexorable fact is that, give or take a few years, the population of the developing world will double in about 25 years.

The significance of the food-population problem is more than humanitarian and developmental; it also has critical implications for the conduct of international relations. Relations between nations are often profoundly affected by long-run forces over which men can exercise only limited control in the short run. The food-population race is an excellent example of such a set of forces. Predictions regarding both population and food, as well as their interaction over varying lengths of time, must be taken into account in the conduct of developmental assistance, not only by aid-giving nations and international organizations, but by the governments of developing nations themselves. Policies and programs designed to win the race between food and population may have unintended, though often predictable, consequences which may have a very broad impact.

IV

Charles Malik once said that "one of the principal causes of both international conflict and internal strife is unfounded expectations. These are based ultimately either on deception or on a belief in magic."[1] What we have in hand seems to many people to approach magic; let us hope that it does not become the source of deception.

To speak of the possible consequences and problems associated with the next phase of the Green Revolution should not be misinterpreted as a plea for the suppression of the Revolution because, like Pandora's box, it will lead to even greater problems than those it was designed to eliminate. On the contrary, I would strongly argue that the list of second-generation problems is a measure of what great opportunities exist for breaking the centuries-old chains of peasant poverty. They also demonstrate how closely interrelated are the various factors which impel or retard agricultural development. This complex interrelationship makes interdisciplinary research and coöpera-

[1] Charles H. Malik, "What Shall It Profit A Man?", *Columbia Journal of World Business*, Summer 1966.

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tion vital if the current problems are to be solved and future ones anticipated. The most realistic prediction is that each country is likely to experience a different set of these problems and that there will be variations among countries between the two extremes of optimistic and pessimistic prognoses.

The quiet, passive peasant is already aware of the modern world—far more than we realize—and he is impatient to gain his share. The Green Revolution offers him the dramatic possibility of achieving his goal through peaceful means. It has burst with such suddenness that it has caught many unawares. Now is the time to place it in its long-range perspective and to engage in contingency planning so that we may respond flexibly and quickly as the Revolution proceeds. Perhaps in this way we can ensure that what we are providing becomes a cornucopia, not a Pandora's box.

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THE THRUST OF HISTORY IN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM

By Robert Triffin

IS our international monetary system heading toward a sudden collapse as in 1931, or toward the fundamental reforms needed to cure its most glaring and universally recognized shortcomings? Or will it continue to drift precariously from crisis to crisis, each one dealt with by belated rescue operations and the spread of restrictions and currency devaluations? Judging from past history, official statements and even intentions are unlikely to provide reliable answers to these questions, for they are more often designed to reassure than to enlighten. The Governor of the Bank of England, Sir Leslie O'Brien, candidly confessed to a Cambridge audience last spring: "I am rapidly qualifying as an instructor on how to exude confidence without positively lying." Another reason is that major changes in the international monetary system have rarely been the result of conscious planning. They have most often been the by-products of broad historical forces or accidents, defying contemporary forecasts and official intentions.

Official negotiations on international monetary reform were launched, five and a half years ago, with a confident agreement "that the underlying structure of the present monetary system—based on fixed exchange rates and the established price of gold—has proven its value as the foundation for present and future arrangements." (Statement issued on October 2, 1963, by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States on Behalf of the "Group of Ten" Members of the Fund.)

The snail's pace of these negotiations, however, and the recurrent and snowballing gold and foreign-exchange crises of recent years have spread mounting doubts regarding these two pillars of the gold-exchange standard. The disbanding of the famed Gold Pool and the introduction of the so-called two-tier gold market in March 1968 were not the planned and deliberate outcome of the negotiations in process, but rather the defeat of fourteen years of efforts to preserve the $35 price in the private as well as in the official market. The optimists—like myself—still hope against hope that these decisions will prove the first, and constructive, steps toward a gradual elimination of gold as the

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ultimate and obviously absurd regulator of reserve creation and destruction. The speculators still choose to view it, however, as the harbinger of a further defeat of official policies and of an eventual and substantial increase in official, as well as private, gold prices. Few, if any, observers give much credence to the third interpretation professedly favored by the officials—namely, that the two-tier gold market is a lasting step toward the consolidation of the $35-an-ounce gold-exchange standard of yesteryear.

The second pillar of the Group of Ten policies, *i.e.* the fixity of exchange rates, is equally assailed today, not only by academics, but even by Congressional leaders and responsible officials, here and abroad. Various forms of exchange-rate flexibility[1] are seriously discussed and advocated as the only realistic cure for the recurrent foreign-exchange crises involving the major currencies of the Western world, and particularly for the persistent deficits of the United Kingdom and the United States, which both countries have repeatedly promised but failed to correct.

In brief, official intentions and pronouncements appear in retrospect a most unreliable guide to the recent evolution of the international monetary system, and are therefore widely mistrusted as a basis for confidence in its future stability. Far better clues and safer predictions can be derived, in my opinion, from analysis of a broader historical perspective and the persistent trends which emerge so clearly from it concerning the direction of changes in our national and international monetary institutions.

II

The first lesson that history teaches us is that these institutions have always been carried forward by an irrepressible evolutionary process, the strength of which was repeatedly misunderstood, underestimated or even totally overlooked by contemporary observers, academic as well as official. Even today, many people evoke with nostalgia the nineteenth-century gold standard, and

[1] The so-called "band proposal" would enlarge the margin between official buying and selling rates, leaving market rates free to fluctuate around a stable middle rate, or par-value. The "crawling peg" proposal would allow the par-value of a currency to depreciate or appreciate, in accordance with market forces, but by no more than 2 or 3 percent per year. The "crawling band" proponents would merge these two proposals, by allowing an enlarged band around a "crawling" par-value. Others would retain the façade of stable rates, but favor special tax and subsidy provisions tantamount to exchange-rate flexibility for merchandise imports and exports.

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remain blissfully unaware of the fact that silver far outpaced gold in importance until the latter half or third of that century, and that paper money—currency and bank deposits—had largely superseded both gold and silver moneys well before the outbreak of the First World War.[2] Whatever stability can be ascribed to the monetary system of those days should not be credited to its automatic regulation by haphazard gold and/or silver supplies, but to the gradual euthanasia of these two "commodity-moneys" and their increasing replacement by man-made "credit-moneys." (Indeed, the near-monopoly of gold and silver money throughout the previous centuries had been accompanied by a gradual and uneven debasement of the coinage, reducing the pound sterling and the franc, for instance, to roughly one-fourth and one-tenth, respectively, of their thirteenth-century gold content.)

A second lesson derives from the first. In every national monetary system the world over, the broad direction of this evolutionary process has been from commodity-money to credit-money. At first the creation of this credit-money was left to the discretion and wisdom of multiple banking firms, but later it was gradually brought under the centralized supervision of national monetary authorities (treasuries and central banks).

As distinct from the former commodity-moneys, however, the new national credit-moneys commanded general acceptability only within the national borders of each country; they were not accepted, or at least retained, in payment by the residents of other countries. The settlement of international transactions required, therefore, the exchangeability of national currencies. This responsibility was gradually concentrated in the national central banks and, to settle net imbalances in international transactions, it was necessary for each of them to accumulate *international reserves* acceptable to other central banks.

The evolution of these international reserves parallels closely, although with a considerable lag, that of the national monetary systems. Commodity-reserves are being gradually displaced by credit-reserves in the international monetary system, just as commodity-moneys were previously superseded by credit-money in the national monetary systems. A parallel evolution can be noted with respect to centralization of responsibility. Commodity reserves—in the form of gold—accounted for about 91 per-

[2] In 1913 currency and deposits already accounted for about 85 percent of world money stocks, gold for only 10 percent and silver for 5 percent.

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cent of world monetary reserves on the eve of the Second World War, but for only 53 percent as of last September. Decentralized credit-reserves—in the form of foreign exchange, *i.e.* overwhelmingly dollars and pounds sterling—rose over the same period from 9 to 38 percent of world reserves, and centralized credit-reserves—in the form of claims on the International Monetary Fund—from 0 to 9 percent.

These trends have accelerated considerably in recent years, and particularly in 1968. In the first nine months of that year, reserves in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) rose spectacularly by $850 million, while the foreign-exchange component of world reserves dropped by $275 million, and their gold component by $840 million.

This gradual shift from uncontrolled commodity-moneys and reserves to man-made credit-moneys and reserves, and later on to a conscious orientation toward the latter by national governments and international institutions, is likely to provide the best clue to future trends. This is the more true as such a shift can be viewed in a broader perspective of the evolutionary process: the persistent endeavors of man to control his physical environment rather than be controlled by it. One may hardly accept the view that these efforts could, or should, be frustrated forever as far as the international monetary system is concerned, and that reserve creation should be abandoned indefinitely to the irrelevant factors that determine it today: the hazards of gold production, industrial consumption, hoarding and speculation, and/or the international financing of unpredictable U.S. and U.K. deficits through the incorporation of their resulting dollar and sterling IOUs in the monetary reserves of the rest of the world.

III

Short-run predictions, however, remain far more hazardous than long-run predictions, for the orderly progress of this evolution is dependent on the adaptability of the institutional and legal framework within which it takes place. Conscious governmental and international action is needed at times to smooth its path, but may also make it far bumpier through misguided action or—as happens far more frequently—through excessive inertia and stubborn resistance to needed reforms.

The repeated financial crises that preceded, but finally impelled, the creation of the Federal Reserve System in the United

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States can be ascribed to the political resistance to centralized monetary management in this country. On the whole, however, the irrepressible evolution of *national* monetary systems from commodity-money to centralized credit-money encountered fewer legal and institutional obstacles than did the later and similar evolution of the *international* monetary system. The centralized supervision of national credit-money systems was part of the increasing role and powers assumed by national states in the direction of their economies. International agreements among theoretically sovereign states about the composition and management of international reserves were, and still are, far more difficult to achieve.

Numerous international conferences failed, over the last century, to elicit any such agreement. The actual composition of reserve assets shifted radically over this century from bimetalism to gold and later to the uneasy coexistence of gold, reserve-currencies (dollars and sterling) and claims on the IMF. None of these changes—except for the creation of the IMF itself—was ever initiated by deliberate government planning. They were mostly the combined by-products of the absence of agreement and of the relative availability and attractiveness of alternative reserve assets.

The failure to reach international agreement as to what should constitute an internationally acceptable reserve asset at first ensured the survival of traditional commodity-moneys, even after they had lost this role within the national monetary systems themselves. The elimination of silver in favor of gold alone was belatedly ratified—rather than initiated—by the governments. The initial step in this direction can be traced back to the totally inadvertent slip of Great Britain into a de facto gold standard, as a consequence of the 1696 recoinage of outworn silver coins. Gresham's law that "bad money drives out good" was not enacted by the British Parliament, but explains why the new, full-bodied silver coins minted by a government intent on preserving the traditional silver standard quickly disappeared from circulation, as their increased silver content gave them a somewhat higher value on the commodity markets than the *legal* conversion ratio between silver and gold at the Royal Mint.

The other, and even more radical, shift from the gold standard to the gold-exchange standard, in the 1920s, was also a de facto reaction to the unplanned impact of the war upon the monetary

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and reserve systems of those days. Wartime operations and postwar reconstruction had been financed in large part by monetary inflation. This had drastically curtailed the ratio of monetary gold stocks to the vastly expanded volume of national paper moneys, and created a "gold shortage" which became the subject of endless debates at gatherings of international experts and central bank meetings in Brussels (1920), Genoa (1922) and the Gold Delegation of the League of Nations (1929–1932). A broad consensus emerged at these meetings to recommend the expanded use of the "gold-convertible" currencies of major financial centers as a supplement to scarce gold. This solution was particularly favored and propagandized by British experts who rightly expected to see sterling—the most prestigious currency of the largest and oldest trading and financial center of the world—play the major role; it would enable the United Kingdom to finance its deficits and/or strengthen its slender gold reserves through the acceptance of its own paper IOUs as international reserves by other central banks. Both expectations proved correct but involved a quasi-automatic financing by other countries of Britain's return to an overvalued rate for sterling and of the balance-of-payments deficits that ensued.

While none of the conferences produced any firm agreements and commitments in this respect, the major "gold-convertible" currencies—particularly sterling, first, and later the dollar—gained increasing acceptance as monetary reserves. Since reserve holders remained free to switch, at any time, from one currency into another, or into gold, a dangerous instability was built into the system.

The Gold Delegation was still debating the ways and means that would prevent an abuse of the system by the reserve centers and protect it against destabilizing switches by their creditors when these very defects prompted the collapse of the pound sterling in September 1931. For a while, this sounded the death knell of the gold-exchange standard, a generalized rush into gold reserves, and a protracted period of beggar-my-neighbor devaluations and trade and exchange controls.

During and after the Second World War, the gold-exchange standard was revived, on the same precarious basis, bringing back the same abuses and sources of instability that killed it in 1931. The financing of World War II and of postwar reconstruction entailed, as in the case of World War I, a new bout of infla-

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tion, curtailing once more the ratio of gold reserves to the increased volume of national paper moneys. The latter continued to rise with the unprecedentedly high rates of economic growth sustained in later years. The resulting "gold shortage" was again made up by huge acquisitions of sterling and dollar balances legally convertible at any time into gold. The day would inevitably come—as I pointed out as early as 1957—when a "liquidity shortage" would arise, either as a result of such conversions of overflowing dollar and sterling balances into scarce gold metal, or because the United States and the United Kingdom would seek—and succeed—to protect themselves against such a danger by eliminating the balance-of-payments deficits which now fed most of the increases in world monetary reserves. This gloomy prognosis was scornfully dismissed at first by overcomplacent officials, but was later accepted by them, prompting in 1963 the opening of another marathon debate on the need for international monetary reform.

One may still hope, however, that the outcome will be less disastrous than it was in 1931. First of all, the world economy is in far better shape today than it was then, and the overall economic and financial position of the United States is far stronger than that of Britain in 1931. Even more important, the world's monetary and financial leaders are now keenly aware of the disastrous consequences which any repetition of the 1931 policies, or lack of policies, would entail for the international monetary, economic and even political fabric of the West. They have developed, indeed, particularly since the first flare-up of gold prices in London in October 1960, an unprecedented degree of international coöperation and an uncanny ability to cope with recurrent crises one after another. They have also acquired an understanding of the basic problems and a sense of joint responsibility for their solution far greater than ever existed in the past.

IV

Thus, history need *not* repeat itself. Our hope that it will not springs primarily from the unprecedented insight now gained by responsible officials regarding the functioning of our international monetary system and the consensus already reached by them regarding the shortcomings that must be remedied by the three major reforms now under negotiation:

1. The creation of international reserves should be deliberately

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oriented toward satisfying the requirements of feasible growth in world trade and production.

2. The resulting reserve pool should be protected against destabilizing switches between reserve assets, and primarily between reserve currencies and gold.

3. These reforms in the overall amount and composition of the world reserve pool must be accompanied by a strengthening of the adjustment mechanism, facilitating the financing of temporary, reversible disequilibria, but also ensuring more prompt correction of persistent disequilibria, rather than their perpetuation either by inflationary financing or by trade and exchange controls.

This consensus should, and some day undoubtedly will, lead to agreement on the kind of reform suggested by past historical trends—*i.e.* the development of a truly international credit-reserves standard aiming at the simultaneous fulfillment of all three of these objectives.

Indeed the cornerstone of such a reform has already been laid by the unanimous Rio resolution on the creation of a new reserve instrument (the so-called Special Drawing Rights, or SDRs) to be issued by the IMF in the amounts deemed necessary by the international community itself to meet future reserve needs. This was undoubtedly the hardest hurdle that the negotiators had to surmount, and contrasted sharply with their earlier myopic denunciation of such a proposal as a dangerous and utopian dream—unattainable "today and for any foreseeable future,"—to set up a "super-bank" with "no supporting super-government to make good on its debts or claims."[3]

The Rio negotiators showed rare vision and courage in setting up this central piece of the international monetary machinery of the future, but unfortunately left for later determination the role to be played by the traditional components of the gold-exchange standard (*i.e.* gold and the reserve currencies). The sterling, dollar and gold crises that were soon to dampen the high hopes evoked by the Rio agreement arose from the inability of the negotiators to tackle with the same vision and courage the more urgent problems raised by the coexistence of overflowing dollar and sterling reserves with the dwindling gold stocks into

[3] The quotation is from Robert V. Roosa, "Assuring the Free World's Liquidity," *Business Review*, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, September 1962, reproduced in "The Dollar and World Liquidity," New York: Random House, 1967, p. 102.

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which they were legally convertible under the rules of the ill-fated gold-exchange standard.

The basic conflict that has so far prevented full agreement on this issue reflects an unrealistic assessment by the reserve-currency debtors and creditors alike of their true national interests. The reserve-currency debtors—primarily the United States and the United Kingdom—welcome the new reserve asset as a supplement, or even an ultimate substitute, for scarce gold, but are understandably reluctant to renounce the privilege of financing a substantial portion of their deficits through other countries' accumulation of their IOUs as international reserves. The reserve-currency holders of continental Europe, on the other hand, still see in gold settlements their ultimate protection against the inflationary potential and surrender of national sovereignty entailed in the accumulation of dollar and sterling IOUs financing U.S. and U.K. policies in which they have no voice and which they may, at times, consider directly contrary to their own interests or those of the world community. This conflict has been exacerbated in recent years by the size and persistence of British and American deficits and the fact that they could be ascribed, at least in part, to the laxity of monetary and fiscal policies—particularly in the United Kingdom. It has been further aggravated by the inflationary pressures triggered in the United States by the escalation of the Viet Nam war, and to what some Europeans regard as an excessive take-over of European enterprises by American capital.

V

Paradoxically, the main hopes for a negotiated agreement spring from the very sharpness of this conflict and from the consequent realization in both camps that neither gold nor reserve-currencies can in fact expand, or even retain, their previous role in monetary settlements.

This conclusion is being forced upon the United Kingdom and the United States by the resistance of other countries to the acquisition and retention of traditional sterling and dollar balances as growing components of their monetary reserves. These traditional "liquid" holdings of sterling and dollar IOUs by foreign central banks rose spectacularly from about $2 billion in 1937 to a peak of nearly $20 billion in 1963, but have declined even more spectacularly since then to about $13 billion in Sep-

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tember of last year. Thus, the traditional reserve-currency role of sterling and dollar balances no longer assures Britain and the United States special facilities for the financing of their current deficits. It exposes them, on the contrary, to the enormous and unbearable risk of sudden or massive repayment of the enormous short-term indebtedness accumulated by them over many years past.

The creditor countries, however, also realize that insistence on gold repayment would inevitably bring about another 1931, as neither the United Kingdom nor even the United States could actually stand such a drain on its gold reserves. The total amount of these ($12 billion as of last September) is considerably short of their gold-convertible obligations to central banks and the International Monetary Fund ($28 billion).

Both groups of countries have thus been impelled by their own self-interest to negotiate new agreements based on the realities of the situation rather than on their previous hopes and expectations. The acquisition and retention of sterling and dollar assets by the major reserve holders of Western Europe, and even by the sterling-area countries, have become increasingly dependent upon such negotiated agreements. Gold or exchange guarantees against devaluation risks were grudgingly granted by the United Kingdom and the United States in order to deter their creditors from speculative switches of their reserve assets from sterling into dollars, or from both into gold. The creditor countries, on the other hand, agreed to retain a specific portion of their total reserves in sterling, and to convert part of their "liquid" dollar claims into longer-term obligations.

Taken together, these various agreements, negotiated since 1963, now cover well over $11 billion of the combined dollar and sterling reserves ($24 billion) of foreign reserve holders. A further $3.3 billion of reserve credits have been extended to the United Kingdom and the United States through the mediation of the International Monetary Fund. Finally, a vast array of reciprocal credit lines—in the form of so-called "swap" or "reciprocal currency" agreements—have been negotiated among major central banks to protect them against speculative attacks on any one of their currencies.

All these negotiations and arrangements testify to the death of the traditional "gold-exchange standard" and to a de facto gradual shift toward what might be called a "negotiated credit-

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reserves standard." The official negotiators should be congratulated for having been able to avoid, in this way, a total collapse of the international monetary order. The new system, however, remains highly precarious, for it depends on continuous negotiation and re-negotiation of the short- or medium-term credit lines on which it rests. Some of the countries called upon to provide such financing also feel that it fails to provide adequate protection against the abuse of such facilities, primarily by the United States. They cling tenaciously to their legal right to gold conversion as their ultimate protection against such abuses and the total surrender of monetary sovereignty which might be imposed upon them if they were incorporated into a formal or informal "dollar area." The continuation of recent trends in that direction would be bound, sooner or later, to trigger a major breakdown, political as well as economic and financial, among the countries of the Atlantic Community. Responsible circles in the United States are keenly conscious of this danger, as is evidenced in the unanimous report of the Congressional Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments last September.

Gold, however, is incapable of providing a reasonable alternative to a "dollar-area" system of international reserves and settlements. The $3.7 billion losses experienced by the Gold Pool countries over a short period of six months (October 1967–March 1968) forced the liquidation of the pool and the hurried adoption of a precarious and ambiguously phrased agreement among its members—with the exception of France—that would, if faithfully and generally observed in the spirit as well as in the letter, freeze forever both the official gold price and the world monetary gold stock at their levels of March 18, 1968, irrespective of future developments in the private gold market.

This is most unlikely indeed to provide a long-term solution to the gold problem, as central banks can hardly be expected to remain forever indifferent to market developments regarding the price of a commodity in which they have invested close to $40 billion and which is still regarded by public opinion in many countries—no matter how erroneously—as the ultimate guarantee of their mounting issues of paper money.

If gold were the only alternative to a dollar-area system, governments would sooner or later have to resign themselves either to a fluctuating gold price, or to a substantial increase in its pres-

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ent price. In all probability, this would set the clock back to 1931, and postpone for many years to come the evolution toward rational reforms of the anachronistic and haphazard gold-exchange standard of yesteryear.[4]

VI

The way out of the present impasse lies in a comprehensive reform plan, inspired by the long-term historical evolution of the international monetary system. It should encompass all major aspects of the problem and thereby give adequate recognition to the convergent interests and feasible policy objectives of all countries concerned.

It was eighteen months ago that unanimous agreement was reached at Rio de Janeiro on the keystone of such a reform: the deliberate creation of centralized reserve assets in the form of internationally guaranteed claims on the IMF, usable and acceptable by all countries in all balance-of-payments settlements. A keystone, however, is not an edifice. The reform cannot stop with the mere superimposition of the new reserve asset upon the traditional ones. It must encompass the role of all three types of reserve assets—gold and reserve currencies as well as SDRs—in the orderly growth of world reserves and the improvement of the adjustment mechanism. The new reserve asset should be created by international agreement, in the amounts needed to substitute for—rather than merely add to—dwindling gold supplies and overflowing reserve currencies, and to adjust overall reserve growth to the requirements of an expanding world economy rather than to the vagaries of the gold market and of U.S. and U.K. balance of payments.

Surplus countries should accept such assets in settlement, retain them as reserves and be able to use them at any time to settle later deficits in their own international payments. They would remain free, of course, to slow down—or even reverse—their reserve accumulation by taking action to reduce their surpluses through trade or exchange liberalization, more expansionist monetary and fiscal policies, and/or larger outflows of capital.

[4] Contrary to Mr. Rueff's expectations, a straight devaluation might, as it did after the dollar devaluation of 1934, give a new breath of life to the dying gold-exchange standard, while a fluctuating dollar price of gold might impel most other countries to accept, at least temporarily, a dollar-area status rather than face the competitive handicap that would result for their industries from an appreciation of their currency in terms of the dollar and of the other currencies that kept stability with it.

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They should not be entitled, however, to force deflation, devaluation or restrictions upon the rest of the world by insisting on gold payments in excess of available supplies. Nor should they be allowed to arrogate to themselves the right to accumulate international reserves in any national currency they choose and then to switch at any time from one currency to another. All countries should agree to deny each other a right which exposes them to political blackmail by the reserve debtors as well as by the reserve holders. Surpluses should be accumulated exclusively—except for working balances—in the new IMF reserve asset.

Such a commitment by the surplus countries would endow the IMF with the lending potential needed to finance the deficits which are the counterparts of the other countries' surpluses. The overall volume of such financing, however, would be limited by rules restricting the IMF's creation of reserves to the amounts needed to sustain feasible, but non-inflationary, growth of the world economy. A presumptive guide-line of 4 to 5 percent per year would probably rally widespread agreement in this respect, but exceptions should be authorized, by qualified majority vote, to combat actual worldwide inflationary or deflationary pressures.

The use and allocation of this lending potential should be a matter for international decision, based on a collective judgment regarding the nature of the deficits. Temporary, reversible deficits, such as those triggered by speculative shifts of private funds among major financial centers, should be met by compensatory shifts of IMF investments from the countries in surplus to the countries in deficit. Persistent deficits calling for correction should be financed only as part and parcel of an agreed stabilization program, designed to eliminate them with a minimum of hardship to the deficit countries themselves as well as to their partners in world trade and finance. External deficits accompanied by internal inflationary pressures are a sign of "overspending," which should be corrected by changes in fiscal and monetary policies designed to equate expenditures with the country's productive capacity. On the other hand, the coincidence of deficits with deflationary pressures and unemployment would suggest that the root cause of the trouble lies in uncompetitive levels of prices and costs, for which a readjustment of exchange rates will often prove the most appropriate remedy.

If the deficit country feels unable to agree with its IMF part-

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ners on the action to be taken, it will, of course, retain its "sovereign" right to conduct its own affairs as it wishes, but not to obtain financing from other "sovereign" countries which disagree with its policies. The gradual depletion of its monetary reserves will willy-nilly force an adjustment of its exchange rate, though trade and exchange restrictions may postpone the day, if they are not made ineffective by other countries' retaliatory action.

More and more people now advocate a shift from stable to flexible exchange rates—whether or not they are limited to an agreed "band" or rate of "crawl"—as a way to strengthen the adjustment process in a nationalistic world. This would be an attractive solution for the disequilibria ascribable to international cost-price disparities, but might tend to foster unnecessary instability and actual distortions of exchange rates in the other two cases of deficits which call instead for financing or for changes in monetary and fiscal policies.

The reforms outlined so far would, moreover, remedy only imperfectly the so-called "deflationary bias" of the international monetary system. They would force the surplus countries to finance, but not to eliminate, disequilibria caused by deflationary errors in their own policies or to an undervalued exchange rate. Ideally, an excessive rate of reserve accumulation, even in the form of claims on the IMF, should force them to enter into policy consultations with the IMF, just as an excessive rate of reserve losses already imposes such consultations upon the deficit countries. In the absence of agreement, they should be enjoined from preventing an appreciation of their exchange rate through further market interventions and excessive reserve accumulation.

Merely to allow exchange-rate flexibility would be insufficient for this purpose, as was amply demonstrated by the outcome of the Bonn conference called last November to deal with the difficulties created for other countries by the obdurate surpluses of Germany and the rush of speculative capital into German marks. The United States, Britain, France and presumably other countries felt strongly that the best solution to the problem was a revaluation of the German mark, but even their combined pressure failed to persuade the German leaders to accept such advice. One may sympathize with the German view that the over-competitiveness of the mark is the result of the inflationary policies of other countries rather than of any deflationary policies in Germany. Yet, after such a situation has been allowed to develop,

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price or exchange-rate adaptations by Germany itself may prove far more feasible and less damaging to all concerned than alternative deflationary action or devaluation by many other countries.

VII

Agreement on all aspects of such ambitious reforms will obviously take time and will have to deal with a number of transitional problems, particularly regarding gold and the bloated reserve-currency balances inherited from the past. Both problems could be met through the creation of an International Conversion Account that would convert into reserve deposits or certificates, identical to the SDRs, all reserve-currency balances in excess of those actually needed for daily interventions in the exchange market. The Account would also issue such deposits or certificates in exchange for the gold it needed to intervene in the gold market, as its members jointly saw fit, in order to regain control over a market now abandoned to speculators by the two-tier decision of March 1968.

This proposal is no longer deemed as utopian and unnegotiable as it appeared to many when I first formulated it a few years ago. The abortive Maudling plan of 1962, but particularly the comprehensive sterling agreements of last September, demonstrate Britain's receptiveness to such a solution of the sterling problem. In the United States, its main features were unanimously endorsed last September by the Congressional Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments. Concrete proposals for such a "Conversion Account" were also developed by Finance Minister Colombo of Italy, and forcefully advocated by him at the last annual meeting of the IMF as an essential complement to the SDR agreement. Finally, President de Gaulle himself should logically welcome a plan that meets the two basic objectives repeatedly emphasized in all his speeches: the elimination of the "exorbitant privilege" of the reserve-currency countries to pay their deficits with their own IOUs, and "the organization of international credit . . . on an indisputable monetary basis bearing the mark of no particular country."

De Gaulle, of course, proposes that the basis be gold, while most of my academic colleagues and Congressional friends would, on the contrary, accelerate the "demonetization" of gold by converting all national gold reserves overnight into Conversion Ac-

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count deposits or certificates. I would myself favor such a solution, but do not feel that it will be negotiable until familiarity and experience with the new system have demonstrated its practicability and developed sufficient trust in the wisdom and fairness of its management.

Such an abrupt transformation of ingrained institutions and habits of mind is, in any case, unnecessary. My own proposals would recognize the essential—but no longer determinant—role which national gold holdings will inevitably retain in our international monetary system for some years to come. All that is needed, and negotiable, at this stage is to agree on those initial steps which are indispensable to meet present-day problems and to reopen the door to the evolutionary process that will gradually improve man's control over this crucial basis of his economic life in an increasingly interdependent world.

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COMING OF AGE IN MICRONESIA

By Philip W. Quigg

WE had best take note of Micronesia. It is, with Samoa and Okinawa, the one area of the world where "American colonialism" is an incontrovertible presence, where our responsibilities are not a matter of policy preference but of law. Except for Papua-New Guinea, which is officially headed for independence, it is the only remaining U.N. Trust Territory, and a unique one at that. No one knows where this splattering of Pacific islands is headed politically and perhaps only the Defense Department really cares. But having completed 21 years under American authority, the Micronesians are expected to vote soon on whether they will freely associate with the United States or strike out on their own.

How is one to become concerned about a people so limited in numbers that they could be fitted into the Rose Bowl, though they are scattered over an ocean area the size of the United States? With all our problems at home and abroad, how can we worry about a hundred thousand lotus-eaters on their picturesque atolls which total only 700 square miles? The answer is that we have a particular legal obligation to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands unlike any other; that we have a national, strategic interest in the Territory which is hardly exceeded anywhere; and that failure to recognize these obligations and interests may carry stiff penalties. That we also have a special moral obligation to the Micronesians, who have been pawns of the great powers for a century, is an added factor that will be acknowledged by some if not by others.

A measure of the Micronesians' condition today can be gained from the fact that their second largest export is scrap metal from World War II. Their population is half what it was a century ago when Spain dominated the islands, as it had for three centuries, bringing them little but Christianity. In the 1880s came the Germans to challenge the Spaniards, first with gun-boats, then with the equivalent of $4.5 million to purchase the islands after Spain's defeat in the Spanish-American War and our seizure of Guam as part of the spoils. The Germans encouraged trade, increased the production of copra and seized lands not actually occupied by Micronesians. These lands, constituting 53 percent

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

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of the total, are still inaccessible to the Micronesians, for whom the United States holds them in public trust.

Next came the Japanese who, having seized the islands early in World War I, administered them under a League of Nations Mandate in the interwar years. In their drive for self-sufficiency, the Japanese used Micronesia as an extension of their home islands, subsidizing agriculture, building fisheries and populating the islands with their own. There were incidental advantages for the Micronesians and, despite the harsh military occupation that concluded the period, many islanders look back on the thirties as the happy days. Then, in a matter of hours, all that had been built up was serially destroyed by war. A quarter of a century later that infrastructure still has not been replaced. The pot-holed roads are those the Japanese left and some of the bomb-scarred structures of reinforced concrete are still in use, supplemented by Quonset huts and other corrugated monuments to the Second World War.

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, like so many political entities today, is an historical accident of the colonial period and therefore an artificial creation. It is composed of a number of distinct cultures and at least nine languages plus many dialects. It includes two Polynesian islands but excludes Guam, which is one of the Marianas and therefore should belong. Of its 2100 islands less than a hundred are inhabited; yet even this number is too large, for only with greater concentration of population will it be possible to achieve significant economic development or provide adequate public services.

Each of the six administrative Districts into which the islands have been divided (see map) contains one dominant cultural group plus minorities (generally on outlying and therefore neglected islands) who feel as put-upon as any in the world. Some people believe the Territory should not be pushed into one mold, but under the terms of our treaty with the United Nations we are obliged to treat Micronesia as an entity at least as long as the Trusteeship lasts. By then it seems likely that the Micronesians will have achieved enough cohesion to turn their backs on all suggestions for fragmenting the area. Nevertheless, their sense of strangeness, even fear of one another, is one reason they may oppose the option of independence when it is offered.

Like Japan, the United States has provided Micronesia both military and civilian administrations. Until very recently, the

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budget for the whole Territory was about $7 million. By the time the salaries and emoluments of the American administrators had been paid, there was little left for development, and Micronesia stagnated. The official justification for so small an appropriation was that we did not want to make the Micronesians permanent wards by establishing a budget which they could never hope to meet from their own resources. By a coincidence which does not escape the notice of Micronesians, a change in this philosophy occurred as the war in Viet Nam began to escalate and as the Japanese heightened the pressure to force us out of Okinawa. Whatever impetus these events added, the change was in fact planned before they became significant.

Within a few years, the budget has risen to about $40 million, including supplemental appropriations and emergency funds to repair the ravages of Typhoon Jean, which swept through the islands a year ago. The outgoing Administration has asked for $41.2 million next year. So far, the increase has not shown dramatically. Micronesians complain that the lion's share of the budget goes for goods and services which primarily benefit the American administrators. It is true that electrification and sewage have a way of ending at the edge of District centers where Americans are concentrated. Except on Saipan, which is the headquarters of the High Commissioner, almost nothing has been done to repair roads and only nine miles of resurfacing is budgeted for the next fiscal year. There are more studies than development projects going on. Inexplicably at a time of increasing budgets, the Farm Institute on Ponape, the only place where there was serious agricultural research and experimentation, was simply eliminated last year "for lack of funds." Transportation and communication except between District headquarters are lamentable, though it must be admitted that an adequate system would be uneconomic in the extreme—as is the case with so many things that need doing in Micronesia, where so few people are scattered over such an enormous area. Also, high salaries are required to induce competent Americans to serve in Micronesia and transportation costs may double or triple the price of a school desk or an earth mover purchased in the United States.

Nevertheless, progress is being made and there are some real achievements. Our best efforts have been in health and education. There is some question, particularly in the minds of Micronesians, whether the education offered is that best suited to the

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people, and certainly vocational education has lagged till now. Adequate training for municipal officials and lesser bureaucrats is not yet even contemplated. Also the education available has varied enormously from one District to another. In Palau and the Marianas, for example, it is estimated that 90 percent of those who want to go to high school are accommodated, while the figure for Truk and the Marshall Islands is probably 25 percent.

The Peace Corps has helped, though their overwhelming presence, which has doubled the American population, is a matter of controversy among Americans and Micronesians alike. There are more Volunteers in relation to population than any place in the world—some 600, of whom only a small minority have a skill. Some lack the dedication associated with the Peace Corps and some are no doubt incompetent, as the professional educators in the Territory are disposed to believe. But what particularly galls the administrators is that the Peace Corps Volunteers are "meddling" in local politics, which they are expressly prohibited from doing. The Volunteers reply that Micronesia is not an independent country whose sovereignty must be respected, that their commitment is to the people whom they elected to serve and that they are under no obligation to defend policies of the United States with which they disagree. In some respects they cause considerable mischief—as when they proliferate rumors about impending military installations or, on moral grounds but without consideration of the economic consequences, they encourage Micronesians to demand equal pay for equal work (with Americans). Yet they are making a contribution which would not otherwise be made on the same scale, and on balance even their political activism may be beneficial in goading the Administration and alerting the Micronesians to their rights and interests.

Our greatest achievements in Micronesia have cost next to nothing. These have had to do with the creation of democratic institutions, including legislative bodies, the rudiments of a free press and the principle that free speech is not only tolerated but encouraged.[1] Popularly elected Municipal Councils and District

[1] The Judiciary is independent of the High Commissioner to the extent that the Chief Justice and the two Associate Justices (all Americans) are appointed by and responsible to the Secretary of the Interior. Judges of the lower courts are Micronesians and in murder cases two Micronesians sit with the Chief Justice or the Associate Justice.

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Legislatures are well established. The Micronesian Congress, consisting of a 12-member Senate (two from each District) and a 21-member House, is now in its fifth session. Its legislative powers are heavily circumscribed and subject to veto by the High Commissioner, but the Congressmen are gaining experience and emerging as a focus of pressure on the Trust Territory government. Soon, though, they must be granted greater responsibilities.

Most recently the beginnings of a press have appeared, publicly subsidized but remarkably free. A Micronesian News Service, with headquarters on Saipan and staffed largely by Peace Corps, serves both District radio stations and twice-monthly mimeographed newspapers printed in parallel columns in English and the local language. A majority of the news items are of course locally produced and are supplemented by editorials and letters, but the News Service, by providing material of Micronesian-wide interest, is helping to force a sense of collective identity among the islanders. In addition, a quarterly *Micronesian Reporter,* in English, does a highly professional job of reporting and analyzing major problems and issues of the Territory, not fearing to explore the most controversial matters. None of these periodicals hesitates to be outspoken and critical (and sometimes misinformed), with the result that the Trust Territory Administration is in a constant state of tension between its pride in having established a free press and a feeling that one or another of the local Micronesian editors has really gone beyond the pale.

Actually it is not easy for Micronesians to learn that they may express themselves freely. It was not permitted in their chiefly tradition and it was not tolerated by their former colonial masters. Within their cultures it remains unseemly to be outspoken. But there are enough thoroughly Westernized Micronesians around to put the Americans' principles to a severe test.

II

It is often said that we are giving Micronesians education but nothing to do with it. The most recent visiting mission of the United Nations, whose detailed report was fair and balanced, was particularly critical of our failure to provide economic opportunity. The Nathan Report said, among other things: "There is also the ever-present possibility that further increasing gov-

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ernment employment while neglecting the needs of private enterprise will absorb most of the available supply of both skilled and unskilled wage workers and thereby create an economy supported mainly by the government and increasingly dependent on imported goods of all kinds."[2]

The sorry truth, however, is that Micronesia's potential for economic development is very poor. Some of the obstacles to development are cultural. Perhaps the most serious is the extended-family system whereby wealth must be shared and any have-not is entitled to cadge on a relative who has. This social pattern, so familiar in the underdeveloped world, does not encourage individual enterprise or the accumulation of capital. It is reinforced in Micronesia by the very ease of living, where all the essentials of life are at hand for the taking and there is no need to lay up stores against a harsh winter (though in fact Micronesians prefer imported foods, especially in cans). A third factor is that a people who have had four colonial masters within living memory, who have seen things given and things taken away in apparently aimless or contradictory ways, are likely to have developed a psychology of dependence. The wonder is not that so many Micronesians are passive supplicants, but that so many are showing enterprise in solving their own problems (though here the difference among the peoples of Micronesia is marked). For example, the Palauans are exceptionally competitive and the Ponapeans support their own rice research and are building roads on a base of coral rock laid by hand.

Much more serious than any cultural obstacles is the simple fact that Micronesia has little natural wealth. So far, the only significant money-maker is copra, and even this is subsidized by artificially low shipping rates. Fishing, the only activity that the Japanese found profitable despite enormous effort, is one of the very few enterprises that has real promise, and much more effort needs to be put into it. Thus far there is only one commercial undertaking—a tuna catching and freezing operation in Palau; meanwhile Micronesians buy quantities of canned fish from Japan, much of it no doubt taken out of their own waters. Strangely, Micronesians do not especially like the sea; many fear the open water and most fishing is done within the lagoons, where the supply may become exhausted.

[2] Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., "Economic Development Plan for Micronesia." Summary Report, Washington, D.C., April 1967, p. 3.

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While agriculture can be improved so as to reduce the heavy dependence on imports, the search for export crops other than copra has so far been unrewarding. At the moment, cacao and pepper look promising, but an experiment in rice growing on Ponape is floundering. Ken Jones, Guam's multimillionaire entrepreneur, has leased a large tract on Tinian and is experimenting with beef cattle, for which there is a good market in Guam. Similarly, an effort is being made to prove that mechanized truck farming is possible on Rota, which is also accessible to the Guam market. But none of these modest operations will have a major impact or alter the fact that the soil of Micronesia is poor and that probably only 15 percent of the land is arable. Much of the rest may be suitable for forestry, which would both reduce erosion and lessen the need for building materials from abroad, but lumber for export, except to Guam, is not likely to be economical.

The same applies to light industry, and for the same reason: there is no sufficient concentration of labor or materials in one place. Many Micronesians ask why they cannot have processing plants for their coconuts. The answer is that, as compared to the Philippines or Indonesia or New Guinea, there are not enough coconuts potentially within economic reach of a plant. Although there is underemployment in Micronesia, there is no unemployment and the labor force is so small and scattered that labor-intensive enterprises are impractical.

Another deterrent to private capital investment is that Americans cannot own land in Micronesia—a reasonable precaution if the islanders are to be protected from exploitation and if we are to fulfill our obligation to hold their lands in trust until such time as they are capable of handling their own affairs. But the effect is to discourage investment, and even to deter Micronesian enterprise, since American bank loans are hard to obtain where mortgages are meaningless. Meanwhile, economic development is further slowed by the very uncertainty of Micronesia's political future.

A principal hope is tourism, about which the Micronesians feel—with some reason—ambivalent. Most realize that they must exploit such slender resources as they have, and the beauty of their islands and their unspoiled culture, especially in the remoter islands, can be an enormous attraction as soon as minimum facilities are available. Continental Airlines, the only airline providing service in the islands, is committed to building

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six first-class hotels—one for each District—in the next three years. Many Micronesians are unhappy about it. They correctly see that the intrusion of thousands of tourists will alter their way of life and that what now is natural may become vulgar and commercial. The Yapese are particularly opposed to outsiders and their District Legislature has passed a resolution opposing the construction of a hotel for tourists. Nevertheless, tourism is on the way, partly because improved transportation makes it inevitable, partly because a significant group of Micronesians is in favor of it and partly because the Americans see it as a necessity. The Japanese are already there, visiting their shrines and the graves of their war dead.

What is left as a source of revenue? Micronesia's most treasured possession, land. By leasing land to the Defense Department at high rates, the Territory could obtain an important source of revenue, while the indirect flow of cash in the form of wages and expenditures by servicemen could be very substantial. It is a matter of profound controversy among Micronesians whether they should do so, assuming, as most people do, that the American military is—or will be—interested.

So far, the Americans have not asked but taken, and negotiated the price afterwards. We drove Micronesians off Bikini and put them on Rongerik and Kili; we lifted them off Eniwetok and put them on the now rat-infested island of Ujelang, 300 miles from the nearest island and 600 miles from the District center; we pushed them off Kwajalein and dumped them on Ebeye, which for years was a ghetto of the most appalling sort. Nothing we have done or failed to do in 22 years has caused so much bitterness as this arbitrary removal of people from their land without adequate compensation.

By law we were entitled to do so. When we took over the islands from the Japanese, we were obliged—consistent with our assertion that we fought the war for no territorial gain—to put Micronesia under U.N. Trusteeship. But we insisted on having the islands designated a Strategic Area in which we had the right to install military bases in the interest of Western defense. Sumner Welles at the time called the agreement "a vicious precedent." According to the agreement, we are responsible not to the General Assembly, as is the case with other administering powers, but to the Security Council where we have a veto. Actually, there are still no bases as such in the Territory; the islands

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confiscated were or are used for atomic testing and experiments in developing anti-ballistic missile systems. Now that our days on Okinawa appear numbered and our bases in the Philippines are a political football in a highly unstable domestic situation, the Defense Department is undoubtedly giving careful study to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands as a fallback area. Every District is alive with rumors that this or that piece of land is about to be confiscated and used as a base. The rumors have some basis in that many plans undoubtedly exist; but it seems equally likely that no decisions have been made.

One reason is that, until the future status of Micronesia is clear, the Defense Department is reluctant to put large investments into property that is not ours. Another is that until the new Administration in Washington decides what role we should play in Asia, what sort of presence in the Western Pacific is required to support our policies, the military can hardly determine what forces and facilities are needed. And basic decisions with regard to Okinawa must certainly precede those with regard to Micronesia. From a purely physical standpoint, there is enough real estate on Guam (a U.S. possession) to replace our facilities on Okinawa and most of those in Japan, though of course one would not want to put all one's military eggs in so small a basket. But so far there is no visible expansion of facilities even on Guam. The State Department also has an interest in postponing any military decisions with respect to Micronesia, for the construction of military bases there, despite its legality, would cause a storm in the United Nations. But understandably the Micronesians are not convinced that further seizures of land are not imminent, and their elected Congress has passed a strong resolution (vetoed by the High Commissioner) to the effect that Micronesians must be consulted before any further military installations are constructed.

Although many Micronesians, especially among the young, are bitterly opposed to military bases of any kind, on any terms, it seems likely that a majority of influential Micronesians will voluntarily accept bases if the price is right. They realize that American interest in the Territory stems largely from considerations of strategy and that bases must bring a greater measure of wealth and opportunity than anything else in prospect. But no one is happy about it, and Micronesians who favor bases are determined to drive the hardest possible bargain. Judging from

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the precedent set in Kwajalein after extended litigation, the price will start at $1,000 an acre for occupied land—possibly somewhat less for "public lands" now held in trust.

III

Indeed, this determination to obtain the best possible terms is at the heart of the movement—such as it is—for independence. Even among Micronesians who realize that independence is not economically feasible, some assert that "only if we are independent will we be able to negotiate with you Americans as equals. Basically, our real estate is all you want and all we have to sell [read 'lease'] and we're determined to get a fair price for it."

Actually most Micronesians don't know what future status they want. The Congress of Micronesia has appointed six of its most able members to a Status Commission to explore the alternatives, to inform the people on the range of possibilities and ultimately to define the options on which Micronesia may conduct a plebiscite, originally requested for 1972, but now almost certainly at a somewhat later date. On the American side, President Johnson asked the Congress to establish a parallel commission. The Senate complied, but the House refused, partly out of personal pique on the part of Wayne N. Aspinall, Chairman of the House Interior Committee, partly out of a feeling that a plebiscite would be premature and partly out of the belief of some Committee members that they themselves constituted the appropriate body to make recommendations. Though one can argue that we ought to improve our performance as Administering Authority before the Micronesians are asked to make the critical decision, it is almost certain that we will not be able to better our administrative record as fast as the mood of self-assertiveness will rise among the Micronesians. Therefore a delay is not necessarily to our advantage.

A widespread view in Washington, especially in the Defense Department, is that independence is not a realistic option and that it would therefore be dishonest to offer it. The State Department rightly points out that we are legally obliged by treaty with the United Nations to offer the alternative of independence, and that the U.N. will insist upon it, however impractical.

One of the problems of the Micronesian Status Commission is to reduce and simplify the possible alternatives to manageable

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proportions without closing out options on which the people are entitled to a choice. In order to obtain a substantial majority, it would be desirable to reduce the alternatives to two; three would be the maximum. The most likely three are: continuation of the Trusteeship Agreement, free association with the United States, and independence. Some Micronesians feel that the first alternative could be dropped simply by waiting until there was an evident consensus that some new arrangement was desired. Since the majority of Micronesians still follow the counsel if not the orders of their chiefs, the number of people who will actually make the decision is likely to be relatively small. Most Micronesians today, even among the well educated, agree that they simply do not know enough about what the alternatives mean to make an intelligent decision. Nevertheless, there is already an unspoken assumption among Micronesians as well as Americans that the islanders will opt for association with the United States. One of the critical questions which has not yet been faced is whether the terms of that association will be fully defined before or after the plebiscite. Almost certainly, the Micronesians will insist that they be spelled out in advance.

If we believe that independence is either impracticable or contrary to our national interest or both, then there are things we can and should be doing to encourage the outcome we want:

1. We should assure the Micronesians now that we will not confiscate land or establish military bases in the islands without full consultation and fair compensation. Pending a more permanent status, it would be understood that this was a matter of policy not of right, and that its continuance was subject to their negotiating in good faith and without intolerable delay, should the occasion arise. On our part, every effort should be made, if bases are deemed necessary, to use public lands which will involve a minimum displacement of people. Meanwhile, a little more candor on the part of the military as to what they are, or are not, up to would not endanger our security and would do much to improve the climate of opinion in Micronesia.

2. Until the future status of the Trust Territory is determined, its administration should be taken out of the Department of the Interior and placed directly in the White House. For more than two decades, Micronesia has been everybody's stepchild. The Departments of Interior, Defense and State bicker over their conflicting interests, but nothing gets resolved. Micronesia has

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no constituency and each Secretary has bigger fish to fry. Washington has no agreed policy with respect to Micronesia and it will take a great deal of head-knocking to get one even within the Executive Branch. This will be only the beginning, for then the President must obtain the support of Congress, the acquiescence of the United Nations and the approval of the Micronesians. For the next few years, the subject of Micronesia, with all its colonial and strategic overtones, is going to be too important a matter to be treated like a poor sister to the Virgin Islands.

3. To encourage the Micronesians to tax themselves, to encourage a sense of unity among diverse island peoples and to remove the Micronesian Congress' sense of impotence, the United States should agree to provide $3 for every $1 collected in taxes by the Micronesian Congress—the whole to be appropriated as the Micronesian Congress sees fit after due consultation and coördination with the Administering Authority. The entire sum would still be only a small fraction of what is being spent, but as it is now, 95 percent of the funds available are those appropriated by the U.S. Congress, which has shown no inclination to let a penny out of its ultimate control. This, combined with the power of the High Commissioner to veto any legislation passed by the Congress of Micronesia, is an invitation to irresponsibility and precludes any genuine experience in the appropriation of funds and the administration of projects. Many Micronesians wonder whether they are participating in a shadow play and whether the whole exercise of ostensible self-government is not a mockery. The Congress of Micronesia is composed of shrewd and able men and if they are not given something to do commensurate with their talents they are going to cause us a lot of trouble. Moreover, if Micronesia is to emerge as an entity bigger than the collection of disparate linguistic and cultural groups out of which it has been created, Micronesians must learn to look to their central government confident of some return. As it is now, for most Micronesians, their Municipal Councils and District Legislatures are more important bodies than the Congress, and they collect more taxes.

4. Remove all barriers to the entry of Micronesian products to the United States. It is absurdly anachronistic to treat Micronesia as a foreign country when we are providing not only regular Congressional appropriations but also poverty funds under the

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domestic Office of Economic Opportunity and emergency disaster funds (for typhoon damage). Although removal of duties would not be of great economic importance immediately, by the same token it would not hurt domestic producers, and the act would have a significance beyond the dollars involved. For example, it is inexcusable for us to apply a 35 percent duty on canned fish, one of the very few industries that Micronesia may be capable of achieving—the more so when other countries are prohibited from investing in Micronesia.

5. Let us at least explore further the possibility of admitting foreign capital. Theoretically, under the "most-favored-nation" clause of our treaty with the United Nations, if we let one country in, we must let in all, including the Soviet Union and Communist China. But many knowledgeable observers believe that a way around this requirement could be found. So far, only Japan has shown a keen interest. One obstacle to its admission has been Japan's stubborn refusal to pay $5 million in cash against Micronesians' war-damage claims. After negotiating for fifteen years, while the Micronesians and the United Nations became increasingly impatient, we now appear to be near a settlement—on Japanese terms. With that out of the way, we should announce that proposals for investment will be considered on their individual merits, that approval must be obtained from the Micronesian Congress as well as the Administering Authority, and that stiff conditions will be laid down with respect to length of leases, the training of Micronesians and the admission of Micronesian capital to the venture. The most likely investment is in fisheries, which Micronesia particularly needs, and since the Japanese are already doing by far the greater part of the fishing in their waters, Micronesians ought to get some advantage from it. Imposing the three-mile limit, when it can be enforced, is no disadvantage to Japanese fishing boats, though it is sufficiently inconvenient that the Japanese have sometimes sabotaged their own ships as a means of obtaining entry into Micronesian ports for fresh food and water.

IV

Perhaps the most important thing we can do at this stage is to give the Micronesians a greater sense of participation in their own affairs. The concern uppermost in the minds of their leaders is that we are irreparably affecting their society—almost un-

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thinkingly and often without consulting them. They feel overwhelmed by the impact of America and Americans. Their poignant hope of preserving their culture while achieving the good things of the modern world will not be realized; they know that the outcome will be a fluid and unsatisfactory compromise, but they would like to feel that they have some control over their own destiny.

Possibly the best and worst that any colonial power has done, or is able to do, is to give its subject peoples the gift of what it most cherishes—whether it be British justice or French culture or American conceptions of democracy and individualism. When it has done less than this, it has generally become quite simply exploitative. We have not exploited the Micronesians and we have not imposed our democratic institutions on them; they have been sought after. But in subtler ways we are doing what all colonial powers have done—assumed that we knew what was best for our wards, without much regard for their own preferences. Micronesia is particularly vulnerable because it is so small and fragmented and its culture has bent to so many winds in the past.

When we left the Micronesians largely to their own devices, we were accused of following a "zoo" philosophy, of romanticizing a primitive state of nature which was already gone. Now that we have finally plunged into the tasks of development, we are accused of being too aggressive in pursuit of progress. It is a harsh dilemma and an administrator can fairly say that if he consulted the Micronesians at every step, nothing would get done. By American standards, Micronesians like to take ample time to ponder a decision and their tradition of operating by consensus (where they do not simply take the orders of a chief) is time-consuming and means that action can easily be blocked.

Nevertheless, there are things that could be done, especially at the highest level—that of the Micronesian Congress, composed of the most Westernized element in the population—to improve consultation and joint planning. Committees of the Micronesian Congress should sit regularly with the Commissioners (department heads) and their staffs. Instead of submitting only the budget to Congress, the plans on which the budget is based should be submitted well before the proposed budget is forwarded to Washington. School curricula, which are generally patterned directly on the American model, are of particular

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concern to Micronesians, and their views deserve to be taken more fully into account.

If development is thereby slowed down somewhat, the price will be well worth it in terms of improved relationships and a lessening of Micronesian fears that they have no alternative between abysmal poverty in independence and being steamrollered into something they do not want to be by a well-meaning but heavy-handed America. We are entering a critical time in our relationship with the Micronesians. These gracious and friendly people deserve our very best and, as the world's most articulate anti-colonialists, we have a special obligation to ourselves to improve on past standards in the field of colonial administration. After years of appalling neglect, we are now doing a responsible but uninspired job. The Micronesians and their incomparably beautiful islands would be an ornament to the United States. If we have selfish reasons for hoping they will freely elect to continue their association with us in dignity and self-government, so much the better for the Micronesians, who have no viable alternative.

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JAPAN BEYOND 1970

By Kei Wakaizumi

JAPAN'S gross national product has been expanding at the scarcely believable rate of more than 10 percent annually. It is evident that growth of this sort means major changes in quick succession. By the mid-1970s, if Japan sustains its current economic pace and the rest of Asia also continues at its present rate, Japan's GNP would virtually equal that of all other Asian countries combined, Mainland China included. Herman Kahn has pointed out that projection of present trends will give Japanese a per capita income equal to that of Americans soon after the year 2000.

Even if we assume that these projections will not be fully realized, Japan is already the third economic power in the world and seems to be on the verge of still greater achievement. Yet Japan's concern with the world outside has been largely confined to selling its goods and making money. Such a policy was acceptable when Japan was recovering from its defeat in the War of the Pacific, but the nation cannot continue in this fashion. As President Nixon wrote in *Foreign Affairs* in October 1967, "Looking toward the future, one must recognize that it simply is not realistic to expect a nation moving into the first rank of major powers to be totally dependent for its own security on another nation, however close the ties."

Prime Minister Sato has stated that Okinawa is the most important foreign policy issue for Japan in 1969. For after 1970 the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty may be abrogated on one year's notice. Implicit in the Prime Minister's statement was the awareness that the Okinawa problem is essentially up to the Japanese to solve. The Japanese themselves, and only they, are capable of determining their own destiny: What do they want? And why? And how do they propose to accomplish their aims? It is, essentially, a question of national self-definition.

The present leaders of Japan (who will continue to hold power in the early 1970s) have personally experienced the Pacific War and its aftermath of defeat. This experience produced the "postwar hangover," a uniquely Japanese pattern of pathological consciousness compounded of resentment, humiliation and a sense

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of guilt about the violence and aggressiveness of Japan's militarists in subjugating other nations. (While Japanese feel shame at their behavior toward their neighbors, Hiroshima and Nagasaki erased the sense of guilt Japanese might have felt toward the United States because of Pearl Harbor.) The "hangover" has been particularly pronounced among intellectuals, who had no effective answer to militarism, and who saw the cherished postwar democracy handed to Japan by its conqueror.

Japan's unconditional surrender in 1945 was moral as well as military. Japanese lost the confidence and pride—both good and bad—which they felt during the Greater Japanese Empire period. Japan became timorous politically. The people sought a safe expression of their energies in commerce, but success in that field has raised again the problems of international scope which the nation sought to avoid. Astute foreign observers criticize Japan for its irresponsibility—its extreme, unrealistic idealism and failure to face international issues squarely. Today's leaders, immobilized by their postwar lethargy, resemble mountain climbers who, finding themselves engulfed in mist, sit it out to wait until the fog clears.

Japan probably cannot expect the needed fresh approach to international problems from leaders who have experienced this hangover. Today, however, the younger generation expresses strong dissatisfaction at the psychological set of their elders. This "born-in-Showa" generation—those born since 1926, the year of Emperor Hirohito's accession—now constitute more than 72 percent of the Japanese population.

In any age in any nation the elders talk of the past, while the young look to the future. Japan is no exception. The eyes of the young are far less clouded by preconceptions and prejudices than are the eyes of their parents; their thinking, essentially pragmatic, reflects the influence of the American educational pattern introduced after the war. Contrary to popular belief, most of the young generation in Japan, while seemingly emotional in behavior, are probably more rational than their elders.

In their pursuit of rational analysis, they seriously debate about the very significance of man's existence. The disproportionately influential *Zengakuren,* like minority radical student movements in many other advanced nations, emphasizes the "alienation" or "cog-in-wheel" status of the individual in a managerial or industrial society; it rejects the present system and

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seeks its downfall. But most of the younger generation realize that the destruction of the managerial society would probably lead either to complete anarchy or to the building of a new type of managerial society. Most shun anarchy while, however, feeling much emotional sympathy with violent student protest.

The born-in-Showa generation already comprises 57 percent of the voting population. However, because Japan still respects age, this generation will not achieve real power until the late 1970s. Then we may hope that Japan will look upon the international scene with a sense of balance, will establish positive diplomatic and security policies based on true national interest, and will take independent action to achieve national goals.

Since this probing for new national goals will take time, the first half of the 1970s may be regarded as a transitional stage of preparation for the latter half of the decade when Japan's truly self-generated foreign policy may be expanded. During this transitional stage, the younger generation will pressure the older one to discard its ostrich-like postwar attitudes and will continue to criticize existing policies. In the process of defining goals truly appropriate for Japan within the new nationalism sprouting in the country, the younger generation will unavoidably find itself taking the initiative. One striking example shows that this is happening already.

Last year, in elections for the House of Councilors, the Japanese Senate, 35-year-old Sintaro Ishihara ran far ahead of all other candidates of all parties. He garnered over three million votes, which is more than the total cast for all Communist candidates combined and fully half as many as the votes for all nine *Komeito* candidates elected. Ishihara had written a well-known short story called "Season of the Sun," portraying the animal impulsiveness of his young generation. The term "sun tribe" became popular in the Japanese vocabulary. When Ishihara stood atop his campaign truck, an emblem of the national flag sewn on his jacket, and severely criticized the old habits and hidebound policies of his own party (the Liberal Democrats), challenging his countrymen to rethink Japan's nuclear policy by breaking the taboos on discussion of the atom, elderly and middle-aged people were amazed. Behind this reaction was their traumatic experience during the war. The younger listeners, however, had neither experienced the war nor felt any responsibility for it. They applauded.

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Because the political atmosphere and the power structure in Japan can be expected to change markedly between the early and later years of the next decade, we will consider the early and later 1970s as two separate periods.

II

With regard to the primary issue facing Japan—what to do about the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States —it is a fair certainty that the Government of the Liberal-Democratic Party, which is expected to continue in power in 1970, and the majority of the Japanese people who support it, will choose automatic extension of the treaty, leaving major security decisions for a later time. A second likelihood is that the administration of Okinawa will revert to Japan during the first half of the 1970s, despite difficulties yet to be resolved concerning the use of the military bases. The Japanese and American Governments must deal with already explosive issues such as Okinawa and trade restrictions in such a way as to prevent public outcries which might compel renunciation of the Treaty by Washington or Tokyo.

What should be Japan's policy in the first half of the 1970s? As a matter of basic posture, Japan should and will discard its past escapism and begin to define what role it wants and is able to play, and be ready to pay its share of the price of peace and prosperity. It is only natural to expect this. A great trading nation like Japan is very dependent on world trends and cannot exist in isolation. Specifically, the following policies should be considered with special emphasis:

First, the maintenance of friendly relations between the United States and Japan is vital to the economy, political health and security of the nation. Japan will probably have to, and indeed will wish to, rely on the nuclear umbrella of the United States as it has done in the past. At the level of conventional weapons, however, Japan as an island nation should increase its defense capacity to the point where it could, without the aid of American forces, deter conventionally armed external aggressors or could repel them in the event aggression actually occurred. A strong will for independence among the people and the establishment of their own policy are essential to achieve this. And recently an increasing number of Japanese voices have been calling for independent self-defense.

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Japan's defense budget for fiscal 1968 was $1.17 billion, or 0.83 percent of her gross national product. A rough estimate indicates that an expenditure of at least 2 percent of her GNP is required to achieve adequate preparedness for deterrence and defense. In light of the fact that nearly all advanced nations of Europe and America expend more than 4 percent of their GNP on national defense[1] the rate of 2 percent is certainly reasonable.

A second objective for Japan is to make a positive contribution to building the foundations for peace and security, especially in Asia, through coöperation with the developing nations in achieving growth and prosperity. Of course this contribution may not ensure peace and security, but it will help to provide more favorable conditions for peaceful development. Japan's basic attitude should be to respect the nation-states it aids by responding to their requests for coöperation and by aiding and encouraging their efforts to help themselves.

At last year's UNCTAD meeting in New Delhi, it was resolved that aid-givers should set as their objective 1 percent of their GNP. Japan should try to achieve this quickly and even double the present 0.74 percent ($855 million in 1967) to nearly 1.5 percent by 1975. This involves of course not merely increasing the amount of aid, but accumulating experience in how to promote such aid effectively. Japan should, with due understanding of the nationalism in the recipient Asian nations, take the lead among the advanced industrial nations in dealing with the problems of development. This is indeed an appropriate field in which Japan might well strive to be first; in terms of GNP it ranked sixth among aid-givers in 1967, with France the leader. The other advanced industrial nations might hopefully accept Japan's challenge and participate in this peaceful competition.

Within Japan at the present time, the opposition to bold policy proposals such as these probably constitutes an overwhelming majority. Some officials in the Finance Ministry would surely consider it madness to propose giving aid totalling 1.5 percent of the GNP. This is a natural reaction for men in their position. To be sure, compared to other advanced nations, the Japanese economy still has its fragile aspects (low per capita income, foreign currency reserves which are small compared to

[1] The United States spends 9.8 percent; the U.S.S.R., 9.6; Communist China, 9.2; Britain, 5.7; France, 5.3; West Germany, 4.3. (Institute for Strategic Studies, London: "The Military Balance, 1968–1969.")

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the scale of the economy, inadequate social capital, differences and inequalities between big business and medium and small enterprises, etc.). For these reasons Japan heretofore has avoided international responsibilities and obligations wherever possible. But if Japan continues to employ such excuses, it will never be able to gain the respect due it as a great economic power, nor overcome the scorn of other nations which consider it a mere "economic animal." And much more is at stake than just the nation's prestige; decidedly more important is the discrepancy between such an evasion of responsibility and Japan's long-term national interests.

As noted earlier, with most of the advanced Western nations spending well over 4 percent of their GNP for defense, Japan's expenditure of close to 3.5 percent on defense and aid *together* would certainly not be an excessive outlay for the sake of its own peace and prosperity.

Third, U.N. peace-keeping offers Japan an ideal opportunity to make an international contribution—of personnel, materials and funds. Although it has been questioned whether this is in accordance with Japan's Constitution, coöperation in U.N. peace-keeping activities does not contradict the spirit of either the Preamble or Article IX. Japan should not restrict its activities exclusively to the maintenance of its own peace and security, but should continue efforts to link these activities constantly with mankind's great desire to establish and to maintain global peace and security. Any pacifism in any nation which does not take cognizance of this imperative is merely national egoism. Japan should demonstrate this in practice at the same time that it appeals to other nations to secure peace.

Fourth, Japan's geopolitical position as a part of Asia is often noted, but it is equally true that Japan is a part of the whole Pacific community. Certainly, Japan's friendly relations with the United States are vitally important. But for Japan to be too intimately associated with the United States is not desirable for either party. Coöperative relations with Pacific nations other than the United States are clearly desirable for Japan and will help to change the impression at home and abroad that Japan is an American appendage. While firmly maintaining its warm ties with the United States, Japan should strengthen its relations —political and economic—with the other Pacific nations.

Concretely, Japan should consider more intensively the con-

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cept of a Pacific economic community and take initiatives toward its realization. As many tentative computations have already indicated, closer economic coöperation of the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan would bring great advantage for all the nations in the region. More important, it should also include economic coöperation with the less-developed nations of Asia and Latin America. Japan, particularly, should take the initiative in aid plans for Asia and should work for the promotion and strengthening of coöperative economic structures in the region, such as the Asian Development Bank. Japan must also support close coöperative relations between the Asian nations and the nations of the Pacific community. A greater political responsibility will inevitably ensue.

III

If Japan is to occupy a firm position as a responsible international power in the mid-1970s, policies such as these will have to be accepted and acted upon by that time. It is better to risk a domestic rebuff now than to continue evading responsibility, which will mean a rebuff from the international community in the future. If the recent growing demand in Japan for autonomous diplomacy is based on the assumption that it will be possible without this amount of cost and sacrifice, then the demand will degenerate into an empty slogan filled with self-righteousness.

By the mid-1970s, a fundamental study of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty will be unavoidable. By then it will no longer be useful or possible to take the Treaty as a given first principle or to simply support or simply oppose it. The Okinawa issue will have been settled, and ensuing events will have changed international relationships as we now know them. Assuming that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty continues in force after 1970 without change, the Japanese Government will be faced by the middle of the next decade with a fundamental choice in regard to the future of the Japanese-American security relationship. Three alternatives are likely to appear as possible options at that time: (1) renunciation of the Treaty by either Tokyo or Washington and Japanese nuclear armament; (2) revision of the Treaty so that it provides only for U.S. nuclear protection of Japan in return for U.S. base rights, but with minimum contact; and (3) renegotiation of the Treaty leading to a close se-

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curity relationship on the basis of equality and mutual interest.

Of course, one can conceive of a policy combining conventional armaments with a policy of neutrality, or of a security treaty with either China or the Soviet Union, or both. But neither the former, which would not constitute an effective response to nuclear threats, nor the latter, which hardly seems possible within the conceivable future, is worth considering at any length. The policy of unarmed neutrality, still presently advocated by the main opposition (the Japan Socialist Party), has lost its magical charm. It has increasingly become an object of theoretical and academic interest. The limited support for this essentially evasive policy will be even less by the latter 1970s. So the three options remain the major possibilities.

These options may lead to some revision of the Constitution. The limitations imposed by Article IX of the present Constitution —the so-called "no war" clause which stipulates that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained"—will be thoroughly scrutinized. But even should those limitations be cast aside, the spirit of pacifism embodied in Article IX will surely be preserved.

The present Constitution has the unhappy history of having been adopted under the American Occupation, and it is inevitably judged to have been imposed. Consequently, the call for the Constitution to be rewritten, sooner or later, by the Japanese themselves, could even be termed a metabolic demand of healthy national self-assertion. Also, unless this happens, escape from Japan's postwar syndrome will not be complete.

The first of the three options—renunciation of the Treaty and Japanese nuclear armament—would involve a complete break with postwar foreign policy, which has been based on the assurance of U.S. protection. Those favoring nuclear armament are presently very few in number. But incipient nationalism and the consequent desire on the part of many Japanese for a free and independent Japan on an equal footing with the United States will almost certainly lead to a very careful consideration of this option. It will appeal particularly to the many Japanese who believe that the security relationship with the United States was imposed upon them at the end of the war. Moreover, some believe that nuclear arms, as a political weapon, can give nations strength in diplomatic manœuvres. Advocates of nuclear weapons also argue that research and development of such weapons

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would greatly stimulate the development of the latest technology, raising the overall level of technological competence in Japan. And even if there should be some limitation of U.S.-Soviet competition in nuclear arms, there will be China's continuing progress in nuclear arms to take into account.

It would not be surprising, then, if Japan should opt for nuclear armaments for reasons of nationalism and self-respect, in addition to anxiety for its own security. Even if only in theory, serious consideration will probably be given to the suitability and feasibility of various kinds of nuclear arms programs.

By 1975 the various domestic obstacles to nuclear arms (the Constitution and related laws, the "nuclear allergy" of the public, the noncoöperation of scientists, the financial and economic burdens, etc.) will have gradually lessened; but various international restrictions may remain as before (the danger of nuclear proliferation, the opposition of the United States, the Soviet Union and the Asian nations, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the danger of an expanding nuclear arms race between Japan and China, etc.). In such a situation, the choice to be made by the more open-minded younger generation cannot be entirely clear now. Already, however, in discussions on such matters as whether to sign the nonproliferation treaty or whether to enact the "three non-nuclear principles" (not to produce nuclear arms, not to possess them and not to allow them to be brought in) as a resolution in the National Diet, voices of the younger generation are saying: "Leave the choice on nuclear arms to the younger generation" or "Don't arbitrarily abandon our nuclear options." The probability that between 1975 and 1980 they will choose the road to nuclear armament, after carefully weighing other alternatives, is certainly not a small one.

On balance, however, it seems unlikely to be the deliberate choice of the Japanese Government, at least within the 1970s. Termination of the Japanese Security Treaty and the development of a nuclear weapons capability would be extremely costly. Such spending would not be popular in Japan and would be opposed by many politicians, businessmen and bureaucrats because of the adverse impact on Japan's economic growth, prosperity and balance-of-payments position. Nuclear weapons would be even more controversial on moral grounds. Although a majority of the people might well be prepared to support such a move as an act of nationalism and independence from the United States,

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a determined minority would almost certainly protest with rioting and further dissension.

The termination of the Japan-U.S. security relationship, including withdrawal of the United States from its bases in Japan and Okinawa, would almost certainly mean a reduction of the American involvement in Asia and a reduced willingness and capability to be involved in Asian conflicts. Japan might then be faced with the prospect of assuming responsibility for the security of East Asia. The provision of forces adequate to maintain stability in this area would require additional defense spending and a further amendment to the Constitution—all of which could adversely affect economic development and further increase internal dissension.

This course of action could also have a negative effect on all-important trade, particularly with the United States. A high volume of trade between any two industrialized nations is naturally accompanied by tensions and disputes. Moreover, Japan and the United States are increasingly competitive in the Asian market, which adds to the sense of conflict. Thus far such issues have been settled amicably, in large part because the negotiations have been conducted within the framework of a close alliance. In the absence of a sense of common security interests, trade and other economic relations could easily become strained and lead to actions which could damage the economies of both countries. Thus it is evident that renunciation of the Security Treaty is not an attractive alternative.

IV

The second alternative would call for a continuation of the Japan-U.S. security relationship, but on a very narrow base. In effect, the two governments would agree that in return for American nuclear protection Japan would adhere to the nonproliferation treaty and provide the United States with the bases which it considered necessary to meet defense commitments in the area. Under this approach, there would be minimum contact between the two governments on security matters and minimum discussion of their respective policies regarding the security of the area. Japan would be free to take its own position on Asian matters. This would require the build-up of conventional forces, but it would not require a Japanese nuclear capability or Japanese responsibility for the defense of other countries.

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The Japanese-American security relationship, at least until a few years ago, was characterized by an approach similar to this alternative. The Japanese Government described U.S. bases in Japan as a necessary evil and pointed to Japan's inability to prevent the United States from using these bases in support of its forces deployed in East Asia. The two governments engaged in few fruitful discussions of security matters or even of political matters with important security implications. Japan was able to grow dramatically in economic terms, while avoiding the domestic controversy which would flow from a closer association with defense policies.

Attractive as this option is, it has two fundamental difficulties. First is the question of whether the United States would in fact be prepared to continue its security relationship with Japan on these terms. Thoughtful Japanese are becoming aware that many influential Americans, particularly in the Congress, view the Security Treaty as essentially a one-sided relationship in which the United States protects Japan while Japan makes no commitment to the defense of American forces or American territory. The unwillingness of the Japanese Government to associate itself publicly and firmly with the American actions taken to defend the security of the area has clearly added to the sense of irritation in the United States and the feeling that at least the financial demands of the Treaty have to be shared.

However, even if this arrangement were acceptable to the United States it would hardly be compatible with Japan's responsibilities and aspirations. Just as many Americans view the treaty as one-sided, many Japanese describe the treaty in the same terms. They point to the provision assuring the Americans relatively unrestricted use and control of the bases. But until the United States has greater confidence in Japan's willingness to support its military forces operating out of Japan, it is likely to insist upon the freedom that it now enjoys. Finally, it is not fitting for a sovereign nation to lack control over military operations supported by bases within its territory. Either the Japanese Government should support such operations as being in the security interest of Japan, or it should insist that they be stopped. If Japan wishes to be fully sovereign, it cannot continue to pursue policies appropriate to an occupied nation.

The third alternative is most consistent with both Japanese and American security interests. The fundamental principle

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should be one of close coöperation in security arrangements as well as on political and economic matters. This does not mean that Japan must or should take on commitments to dispatch its forces overseas or to defend territory beyond the Japanese homeland. It does mean, however, that Japan would take the entire responsibility for its own conventional defense, including Okinawa, and that American troops in Japan could be reduced to a bare minimum. The bases required by U.S. forces could become Japanese bases and Japan could assume responsibility for the maintenance of the bases for military operations. It could also assume responsibilty for the maintenance of the necessary ship-repair facilities for the U.S. Seventh Fleet. In this way, Japan's sense of inequality could be eliminated: Japan would be making a genuine contribution and its sovereignty would no longer be infringed.

This approach would require a broadening and intensification of the consultations on security matters which have already begun to develop over the past few years. The framework for such consultation already exists in the joint Security Consultative Committee which was established in 1960, as well as in the frequent meetings of Japanese Prime and Foreign Ministers with their American counterparts. Such discussions should focus more and more on the real security issues in Asia and on the sensible response for both countries. The United States must be prepared to take fully into account Japanese views about appropriate courses of action, but at the same time Japan must be prepared to support visibly those American military moves which the Government believes are necessary for the security of Japan as well as the United States.

This policy has drawbacks, as do any alternatives. An obvious disadvantage to such a close Japanese-American security relationship is that it produces continuing internal dissent and debate. Moreover, the development and maintenance of a relationship which nevertheless permits each country to act independently when it feels compelled to do so require consistent attention to avoid misunderstandings and bitterness. Assuming that Japanese and U.S. interests in Asia are basically similar, a security relationship based on equality and close consultation is the only one compatible with the dignity and the responsibility of both great nations.

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FOREIGN AND HUMAN RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

By Covey T. Oliver

THE substantive and procedural problems of Latin American development are hard enough. Harder still is the inseparable task of understanding the social and psychological problems well enough to begin coping with them. With Latin America, we do not have any significant difficulties in formulating goals. The 1961 Charter of Punta del Este, the lines of action agreed on by the Presidents at Punta del Este in 1967, the economic and social principles of the revised Charter of the Organization of American States—indeed the constitutions of the other American states—all support this assertion. The difficulties begin thereafter, when operations start to go forward. The problems are various, and their origins are distributed. Most of the impediments that are fairly attributable to the United States arise from that short-haul practicality all too often, and incorrectly, called "pragmatism."

Frequently, in Latin America, development operations have been impeded by emotional responses. Neither we, who want to help, nor they, who want help, understand very much about the psycho-political nature of these difficulties. The fact is that the difficulties are related to attitudes not yet scientifically identified. Traditional assumptions and classic models still govern the execution of mutual assistance.

We do justice to ourselves and a favor to our neighbors when we insist that the reasons for Latin America's problems are mostly in Latin America. We can, however, accomplish little by preaching to others, especially about problems that are emotional. These comments, then, focus on what North Americans need to understand about the nature of our own influence and its interaction with change to the south of us.

II

Most of us in the United States see ourselves as a large but well-motivated nation, richer than our neighbors but with no wish to exploit them, moderately successful in tackling our own immense problems and puzzled that others do not go about solving theirs in a more purposeful way. This image only slightly

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overlaps with what many Latin Americans see. For them, we are a giant with an unfair proportion of all the good things in the world except natural resources, in which Latin America is supposed to be equally rich. Many are frustrated, envious and ashamed. The United States must have had unfair advantages—how else to account for the contrast? From there, it is easy and psychologically comforting to pass to belief in an exploitative plot. This is assisted by some pages of history and conspicuous U.S. presence in certain events, even without theoretical support from parties boosting a Soviet or Red Chinese line.

This image has some strange manifestations. The United States is, for example, sometimes accused—almost in the same breath—of being excessively naïve and of running a fantastically efficient scheme to dominate Latin America. The naïveté charge may merely reflect the correct belief that we do not know as much as the Latins about their own societies. But the plot theory is difficult to dismiss with broad hints that escapism has never yet solved any country's development problems, even though we may believe that no more attention is deserved.

A related dualism characterizes widely held attitudes about "nonintervention," which cause resistance to useful forms of collective action. History and North American military preponderance, of course, have a good deal to do with Latin American chariness of regional organizations. But how do we explain the phenomena of our being blamed when we abstain from activity because of this resistance? A Brazilian student, for example, recently accused the United States of: (1) slyly keeping his vast country weak by obstructing growth of its "greatest natural resource" through campaigning for birth control (which we have not), and (2) failing to "do anything" about Brazil's inability to meet the social needs of its expanding population.

Perhaps all concerned would be helped toward better understanding of such problems if we knew more about the nature of our operational influence in Latin America. To get this knowledge is more difficult than it sounds. Not enough research has been done; much of what has been done is done without "inside" knowledge of what the operations have been in fact. Conventional patterns of analysis ("nationalism," diplomatic history, formal structures of institutions) have prevailed here. In Latin America, even this much has hardly been undertaken. True, many episodic assertions about the operation of U.S. influence

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are useful, even obvious; but their sum is elusive. It is very easy to pass from platitudes to blunders without pausing for insight.

Our operational influence as to development is, in the first place, *marginal*. In terms of economics, we rarely offer more than a minor input as compared to the sum of local investment, including those negotiated in connection with our dollar assistance. Our inputs have come to be sporadic. We are uncertain from year to year, both as to absolute amounts available and restrictions on use. A reasonably continuous marginal economic influence, as any economist knows, can be vastly important when properly directed over a span of time. None the less, even with continuity, what is marginal remains marginal and the foreigner's operating influence remains foreign. The same is true for political and social development.

The fact that our influence is marginal means that, over the short term, what we can accomplish is limited and spotty. There is, for example, typically very little our political influence can do to prevent military coups d'état. Ambassador John Bartlow Martin's book on the Dominican Republic[1] describes how, in a very small and nearby country, he went much farther in support of elected President Juan Bosch than would normally be productive. His efforts did not work. This does not mean that we should stop urging our neighbors to give their fragile democratic institutions a chance. (Successes, by the nature of things, will never be so well documented.) It does mean that we should not expect our short-term, discontinuous influence in Latin America to reflect our enormous strength. The paradox of destiny-control versus behavior-control seems old and obvious: we have the power, at one extreme, to remove almost any country from the map by means of a few nuclear weapons; but we could not, even if we wished, translate this into control over the country's routine actions. If this impresses any reader as self-evident, it might be added that life in the Department of State will become much easier when the point gets through to its usually critical constituents—Congressmen, editorial writers and even scholars.

The marginal nature of our influence also means, however, that its long-term cumulative effect can be very great—if it is exercised quietly, wisely and consistently. Our foreign affairs managers are always being called upon to "use influence vigorously" in order to effect some occurrence in Latin America. The call may

[1] "Overtaken by Events." Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966.

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occasionally be justified. More commonly it is a call to do something emotionally satisfying now at the expense of our long-term capacity to get a mutually acceptable solution. The origins of many current problems lie beyond rationality, and their treatment by diplomatic logic—let alone threats of force—may delay effective resolution dangerously.

The case of Latin American military expenditures could become an outstanding example of short-term satisfaction versus long-term accomplishment. Congress has, through directives having the force of law, tied development assistance to military austerity on the part of the recipient. The objective is admirable, and it is rather widely shared by foreign policy-makers in Latin American executive branches. But the tactics are deplorable. In the first place, Latin America is free to spend more money on sophisticated weapons from outside the hemisphere, if only to show the United States that no sermons on military budgets are needed from the holder of the world record. In the second place, the best available statistics show that Latin American defense expenditures have long been declining in relation to other government spending and now constitute a military burden lower than that of any other region in the world, with the possible exception of sub-Saharan Africa. There have been a few outstanding and well-publicized acquisitions of a relatively few pieces of expensive, modern military equipment, but there has been no arms race; and there will be none unless moderating influences within the hemisphere come to lose acceptance.

Parenthetically, it is not valid to argue that U.S. attempts to legislate arms control for Latin America are of assistance in preventing coups. Of all United States aid, military assistance is the most marginal as to amounts and the most restrained as to U.S. participation. Certainly it is not true that the United States is responsible for the continuance of military power in Latin America. The military establishments there (frequently states within states) are often directly imitative of the military systems of the great powers of the nineteenth century. Our military influence has sought to change that pattern, not always with conspicuous success. As things are today, in fragile political structures with vast popular nonparticipation—both of which factors we are trying to help change—uninformed, unarmed, uncertain citizenries can and do lose their elected governments to 1898 model rifles bought in Imperial Germany, not to Mach 2 jet aircraft.

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III

The difference between the world roles of the United States and Latin America introduces additional distortions in our relationships. A newspaper in São Paulo covers U.S. Presidential elections as well as a paper in Chicago—but a Chicago paper gives Latin America almost no coverage unless there is a disaster or an expropriation. The Latin American who reads or listens to a transistor radio knows not only our official decisions but much detail of our decision-making processes. An intemperate speech, resolution or editorial can cause reverberations from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego, with the help of our own wire services. But it is rare for U.S. citizens to be aware of debates in Latin America about us. Although they are no more restrained, we do not know what they say of us, while even our rhetorical mimesis of an ephemeral past is taken seriously by newspaper-readers and transistor-listeners there.

Latin Americans listen continuously because we are so important to them, especially in matters of trade, capital flow and investments. They listen critically and apprehensively, often emotionally, not logically. Our communications pattern is not healthy. The United States has vast problems of tact and sensitivity to cope with until things get better in Latin America.

If we can succeed in helping Latin America modernize, reform and believe in its success, we can expect many areas of U.S. influence to increase, even as our present tremendous preponderance declines. We are now so overwhelmingly present that we induce psychological attitudes of much moment. An outstanding example is the theme of U.S. "economic imperialism." The term jars our senses. We have always disliked formal colonialism, and we have not practiced it very much. (Were it otherwise, the political structure of the hemisphere would be quite different and there would be no Castro.)

To us, logically perhaps, "imperialism" requires either formal political structures or, at least, political control. Discounting the invective made of the term by certain "lackeys of socialism," there remains the feeling, widely held in Latin America, as by the New Left here, that "imperialism" includes the capacity and the determination, regardless of formal stuctures, to manipulate other groups against their will or their conception of their interests. Do we eschew this degree of involvement in Latin America? If I were to take all the responses of which I am aware, the

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conscious and the subconscious, I would have to admit that by self-restraint, idealism and tact, we could make a positive reply clearer than we have so far.

For some North Americans, the fact that the problem is psychological means it is "all in the head" and so can be ignored. Our American rationality is a great thing, but a therapist needs other qualifications.

We can get at least an idea of the dimensions of the problem by noting the tremendous impact in Latin America of Servan-Schreiber's "The American Challenge." It is a rational book about a somewhat irrational problem *in Europe*. In some Latin American countries, it has broken all postwar best-seller records. Despite the author's disclaimer of any intent to deal with Latin America, and his precise distinction between "challenge" and "threat," the book is widely accepted as a warning against North American "imperialism" through private-sector investments. (One hopes that some readers in this hemisphere have noted the similarity between Servan-Schreiber's positive prescription for Europeans and the goals of the Alliance for Progress.)

The fears aroused by U.S. businesses abroad present us with some unusually delicate decisions in foreign policy. We owe it to the interests of the entire hemisphere to promote foreign investment. At its best, it is an efficient vehicle of development; it transfers know-how and costs U.S. taxpayers little (although the Government assists in many ways and should look for others). Major new waves of U.S. investment in Latin America should nevertheless be accompanied by measures to lower its coefficient of friction. Such measures will require the attention of U.S. businessmen, their Latin American counterparts, Latin American governments and—emphatically—the United States Government. Private investments do not normally provide any short-term help for social development, and they must be paralleled by increasing amounts of bilateral and multilateral aid. Old Latin American hands live in dread of a proposal to "revivify" the Alliance for Progress by excluding public-sector assistance in favor of private investment. In reconstructed Europe, the new wave of private investment followed, rather than displaced, the Marshall Plan. A proposal to reverse this pattern in Latin America would be perfectly rational and perfectly disastrous.

We in the United States, then, may have a cultural block that hinders our understanding of the impact we have had on Latin

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America. It is no less true that Latin Americans rarely have a clear view of the meaning of U.S. development. On the one hand, they have historically looked upon this country as a model for emulation. Every developing nation could use a simple formula for success, and ours is an enticing one. We have accomplished certain things before any other country on earth, and for this reason alone we are bound to be studied even by enemies.

Moreover, the United States is traditionally friendly with Latin America; our economies are interdependent; we were born sharing many political precepts; and we all believe in a wide degree of diversity. Any objective scholar must agree that the United States has useful examples to offer. But he should understand their limitations.

We are successful in the United States because we have worked out a democratic, egalitarian and *experimentalist* society. Americans who work for the development of other nations come to realize just how successfully empirical we are at home, especially with respect to our social problems. Unfortunately, experimentalism is at once the best path to development and the hardest sort of mechanism to explain to others. To many Latin Americans, the North American way seems not science but nonscience. Ideological solutions, on the other hand, are splendidly satisfying to communicate—and quite frequently obstacles to development. We in the United States do not, of course, have any general ideology, except one of effective human dignity. It has not changed for a long time. But beyond this, we are fairly eclectic, although often thought otherwise: many Latin Americans visiting the United States for the first time are astonished to find that our nation is not classically laissez-faire—which we have not been for more than half a century, if indeed we ever were.

This has touched only the high points of U.S. psycho-political influence in Latin America. We need to know far more. We need to explore in depth the consequences of conspicuous U.S. success as contrasted to Latin feelings of under-achievement. Universities must do serious work on attitude studies; and in order to do so, they must come to view foreign relations as a branch of human relations, not a chess game.

IV

Latin America has not changed quite so fast as many U.S. observers expected. The supposedly seething peasantry has proven,

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in fact, to be quite conservative—so long as population pressures have left it enough land to scratch out a subsistence. The masses, instead of demanding "new solutions," have apparently been acquiescent when military coups have overthrown viable, constitutional régimes. In point of fact, when economic development has been vigorously pursued, it has sometimes been precisely through authoritarian methods that seem influenced by traditional Iberian (and behind them, Roman) models. If U.S. observers are sometimes puzzled, however, they need only look to the Marxists for a picture of utter bafflement.

Nevertheless, there have been important changes, though they have followed elusive patterns. The endemic political instability continues in cyclical, though probably diminishing, waves. Unconstitutional overthrows do not impress us as ideal mechanisms for change. But let us recognize them for what they are: almost institutionalized. It would be false to say that any nation's unwritten constitution allows the military to push out an elected president who is both reformist and viable, if problem-plagued. It would not be an exaggeration to say that, in the political mores of many Latin American states, the military is expected to intervene when civilian government becomes conspicuously unable to govern.

In any case, it would be a mistake to assume that the violent process of changing the guard, even though it looks traditional, is nowadays aimed at simply preventing deeper change—at "preserving the status quo," in the journalistic cliché. The new Latin military leaders do not consider themselves Trujillos bent on personal enrichment. (But, probably, neither did Trujillo when he started—nor Batista—nor Diaz.) Personal ambitions sometimes play a part and sometimes do not. (The same is true of leaders from the left.) Sometimes the military régimes have governed in such a way that the Latin American "establishments" have profited more than the masses, but so have almost all other régimes. The establishments have the know-how and the talent —including some let in from below—to defend themselves under varying circumstances.

Most, but not quite all, recent military régimes have reflected dissatisfaction with the ability of civilian governments to bring about "development." The people may have gone along because they hoped that the military could in fact do better. "Development," however, has often been defined in preponderantly eco-

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nomic terms, and it remains to be proven that régimes dominated by the military can lead to social and civic development.

In terms of their immediate political problems, some of the generals have perhaps been quite sensible in taking advantage of "the negative dynamism generated by an aggressive independence of the United States"—as it was put by Claudio Véliz in the October 1968 issue of this journal. To the extent that this aggressiveness is used to increase reliance on self-help, the results can only be good. But to the extent that foreign investors are frightened, needed transfers of capital and know-how are lost. If U.S. taxpayers become embittered about the effectiveness of our aid, the results will, again, be unfortunate.

While some of the Latin American military have been engaged in running governments, or dreaming of world-arena hardware, their real responsibility in society is shifting. In the near future, there will be new challenges from urban—not rural—violence. Moreover, the violence may seem unstructured, almost pointless, and therefore more difficult to understand and control. This may be taken as the lesson of student upheavals in countries as diverse as France, the United States, Japan and Mexico. There is undoubtedly an imitative effect at work, and one hopes that Latin America's security forces are thinking about how to react properly—which is not the same thing as physical adequacy.

There has been much euphoria about the phenomenon of violent social revolution in Latin America. In some circles, it is not possible to talk of revolution unless you mean violent revolution. Certain Latin American countries are said to be unable to make permanent progress because "they have not had their revolutions."

This is not the place to explore the intricacies of revolutionary theory, but it does seem that fans of violence have overlooked two points which might seem obvious to North Americans. First, while violent social revolution has undoubtedly led to modernization of some societies, even the classical cases are not patently more convincing than parallel cases of gradual revolution. (Compare the Soviet Union, France and Mexico with England, Scandinavia and the United States.) The second point is that, even ignoring its appalling human costs, violent revolution is too costly in time and money for today's Latin America. Violent revolution tears down quickly but rebuilds slowly, if at all. Many Latin American nations have large financial investments in mod-

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ernization—investments that must not be wiped out. They have, moreover, demographic pressures that were not present in the classical cases. No nation with a population growth of 3 percent yearly can contemplate the luxury of time-out for three or four decades of violent social reorganization. To the charge that some non-revolutionary societies are "not working," one can only reply that violent revolution is almost certain not to work.

V

One is left with the conclusion that peaceful revolution for Latin America, roughly along the lines agreed to in the Charter of the Alliance for Progress, is Latin America's worst solution, except for all the others. The Alliance partners have achieved important economic and social successes in addition to the ideological success represented by agreement on goals. They have built structural and financial bases for the much more that remains to be done in the next phase.

There are, to be sure, new threats to development from both right and left in Latin America. It would be a mistake to underestimate them, and an equally serious mistake to interpret what is going on as a sign of past failure. The current polarization in Latin America is an undesirable but inevitable accompaniment of the modernization that the Alliance promised. The parallel with U.S. domestic politics may be useful: there was no talk of Black Power until there had been black progress.

At the risk of repetition, it should be stressed that the United States can take only a fraction of the credit for the changes, good and bad, in the rest of the hemisphere. The term "Alliance for Progress" means the total hemispheric effort described in the Charter, not just U.S. aid.

There is no plea here for a U.S. policy that is "realistic" in the sense of being conservative and unimaginative. Our policy for Latin America should be realistic in that we must always make an honest, orderly assessment of our means and then try very hard to do what we think we might be able to do. Trying hard will involve risks, but we cannot afford total caution. Even unsuccessful risks can create at least a useful dynamism. One might gather from some highly selective press and Congressional reports that our financial aid has been strewn around loosely, but it has in fact been subject to overcaution and overadministration. It is safer, in terms of public and Congressional opinion, to

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spend ten dollars on administration and accounting than it is to risk two on a project that may be too far out. Like respectable ladies on a swing of the Continent, we would rather pay for a guided tour than do it ourselves for half the price, risking the occasional bawdy hotel and padded bill.

An honest foreign policy means not kidding ourselves about some of the embarrassing decisions involved. If, for example, our policy is to support democratically elected governments—and it should be—we must nevertheless take a close look at what has happened when one of them falls. The new régime will always say that the old was victim of its own sins and inefficiency, and the accusation may be right: political hari-kari has not completely disappeared in Latin America. When a viable, reformist and democratic government has been pushed out, however—even by men who may be convinced they can do better—losses in the dynamic of development seem inevitable. Beyond these, what? We have, formally, two options.

The first is to deal with the new régime on some basis, but not necessarily very soon or enthusiastically. We should avoid the kind of sermonizing that is both pointless and open to accusations of intervention. We should not attempt to penalize the common people, although we might wish to ourselves that they had given greater signs of interest in the democratic process. But our scarce aid funds will always have to be divided on a basis of strict priorities, and we should not give the hemisphere reason to think that any régime can earn a high one by ignoring the goals of social and political development. Our sights should be fixed on the basic needs of people, including their needs for self-respect, dignity and confidence, despite their precarious political state. We should seek ways to help them without entrenching their self-appointed rulers—for example, by doing as much as these will tolerate through municipal and other local governmental entities.

Our second option is not to deal with the new régime, and this involves a strong possibility that all U.S. ties with the country will eventually be severed, while our diplomacy is almost powerless to do anything about it. More seriously, it forgets the people who will still be there, and in greater numbers, when *golpistas* go. True pragmatism—in the sense of adapting a long-range humanistic ideal to doing the best that can be done with the facts at hand—inclines one to the former course.

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THE FORGOTTEN RHODESIANS

By David R. Smock

AMID conservative hopes for a settlement and liberal fears of a sell-out, Harold Wilson arrived dramatically at Gibraltar at midnight on October 8, 1968, prepared to meet Ian Smith aboard *HMS Fearless* to discuss the three-year-old Rhodesian crisis. Thus one more move was made in the contest that has been stalemated ever since it began on November 11, 1965, when the white minority government in Rhodesia made a unilateral declaration of the territory's independence (UDI). Despite the hopes and fears surrounding the Wilson-Smith meeting, the *Fearless* talks left the situation virtually unchanged. What turned out to be more significant than the talks themselves were the national and international pressures which lay behind the decision of the two sides to meet.

British efforts to force a "return to legality" in Rhodesia have been rendered largely ineffective from the outset by the British announcement well before independence had been declared that force would not be used to bring down the Smith régime and maintain Rhodesia as a British territory. Given the domestic political climate in Britain at the time, the decision against the use of force was probably the only realistic course open to Wilson; yet the public announcement of this policy before the threat of force had been used to full strategic advantage was a serious blunder.

Once force had been ruled out, the only recourse left to the Labor Government at the time of UDI was the imposition of economic sanctions. These included the prohibition of arms exports to Rhodesia, a ban on exports of British capital, a denial of access to the London capital market, a denial of all Commonwealth trade preferences and export credits, and a ban on the importation of Rhodesian tobacco and sugar, which together represented more than one-third of Rhodesia's exports. Although these selective measures hardly lived up to Wilson's promise to "throw the book" at Mr. Smith, they were as far as Wilson was prepared to go.

A Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in September 1966 set November 30 of that year as the final date for a Rhodesian solution, and gained British assurances that if no settle-

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ment was reached by then an appeal would be made to the United Nations for selective mandatory economic sanctions. Moreover, all offers for a settlement would be withdrawn and replaced by insistence that there would be no independence before majority rule (NIBMAR).

This led to the earlier face-to-face encounter between Wilson and Smith aboard *HMS Tiger* in early December 1966. The terms offered by Wilson were much more favorable to the whites of Rhodesia than most observers thought Wilson was prepared to offer, for they provided that Rhodesia would continue to be controlled by the white minority. Wilson defended his offer by maintaining that it was consistent with these six principles, which he considered essential to an acceptable agreement:

1. The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to majority rule . . . would have to be maintained and guaranteed.
2. There would also have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution.
3. There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.
4. There would have to be progress toward ending racial discrimination.
5. The British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.
6. It would be necessary to ensure that, regardless of race, there was no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority.

The British proposal was offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, with Smith being given 48 hours to accept it and call off the rebellion. After Smith had returned to Salisbury and indicated that these terms were unacceptable to his government, Wilson declared, in keeping with the undertakings given at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference, that there would be no independence before majority rule. Despite British insistence in previous U.N. debates that Rhodesia was solely a British responsibility and not a legitimate concern of the United Nations, Wilson also asked the Security Council to impose selective mandatory sanctions. By Security Council action, member states of the United Nations were prohibited from importing key Rhodesian exports and were required to prevent their nations from assisting with the importation of oil or oil products, arms and military equipment, aircraft and motor vehicles to Rhodesia.

The selective character of the sanctions and their open violation by South Africa and Portugal, plus the covert violation by

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various French, German, Swiss and Japanese firms, have meant that the sanctions program has failed to bring Rhodesia to her knees.

It has been impossible to assess the actual impact of the sanctions program on the Rhodesian economy, largely because the Rhodesian government has been unwilling to release accurate economic statistics. It is likely that the curtailment of real economic growth since 1965 and the precarious state of Rhodesia's foreign reserves, plus the feared consequences of the comprehensive U.N. sanctions imposed in May 1968, were of some significance in inducing Smith to meet with Wilson on the *Fearless*. However, many other factors were also involved in this decision, and the fact that he turned down the terms then offered is indicative that the economic squeeze is not great enough to force many concessions.

Despite Wilson's pledge at the 1966 Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference that there would be no granting of independence before majority rule, the terms Wilson offered on the *Fearless* allowed for continued white control. They were largely a restatement of the *Tiger* proposals, although in some respects they were even more attractive—for example, the concession to Smith that only a token return to legality would be required before the granting of full independence. Despite the 1–20 ratio of whites to Africans in Rhodesia, the whites would have little difficulty maintaining control and forming an all-white government as a result of stiff voter qualifications and reserved seats for Europeans. Wilson committed a British contribution of up to $120 million for African education in Rhodesia, on the condition that it be matched by the Smith régime. This was to be Britain's effort to bring Africans into the mainstream of a society in which white domination is defended on the basis of low educational achievement by Africans.

The parts of the British proposal which Smith and his government found the least palatable were the safeguards against retrogressive amendment of the "entrenched clauses" in the Constitution, which include such key items as the Declaration of Rights and the statement of franchise qualifications. One such safeguard is the requirement that at least one-fourth of the legislature be composed of popularly elected Africans, with the concurrent requirement that the entrenched clauses can only be amended by a vote of at least three-quarters of the legislature; this is the

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so-called "blocking quarter." The other safeguard is the requirement that amendments to entrenched clauses be reviewed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, a provision Smith argues allows for only incomplete sovereignty.

At the conclusion of the *Fearless* talks, Smith summed up his government's position with the statement, "There is no doubt that we can improve on these terms from the Rhodesian point of view and I will certainly not allow myself to be deviated from this objective." Hoping there might still be grounds for a settlement, Wilson sent George Thomson, Minister Without Portfolio in charge of Rhodesian Affairs, to Salisbury for further talks, but after two weeks there he returned to London and the *Fearless* chapter came to an end. Talks may reopen again, but the crisis is far from being resolved.

II

The question remains why Wilson and Smith agreed to meet on the *Fearless*. To some extent each side miscalculated the readiness of the other to make new concessions. Wilson felt that Smith's position in Rhodesia had been significantly strengthened over the summer. He had succeeded in ousting some of his severest critics from the Rhodesian Front, the ruling party, and had emerged from the party congress in September with new strength and bargaining power. Moreover, a visit to Salisbury by Sir Alec Douglas-Home in March 1968 led him to announce that Smith was prepared to make concessions in order to arrive at a settlement. Although envoys sent by Wilson to Salisbury in September did not return with such optimistic reports as those of Sir Alec, they did report that the time might be propitious for productive talks.

Part of Smith's conflict with the conservative wing of the Rhodesian Front has been over the question of whether it was possible and judicious to reach a settlement at all. To some degree Smith was bound by the logic of his own rhetoric to make an effort to reach a settlement if the opportunity presented itself. Moreover, in addition to the pressures exerted by economic sanctions, there was the increasing guerrilla activity within the country, which may have been of greater importance to Smith.

The first sustained battle between guerrilla fighters and Rhodesian forces occurred in August 1967, and the level of guerrilla activity has grown steadily since then. Some raids are probably

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launched from bases across the border in Zambia, but most appear to originate from bases within Rhodesia itself. South African Prime Minister Vorster considers the guerrilla threat sufficiently serious to send substantial military aid to Rhodesia, including men as well as arms. Noting the increased level of military activity, the Johannesburg *Sunday Times* has stated, "The guerrilla campaign against Rhodesia is now a full-scale war of attrition." The level of military activity still falls short of that in neighboring Mozambique and Angola, but its development must certainly play an important role in Smith's calculations. The concessions which the Rhodesian Front is prepared to make concerning "unimpeded progress to majority rule" are so insignificant that a settlement with the British made on such terms would certainly not satisfy the leaders of the two nationalist parties, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and thus would not bring an end to guerrilla activity. However, support for the guerrillas among villagers and the urban proletariat would probably be less enthusiastic and energetic if a settlement were reached.

Domestic political considerations loom large as factors shaping Wilson's various positions and policies regarding Rhodesia. Probably to a greater extent than on any other significant policy issue facing him since he took office, Wilson has assiduously sought the support of the Conservative Party on the Rhodesian issue. Until the general election in March 1966, the Labor Party's four-seat majority led Wilson to fear that Conservative opposition combined with some backbench Labor opposition to a British confrontation with the Rhodesians would bring his government down. In the wake of the talks on the *Fearless,* Wilson could face serious opposition from within his own party with the assurance that, if a showdown came in the House of Commons, he could count on most Conservative MPs to side with him.

The growing political embarrassment created by Conservative claims that Smith was ready to talk and reach an honorable settlement, if Wilson would only arrange talks, was one reason Wilson agreed to meet Smith. These claims arose from the conversations of Sir Alec Douglas-Home and other Conservative leaders with Smith in Salisbury over the previous twelve months. The rejection of the terms offered by Wilson on the *Fearless* undercut the political capital which the Conservatives were mak-

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ing from these charges. Moreover, the timing of the talks enabled Wilson to upstage the Conservatives at their annual conference, which took place at the same time Wilson and Smith were meeting.

In the process of pacifying the Conservatives, Wilson has alienated many Labor backbenchers and local party leaders. At the annual Labor Party conference at Blackpool in early October, the delegates passed a motion criticizing the Government's Rhodesian policy. Observers in London estimate that 100 Labor MPs would have been prepared to vote against the terms offered in October if they had been presented in Parliament for endorsement, and that some non-cabinet ministers would have resigned if the terms had proved to be acceptable to Smith. One might argue that to arouse such opposition within his own party was more costly politically than to alienate the Opposition, but Wilson seems to have decided that it was easier on this issue to weld a coalition between the Conservatives and the right wing of his own party than to try to devise a policy which would be acceptable to all parts of the Labor Party.

Despite the fact that by going to Gibraltar for the *Fearless* talks Wilson undercut Conservative criticism and by not reaching a settlement he was able to pacify Labor dissidents, Wilson did not arrange the meeting simply as a political manœuvre: he wanted a settlement. The sanctions imposed on Rhodesia take their toll of Britain's economy through loss of export sales and increased cost of certain imports. More importantly, the Rhodesian crisis is straining British relations with South Africa, whose role as a trading partner is much more important than Rhodesia's.

The psychological burden of confronting such a prolonged crisis has also been an important stimulus to reaching a settlement. Colin Legum in a recent article in the *Observer* writes, "Scuttling out of Southern Africa—and thus avoiding involvement in its seemingly unresolvable problems—is now a fashionable element of British foreign policy. It appeals as much to the *realpolitik* instincts of Labor's managers as it does to the Tories." The inability of the British to find a solution, or to force a solution on the Rhodesians, is also a sharp reminder of Britain's growing impotence in international affairs. Moreover, the bungling of this last episode in Britain's colonial history, in contrast to the remarkable ease with which earlier chapters have been

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closed, is not something for which Harold Wilson would like to be remembered.

Britain's offer of such favorable terms to the whites of Rhodesia also reflects the lack of support Wilson could count on from other major world powers in a confrontation with Rhodesia and South Africa. The United States is certainly not prepared to offer military support for such a confrontation, either during the Viet Nam war or after. Nor could the British count on major support for economic sanctions against Portugal and South Africa, which is the only possible way of making economic sanctions against Rhodesia effective. This point, however, is academic, since Wilson has asserted from the outset that no steps against Rhodesia will be taken at the risk of a confrontation, either military or economic, with South Africa. In fact, the Board of Trade is vigorously pushing a program to expand British trade with South Africa. Wilson's efforts to avoid offending South Africa take the economic sting out of the sanctions, and take the moral sting out of Wilson's rather pious condemnations of racism in Rhodesia.

III

Despite South Africa's active military and economic support of Rhodesia, Vorster does not appear willing to prop up the Smith régime indefinitely. In fact, he is the person most likely to be able to effect an agreement between Smith and Wilson. His pressure on Smith and his assurance to Wilson of possible success in negotiations were major factors leading Wilson and Smith to meet at Gibraltar. Although Vorster claims he is proposing no formula for a settlement and that the character of a settlement should be determined by the British and the Rhodesians, he has made no secret of his desire for some sort of resolution of the situation.

A major concern of Vorster is the guerrilla activity in Rhodesia. As an advocate of the domino theory, his sending of military support to Rhodesia is based on the fear that guerrilla successes in Rhodesia would pave the way for guerrilla attacks on South Africa. His fears are compounded by the fact that guerrilla activity in Rhodesia is a joint effort by ZAPU and the African National Congress (ANC), a South African nationalist organization. The threat to South Africa was dramatized in August by the killing of a South African soldier by the guerrillas in Rhodesia. One South African newspaper described it as the first shot

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in communism's war of conquest on South Africa. In August 1968, war games were staged in South Africa, and were described as being in preparation for a possible "terrorist invasion." These exercises constituted South Africa's most significant military operation since World War II. Vorster probably does not believe that a settlement in Rhodesia would end guerrilla activity, but he does think that the chances of its success would be reduced.

South African leaders are also concerned about the sanctions imposed against Rhodesia. In economic terms, South Africa has benefited from the sanctions, because of the profits involved in supplying Rhodesia with prohibited goods and the increase in trade with Zambia resulting from that country's efforts to lessen its economic ties with Rhodesia. (Between 1965 and 1967 Zambian purchases of South African goods jumped from $56 million to $90 million.) South Africa fears the possibility that world pressure might lead to sanctions being imposed against itself for violating the sanctions imposed on Rhodesia.

The Rhodesian situation and South Africa's support for Smith have also placed South Africa once again in the uncomfortable position of being in the international limelight. Once the South West Africa case had been disposed of by the World Court, South Africa hoped to avoid international attention and criticism. She feels that a settlement in Rhodesia might finally enable her to do so. Of equal importance is Vorster's fear that continued South African support for the rebellious white government in Rhodesia will endanger the success of his new "outward-looking" policy, the intention of which is to improve South Africa's relations with her black neighbors. Buoyed by the coöperative spirit being demonstrated by the three former High Commission Territories (Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland) and by Malawi, Vorster feels there is a good chance he can buy the coöperation of countries such as Zambia as well, thereby creating a cushion of black buffer states whose coöperation would be secured through aid and economic dependence. Similarly, Vorster seems ready to accept the possibility of eventual African control of Rhodesia, for he feels that Rhodesian economic dependence on South Africa will assure coöperation by that country's government, whether the leadership is black or white. If eventual African control in Salisbury is likely, a peaceful settlement between the British and the Rhodesians would be preferred by South Africa because there is greater likelihood of a black government being coöperative if

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control is passed into African hands through peaceful settlement than if it is the result of military success by ZAPU's guerrilla forces.

Preposterous as it may appear to observers familiar with Zambia for South Africans to believe that the Zambian leadership would permit their country to become a South African satellite, Vorster believes it is possible, and rightly feels that Zambia is the key to the success or failure of South Africa's outward policy. P. M. Botha, South Africa's Minister of Defense, said recently of President Kaunda's efforts to buy weapons in Britain, "If he would be realistic and seek true friendship, it would not be necessary to look for weapons against Southern Africa. He should rather expel the terrorists from his country and together with the rest of Southern Africa build up a strong force against communism, which aims to subject Zambia and the other countries in Southern Africa to slavery. Kaunda is looking for his friends in the wrong places." South Africans feel that the longer they are seen to be propping up the Smith régime, the less likelihood there is that Zambia can be enticed into an attitude like Malawi's.

Kaunda has not been responsive to these overtures. In October 1968 he replied, "In South Africa the Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, has of late consistently declared that he favored friendship with Zambia. This declaration is welcome; but I have to say quite clearly that nothing stands between South Africa and Zambia in fostering friendship and coöperation except that Government's policy of apartheid which, frankly, is the policy of oppression and exploitation. . . . Let Afrikaners show respect to Africans in South Africa and manifest genuinely the spirit of coöperation among all sections of the South African community including the African majority. Then I will be more than ready to extend in full my hand of friendship on the basis of true equality and for mutual advantage." Zambia fortunately has sufficient economic strength to enable her to stand beyond South Africa's reach.

If Vorster decides that a Rhodesian settlement is highly desirable, he can exert considerable leverage. Although the sanctions imposed have not hurt sufficiently to bring Rhodesia to her knees, this has been largely due to the assistance rendered by South Africa. Smith knows that if South Africa stops the flow of goods in and out of his country he will be in serious trouble. The question remains of how much leverage Vorster is prepared

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to use to force the Smith government to agree to a settlement that it finds distasteful. Vorster reportedly promised Wilson before the *Fearless* talks that he could assure Britain of Smith's readiness to sign an agreement if the British did not insist upon the Privy Council's right to pass on constitutional amendments. Now that Wilson has insisted on retaining this blocking mechanism, it remains to be seen whether Vorster is prepared to force a concession by Smith on this issue. If Wilson is prepared to make some concessions on the South African arms embargo, Vorster might be willing to exert the necessary pressure on Smith to accept the British terms, including the right of review by the Privy Council.

The history of Rhodesia is closely intertwined with that of South Africa. It was colonized from South Africa, many Rhodesians have been educated there and it is economically dependent upon the Republic. In 1923 Rhodesian whites voted down by only a slim margin a proposal that Rhodesia be incorporated into South Africa. However, one must be careful not to exaggerate the importance of these ties in assessing South Africa's motives and in predicting her strategy. An important factor to be borne in mind is that South Africans do not generally view Rhodesian whites as being their equals. They think they are rather crude and lack sophistication, as a result of their predominantly lower middle-class background. Moreover, an Afrikaner government is ever aware that the Rhodesians are of British origin.

IV

As Rhodesia's neighbor and former partner in the Central African Federation, Zambia probably has more at stake in the Rhodesian crisis than any other country. Although the Zambian diplomat who characterized Britain as a "toothless bulldog" was not speaking with authorization he was offering a fairly accurate description of Zambia's assessment of Britain's Rhodesia policy. President Kaunda has consistently, and accurately, maintained that economic sanctions will not achieve their purpose, and that British military action is the only means of achieving a return to legality. Zambia, even with support from African and Western allies, is not sufficiently strong to consider a confrontation of its own with Rhodesia. Kaunda has, however, apparently allowed the ZAPU-ANC guerrilla bands to maintain bases in Zambia.

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Even this limited support for ZAPU's military efforts has proved to be risky for Zambia. South African military reconnaissance planes occasionally fly over Zambian territory and talk of an attack against Zambia is heard with increasing frequency in Salisbury and Pretoria. The Israeli military strategy in the Six Day War is seen by many Rhodesians and South Africans as the best means of wiping out guerrilla bases in Zambia and of teaching Zambia a lesson concerning the balance of power in southern Africa. The lingering hope in South Africa that Zambia can be won over to a coöperative position by other means is the principal deterrent to quick and decisive military action.

To forestall such a possibility, Zambia has recently sought to build up an air force and purchase and install a defensive missile system. Although this constitutes a sizeable investment for a country of Zambia's size and level of development, Kaunda feels that the risks entailed in remaining defenseless against an attack from the south justify the costs.

The investment in a defense system constitutes only a fraction of the costs to Zambia resulting from UDI and from her efforts to break economic ties with Rhodesia. In addition to having to open road routes to the sea through Tanzania, construct a petroleum pipeline to Dar es Salaam, open new coal mines and organize a separate railway operation, Zambia has been forced to become more economically dependent upon South Africa. As a long-term solution to its transportation needs, Zambia and Tanzania plan to build a 1200-mile rail link between the Copperbelt and Dar es Salaam at an estimated cost of $300 million. This is to be done through loans and technical assistance from the Chinese. Added to the economic costs of these projects are the obvious political costs of these new ties with South Africa and China.

Aside from whatever hospitality Zambia offers the guerrilla forces, her leverage on Britain and Rhodesia to reach an acceptable settlement is not very great. Kaunda's principal weapon in fighting a British sellout to the Rhodesian whites is a threat to pull Zambia out of the Commonwealth and encourage other members to do the same. Wilson considers the Commonwealth an important institution to preserve, if only as a last reminder of the glories of Britain's imperial past. However, he has felt that a settlement based on the six principles, reached at the right moment, and defended persuasively, would keep the Common-

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wealth intact. British businessmen have recently accused the Zambian government of discriminating against them in the award of contracts, but even if the charge is true, this sort of economic pressure is unlikely to be of much significance. In fact, Zambia's purchases of British goods have risen substantially since UDI, and it would be very difficult for Zambia to loosen the economic ties between the two countries.

There has been some uncertainty concerning the role the new Portuguese leaders might want Portugal and Mozambique to play vis-à-vis Rhodesia. There was speculation that Lisbon might loosen its grip on Mozambique and Angola, and also that there might be a move by the settlers to strike a bargain with nationalist leaders and declare the independence of the two territories. The new Portuguese President, Dr. Caetano, now appears to be continuing Salazar's African policies, which will probably mean continued coöperation with Smith in seeing that such essential imports as petroleum reach Rhodesia. A declaration of independence by a multiracial government in Mozambique seems unlikely, but if it happened and was successful, then a serious economic blow would be struck against the Rhodesians.

Although the Rhodesian crisis was one of the two central topics of discussion at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in January, no important shifts in position followed. Twenty-three of the 28 Commonwealth nations represented urged Wilson to return to the NIBMAR position he took following the 1966 conference, but Wilson clung to his declaration that the *Fearless* terms were still "on the table."

It became obvious that a British settlement with Rhodesia could not be forestalled by Commonwealth pressures, although Wilson did seem to be impressed by the argument made by several heads of state that teeth would have to be put into his fifth principle concerning the test of acceptability. In other words, the Royal Commission which would be set up to determine whether the terms of a settlement were acceptable to Rhodesians would have to do more than seek the opinions of government-appointed chiefs. In what was claimed by many to be the most forceful speech of the Conference, President Nyerere of Tanzania is reported to have said that on only two occasions in the past has the British Government relinquished control of a colony to a government not based on the clear will of the majority. One of these was South Africa, where the Africans are still

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suffering the consequences, and the other is Zanzibar, where the minority government was soon overturned.

With the Commonwealth Conference out of the way, a final attempt to reach a settlement will probably be made this coming spring. Both Wilson and Smith seem eager for one last try. Those whose interests will be least represented will again be the four million Africans who make up 95 percent of Rhodesia's population. Although in his discussions with Smith on the *Fearless* Wilson claimed to be their representative, the real determinants of British policy are the economic and political implications for Britain of various types of settlements. South Africa's position is not based on any concern for the welfare of Rhodesia's Africans, and this is true for Portugal as well. Those who are concerned are either not sufficiently concerned or not powerful enough to force a solution favorable to the Africans; hence the final outcome will be dictated primarily by what are thought to be the national interests of Britain and South Africa, rather than the interest of the vast majority of Rhodesia's population.

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AN IDEOLOGY FOR AFRICA

By Henry Bienen

AT the end of January 1967, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the ruling party on the mainland of Tanzania, announced the Arusha Declaration, named for the town in the northern part of the country where the Declaration was first promulgated. Supplemented by subsequent formulations throughout 1967, it has become something of a milestone, for it enunciated an ideology and articulated policies especially designed for the needs and conditions of an African country.

According to Arusha, TANU stands committed to policies of socialism and self-reliance. Socialism is understood as a social situation which excludes exploitation of one man by another or of one class over another. The major means of production are to be under the control and ownership of the workers and peasants through the agency of the government and through coöperatives. Self-reliance means that development as a whole must be achieved through reliance on Tanzanian resources (which are chiefly agricultural) rather than through dependence upon foreign aid in capital development and technical assistance. This should enable Tanzania to remain independent in making and carrying out foreign policy. The Declaration also sharpens the definition of political commitment for both members and leaders of TANU who will be instrumental in carrying out this policy.

The Arusha Declaration does not aim to create a classless society at the expense of the country's economic development, but it gives social goals primacy over more narrowly defined economic ones. It calls for a rectification of a mistaken emphasis in the past on industrial growth, and a new concern with agriculture and rural society in general. The agricultural policy also emphasizes self-reliance in instructing the people to be self-sufficient in food, clothing and housing. The country is to exploit its resources of land and agriculture, the people and good leadership. The policy of socialism and self-reliance is itself seen as an exploitable resource.

Arusha's economic policy breaks with the recent past only to return to some specific measures of an earlier period. For the primacy of rural development, with emphasis on cottage industry, primary schooling and piecework payment in communally

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organized work settings all had their precedents in the colonial period. The political and social context in which these practices are now to be undertaken, however, is obviously greatly different from that of colonial times and even from that of Tanzania's recent past. For the Arusha Declaration marks a determination on the part of Tanzania's leadership not to be bound to the same course as other independent countries in tropical Africa.

Indeed, Arusha is a reaction against Tanzania's incipient tendency to reproduce patterns of development which have become clearer in more economically advanced African countries and which are felt to be inimical to the stated goals of equality, socialism, rural improvement and national control over indigenous resources. Tanzania, too, was by 1967 witnessing a widening of gaps in income and life-styles between rural and urban areas and between educated and non-educated people; and a labor aristocracy was being created along with a bureaucratic and political élite. Furthermore, like other African countries with a rhetoric of centrally directed economic development and social change inspired by national leadership, Tanzania's low levels of economic development made it difficult to forge the political instruments for carrying out centrally established goals. Thus the changes which were occurring appeared to the leadership to be taking place outside their direction and control.

The promulgation of the Arusha Declaration marks an important departure from the patterns of contemporary African history chiefly because Tanzania has proved atypical in following up the Declaration with a further elaboration of ideas contained in it and a whole new array of assertions, policies and ideological statements, which were put forward in the course of 1967. Much talk of "back to the land" and of the need to reduce unemployment by making rural areas more attractive to would-be migrants has been heard in many African countries. In Tanzania, however, agricultural development has been defined as the building of rural socialism, which means increasing production through the construction of *Ujamaa* or communal and coöperative villages (rather than either state-farms or independent peasant homesteads). And unlike other African countries, Tanzania has not considered agricultural development in isolation or narrowly construed it as government provision of technical assistance, capital inputs or land reform. Another innovation is the new education policy, which emphasizes preparation for a rural exis-

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tence. And even more unusual for Africa, policies have begun to be implemented to change in fact the educational system, the pattern of rural development, the control of industry and the relationships between ruler and ruled.

II

In some spheres, it has been relatively easy to bring intentions to fruition. This is the case with state policies in the industrial sector. Thus TANU could announce its intention to take control of banking and certain industrial and trade enterprises in accordance with long-standing clauses in the TANU Constitution; the Government could nationalize the banks and the targeted enterprises; and the National Development Corporation could negotiate for a 60 percent interest in other selected industries (*e.g.* breweries and tobacco) without too much difficulty. Indeed, although the steps in nationalization taken immediately after the Declaration itself have received most attention in the world press, it is a mistake to consider nationalization the most radical segment of the Arusha formulations. President Nyerere's own perception of nationalization as "a little exercise" which "set the mood" for what was to follow is more accurate. While nationalization was bound to attract a great deal of attention abroad, there was nothing either in principle or in implementation which was striking about it except that it defied the notion that tropical African countries are too weak and too reliant on foreign capital and expertise to get away with it.

The merits of nationalization in Tanzania are debatable, but the doctrine of self-reliance for development seems the least ambiguous part of Arusha, the one most demonstrably applicable to Africa, and the one whose implementation marks a radical break with past policy. Self-reliance is neither a romantic notion nor a policy of autarchy, but a means of insuring that an independent foreign policy will not lead to disruption of economic plans. Tanzania is inevitably tied to world markets it cannot control because it has to export agricultural commodities which are not in scarce supply. And the Government has never denied wanting to attract foreign investment and skilled manpower from abroad. Tanzania has not despaired of achieving economic growth, and its doctrine of self-reliance is more than a tactical move of the leadership to build support at home. It is a practical reaction to the exigencies of economic development.

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Aid to Tanzania and to Africa should be put in proper perspective. The amounts provided are lower and the costs to the recipient higher than most people realize. Furthermore, throughout the African continent aid is increasingly difficult to get; and as the prices of industrial goods rise faster than the prices of the agricultural commodities which Africa exports, the aid given by donors buys less of their own goods than might first appear. In Tanzania, and undoubtedly in many other countries, the fall in prices of export goods (in Tanzania's case sisal primarily) and the rise of import goods are costing considerably more than the total of all aid receipts. While this does not make foreign aid undesirable, its benefits to African economies should not be overestimated.

Self-reliance must also be viewed in relation to specific events in Tanzania's recent foreign relations. Tanzania had been criticized in the West for casting off its former ties and specifically for strengthening relations with China. Its acceptance of Chinese military assistance and economic aid, its provision of a home for southern African liberation movements, the union with Zanzibar in 1964, and Tanzania's stand on Viet Nam all strained relations with major Western donors. After the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the new state ran into difficulties with the Federal Republic of Germany since Zanzibar had previously recognized East Germany. When East Germany was permitted a consulate in Dar es Salaam, the West Germans broke an agreement to aid the Tanzanian air force and Tanzania then told the Federal Republic to withdraw all aid.

Even more costly for development efforts in the short run was Tanzania's break with Britain in accordance with an Organization for African Unity (OAU) resolution on Rhodesia. In the name of anticolonialism, African unity, African honor and freedom of action, Tanzania lost British assistance at a crucial time in the first Five Year Plan period. Thus it seemed to the TANU Government that Tanzania's foreign policy decisions would have immediate consequences for its economic prospects as long as it continued to rely on foreign capital for development. And in its Five Year Plan for development Tanzania was relying on foreign investment and foreign aid for more than three-quarters of central government investment.

Furthermore, Tanzania is not as attractive to foreign investors as neighboring Kenya, which is more industrially developed. It

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was felt by some economists in Tanzania that on the one hand not enough foreign investment could be attracted to make a real difference to total growth and on the other hand that foreign investment made a negative impact by favoring the urban-industrial sector over rural areas, utilizing wrong techniques and creating a privileged stratum in the country.

It was asserted that foreign investment accentuates social and economic gaps as it furthers the creation of a labor aristocracy in the industrial sphere and creates pockets of managerial wealth. There are some weaknesses in this argument. The creation of a privileged industrial working class both in Tanzania and elsewhere in Africa has had less to do with foreign investment than with the reactions of African governments to trade union pressures. Tanzania has shown a typical pattern. Rising wages and the imposition of minimum-wage legislation follow union demands. Employment falls as enterprises try to avoid high labor costs through the utilization of capital-intensive techniques which would be irrational in Africa were it not that wage increases were outstripping productivity. In Tanzania, there were continuous declines in employment from 1961 to 1966; only in 1966 and 1967 did employment increase, by about 3 percent a year.

Therefore it is not clear that nationalization alone will be able to keep wage demands in line with increases in productivity or to equalize income between better-off employees and poorer ones (not to mention the gap between wage laborers and farmers).

Since corporate profits were declining in the pre-nationalization period, while wages were going up, the Government may have nationalized both economic and political trouble. It is possible, however, that the TANU Government will now be better able or more determined to hold wages down. In 1966, the public sector's total wage bill rose faster than the private, but in 1967 the order was reversed. Since the Arusha Declaration, the Government has imposed an average 5 percent ceiling on wage increases. The stage is set for periodic confrontations with the unions, which are ostensibly tied into the ruling TANU structure but which in practice rebel against wage restraint.

III

TANU's policies of self-reliance and socialism are meant to be linked just as self-reliance and national independence are thought to be inextricable. As applied to individuals and social

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groups, self-reliance is meant to signify hard work, the absence of exploitation, and coöperation among local producing, marketing and political organizations. But in Tanzania it is extremely difficult to disseminate ideas from the center without a great deal of distortion taking place. Abstract political words may acquire very different connotations when translated at local levels. And TANU is not an organizational juggernaut which can spread the word throughout the country in monolithic fashion. This must be done by local TANU district or cell leaders whose interpretation of the ideology, goals and policies is often very different from that of the national leaders. For example, TANU's leadership has certainly never construed self-reliance as antithetical to coöperation. But individuals have justified opting out of communal relationships on the ground that self-reliance means individualism. The Arusha Declaration asserts that socialism has no relationship with racialism. But posters meant to publicize the exploitative nature of shopkeepers have had distinctly racial connotations.

Jobless persons in the towns have been the targets of political attack and have been periodically rounded up to be sent back to their rural places of origin. But the categories of "jobless" have not been precise. Water-carriers fulfill real functions in the towns, but they have at times been considered exploitative and at other times as part of the jobless! To further self-reliance, one district council determined to end education subsidies to poor people in the district—despite the increased official emphasis on local co-operation in making education more widely available at the local level.

The difficulty of translating slogans and policies into action at the grass roots becomes clearest in regard to the Arusha formulations on rural change. The logic of a policy of self-reliance calls for direct action on rural problems. A major gap has existed in Tanzania between wage-earners and "self-employed" farmers. Arusha recognized that a solution to Tanzania's problems could not be found in industrial development, that rural development therefore had to be the main focus, and that the drift of rural population to urban areas resulting in increased unemployment must be stopped. Policies for dealing with both the traditional rural economy and the changing rural society of cash-crop farmers then had to be formulated. For along with distinctions between rural and urban, economic differentiation on the land has been

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taking place. Arusha also sought to halt an increasing social and economic differentiation among farmers.

In so far as guidelines are provided for rural change, they are laid out in those parts of the Arusha formulations known as *Ujamaa Vijijini* or "Socialism and Rural Development" and in "Education and Self-Reliance." These are perhaps the most important parts of the Arusha ideology, but while they are addressed to real issues, they are also the loosest in conception, the most difficult to apply and the most debatable with regard to their appropriateness for tropical Africa. Surely, one argument of "Socialism and Rural Development" must be accepted. This is the understanding that Tanzania cannot transform its rural society through widespread use of heavy equipment or through capital-intensive pilot agricultural schemes which would somehow revolutionize agrarian techniques through the force of their example. The society simply does not have the social and economic resources to support either strategy; thus there must be better utilization of land and labor through improved tools and better organization. Or, as President Nyerere puts it, a move from hand tools to the ox plough rather than the tractor is needed.

Nyerere's prescription for rural development is to synthesize old and new values; he intends to combine efficiency and rapid development with equality and freedom—clearly maintaining the primacy of equality. But the Arusha statements reveal the major difficulties in translating the simultaneous goals of economic growth and egalitarianism into agricultural and social policies. On one level, Arusha's answers consist of Benjamin Franklin-like injunctions. People are given homilies on the management of their household affairs and they are exhorted to work hard. On another level it is stated that the basis of Tanzanian life should consist of rural "economic and social communities where people live together and work together for the good of all, and which are interlocked so that all of the different communities also work together in coöperation for the common good of the nation as a whole." The nation should be made up of such Ujamaa village communities. A democratic system of local government is to grow out of these living and working communities. For practical reasons and because they would violate the moral meaning of socialism, both a universal blueprint and coercion are rejected as instruments for getting people into these villages.

The village communities are to be characterized by joint de-

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cision-making on matters affecting village life and by the absence of marked social and economic divisions between members, although distribution of returns is to be according to work done. The call for coöperative and communal farming is not a harking back to simple family or extended-family homesteading, for the village center is not supposed to be a parochial family group. Moreover, some specialization of work and modern production techniques are to be introduced where possible. The crucial point emphasized is that a man not be dependent on anyone except the community for land and tools. And one man should not be able to hire another. It is recognized, however, that in some areas private profit will continue to be a major incentive. The immediate limitation of private profit is called for, not its abolition.

IV

What has been accomplished so far? Tanzanians will disagree over how many Ujamaa village communities have been created. Before the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania had experimented with different kinds of pilot-village programs. Some were communally run; others had coöperative components but were run by expatriate farm managers and were capital-intensive, with the Government providing equipment and some social services. Now "naming" is going on; that is, old schemes are being renamed Ujamaa villages without a fundamental transformation in their organization and operation. This has happened before in Tanzania as local government organs were revised and renamed with little real institutional change taking place. Purists contend that there are no more than twenty Ujamaa villages in Tanzania at present. Some of these were communal villages started long before 1967.

A Ujamaa section was created within TANU in the summer of 1968 to help organize the building of new villages, to train a cadre of organizers in the economic and organizational problems of Ujamaa living and production, and to coördinate efforts made by various government ministries in promoting rural development. The head of the section is a Member of Parliament who led a famous communal farming scheme in southern Tanzania. But as in other TANU projects, staffing is short; project leaders wind up traveling abroad; programs remain uncoördinated. Much of the action that takes place is symbolic.

This has been true also for measures designed to repatriate

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urban unemployed to rural areas—an undertaking of great magnitude. In most African countries the slogan of "back to the land" is not backed up with any administrative measures actually to take unemployed townspeople to the land, nor are any incentives given for people to go back voluntarily, nor is land always available. In Tanzania there were periodic roundups of unemployed before Arusha, and individuals have had to get permission from the head of government in their home district before they could migrate to the capital, Dar es Salaam, or to certain other towns. But people rounded up can slip back to the towns, and individuals can avoid the regional administrative barriers. The effort again becomes symbolic unless machinery exists for helping people to open up new land and for providing initial assistance in resettlement, including, perhaps, aid in starting cottage industries. TANU and the Government lack trained manpower and capital to facilitate this process.

Where there have been successful Ujamaa villages the success has been due to good local leadership. Indeed, it is not likely that building up a staff in an administrative section located in the capital would decisively affect the implementation of the program. Its success will depend on the ability of local TANU and government organs to produce local leaders and establish Ujamaa villages. Centrally directed organizers will have limited impact, if past Tanzanian history is any guide.

What incentives exist, then, for local initiative? What kinds of incentives will there be for peasant farmers who are getting ahead to coöperate and give up individual peasant homesteading or to utilize traditional communal forms in new ways? For one thing, poor people in poor countries measure the possibility of attaining increases in income very carefully against other desirable goals like social security and social acceptance. Thus, for many farmers, the virtue of communal villages may be apparent even if they do not perceive immediate economic returns. But for those who have abandoned or are in the process of abandoning communal units for capitalist farming, it remains to be seen whether the example of socialist villages will prove attractive.

So far, there is no evidence that better-off farmers are being forced into communal villages. Exerting force against those farmers who are getting ahead would have severe economic and political consequences, and this policy has not been envisioned. In fact, it was only in October 1968 that village development com-

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mittees were empowered to impose sanctions on those who refused to participate in local nation-building activities. Where local coercion has occurred in Tanzania it has not stemmed from centrally established policy directives.

Therefore, the successful absorption of individual peasant farmers into larger coöperative or communal village units does not appear to be an early prospect. Even family-based producers' coöperatives seem given to splitting off as more ambitious farmers try to get ahead or individuals chaff at the personal restraints and close contact the coöperative venture entails. Difficulties also arise in working out a division of labor over food-crop and cash-crop work, and the role of women's efforts where women traditionally have specified rights and duties.

For many people, living in villages represents a break with the past. A number of historical studies have indicated that groups in Tanzania resisted being organized in villages in both colonial and pre-colonial periods because the village became the organizational nexus for extracting economic resources and political duties. For people with these historical memories, Ujamaa villages may appear as another such attempt and much persuasion will be required before voluntary changes in behavior take place.

V

It is precisely because Tanzania's leaders are aware of the varied social patterns and values which exist throughout their country that they have tried to influence these patterns and values by intervening directly in the educational system, using TANU as a conveyor belt for new ideas.

In "Education and Self-Reliance," Nyerere has cogently argued that Tanzania's school system continues to foster élitist attitudes. Like earlier critics of African education, he maintains that scarce resources have been too heavily committed to an educational system which has a negative effect on society. Nyerere, however, unlike his predecessors, recognizes that pressures for education come from the populace itself and not from the élites' commitment to some myth of education. Nyerere does not want to abandon emphasis on education but to alter the form and content of the educational system. Although far fewer can be enrolled in secondary schools than in primary, Tanzania cannot afford to increase substantially the number of secondary-school places available. The few who do finish secondary school

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go through a boarding experience which cuts them off from their rural roots. The rest are the so-called "school-leavers," who cannot be absorbed in the wage sector, who do not want to return to the land and who constitute an explosive element in the society. Moreover, by 1980, at the present rate of expansion, Tanzania will have reached a saturation point for the absorption of secondary-school graduates into the wage economy.

To meet these exigencies, Nyerere proposes that primary-school education no longer be considered as preparation for higher schooling, but that it should be a full education in itself, training people for the life they must lead on the land. This requires a radical change both in the educational system and in community attitudes. Whereas in the past schools have been isolated from the rural countryside, now they must be integrated into the surrounding community. Schools should also be self-sufficient farming communities and work with neighboring farmers to improve agricultural standards. A social-service ethic must be created and maintained at all levels of the educational system, and students should be judged in terms of this ethic as well as by their academic accomplishments.

Should the school system of Tanzania be fundamentally revised, this would mark a revolutionary break with contemporary African patterns. For here the problems of discontented school-leavers, urban unemployment and allocation of national resources would be attacked at their roots. Some changes have been made already. Agriculture has been reintroduced into the school syllabus. Primary and secondary schools are creating their own farms where these have not existed. Prior to Arusha, Swahili had become the official language of Tanzania and was the language used in primary schools. The Ministry of Education is now considering use of Swahili as a medium of communication in secondary schools, and revisions of the syllabus in history and civics as well as agriculture are in process.

Implementing fundamental curricula changes necessarily involves great difficulties. A major problem is the lack of teachers who are committed to these changes. Most of the present secondary-school teachers either have been recruited from overseas or are university graduates who themselves were educated under the old system. The latter, who have been the major beneficiaries of the old system, are imbued with élitist attitudes. There is also a shortage of teachers trained in agricultural education.

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Perhaps the greatest changes have taken place in the primary schools in Ujamaa villages. There students are part of a whole community, and thus farm work, academic work and direct participation in communal living can be tied together. Moreover, primary-school teachers themselves have proceeded less far in the educational hierarchy and may be more sympathetic to changes. Similarly, it is likely that adult education in Ujamaa villages can be carried out in accordance with the Arusha goals.

TANU has been charged, along with the Ministry of Education, with effecting these changes in education. In 1965 TANU Youth League sections were introduced into the secondary schools and in 1966 TANU became more active in the University College. The party is to coördinate its activities with the Ministry of Education and direct its own programs through a political education section established at TANU Headquarters in Dar es Salaam. The small staff at the National Headquarters will find it difficult to centralize direction of the education program. Whatever the inclination of the Ministry of Education and TANU Headquarters to infuse the syllabus with more political education, the implementation of central directions again will depend on the interest of local TANU organizations and the coöperation of local teachers.

VI

Leadership is of course a central issue of the program. Arusha has been formulated and articulated by Julius Nyerere. The public definition of the Tanzanian way and the international publicity given to it have depended almost exclusively on the President's own writing and speeches. This raises important questions about the nature of support for Arusha within TANU, especially since one important part of the Declaration deals with restrictions imposed on TANU leaders.

A specific trigger of the Arusha Declaration was the refusal in 1966 by students at the University College in Dar es Salaam to do National Service because of its low rates of pay. They also rejected what they called political indoctrination during the National Service program. The President saw the students' rejection of National Service (which required of them both some short-term quasi-military service and a period of employment in earmarked jobs, largely as teachers, after graduation) as a rejection of commitment to the nation which had financed the stu-

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dents' education. He foresaw the emergence of an educated élite cut off from its own rural roots and without an ethic of service to the nation.

With this incident in mind, the framers of the Arusha Declaration laid down qualifications for leadership in TANU which attempt to prevent the separation of privileged government and party leaders from the mass of society. Every TANU and government leader is supposed to be a worker and peasant and to have no connection with capitalism and feudalism. What this means concretely is that leaders at all levels must divest themselves of shares in corporations and memberships on boards of directors, and must cease renting property they have acquired. These injunctions apply to high and middle-level civil servants and their husbands and wives as well as to political leaders. Those who do not meet the requirements within a year's grace period are to lose their posts. So far, some of those who sounded most "radical" in the past have been accused of flagrant accumulation of wealth and violation of socialist ethics. A prominent example is the former Secretary General of TANU, Oscar Kambona, who had earlier fled the country.

As a result of student complaints that they were the targets of Government austerity when Ministerial salaries were high, the President announced he was taking a permanent 20 percent pay cut in October 1966; Ministers promptly offered to follow suit. Heads of the government and party in the regions and districts took 15 and 10 percent cuts respectively and civil servants with salaries over $5,300 a year took 10 percent pay cuts. Members of Parliament did not take salary cuts but they did not get increases for which they had pressed. (Tanzanian parliamentarians receive about $2,200 a year, which is around two-thirds of the amount a Kenyan MP gets.) Moreover, Ministers gave up their state-owned Mercedes, which had been full time at their disposal, and made do with a government-business car pool. Government low-cost loans for automobiles were ended too, and TANU and government leaders had to sell their "second" houses, causing a fall in property values in Dar es Salaam. Some people, including a Junior Minister, who wanted to hold onto their commercial stake, have resigned. That MPs were worried about their financial positions was indicated clearly when President Nyerere answered questions about the Arusha Declaration from MPs in April 1967. Almost all the questions were about re-

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strictions on government and party officials; no one asked about the ideological aspects of the program.

These restrictions strike at what has been a fundamental means to enrichment in new states—wealth through politics. Even with Arusha, Tanzanian leaders and many salaried officials will still be living much better than all but a few of their countrymen, but they are no longer supposed to feather their nests for the future. Political responsibility is not intended to lead to economic security.

The whole thrust of Arusha has been to sharpen the definition of political commitment in Tanzania. No longer does TANU aim to enroll all citizens. (TANU is supposed to be a party of workers and peasants but these terms have not been sharply defined.) It is not yet clear whether qualitative criteria for membership are being strictly imposed at lower levels, but within the leadership the President himself is being pressed to tighten TANU discipline. At a meeting of the National Executive Committee held in Tanga last October, nine TANU members were expelled. They included the former Secretary General, Kambona, already in exile, and the former TANU Youth League Secretary and MP, Mr. E. Anangisye, who was in detention and apparently was closely connected with Kambona. The other seven who were expelled were all Members of Parliament who had been outspoken on various issues. Two had objected to the way that Ujamaa villages were being set up in their region, West Lake; another had complained about lack of freedom within the party and had objected to the failure of Zanzibar to carry out elections. The MPs who were expelled from TANU lost their seats in the National Assembly. They were not accused of specific violations of the Arusha provisos on economic accumulation but were said by the party newspaper to have "grossly violated the Party creed both in their actions and attitudes, all of which sum up to a very clear opposition to the Party and its policies."

The National Executive Committee has now shown its willingness to move against people who are in one way or another vigorously opposing a TANU line. It remains to be seen how freely the labels "anti-people" and "anti-TANU" will be applied —whether they will be used chiefly against those who oppose the Arusha formulations or whether they will become a weapon against those who voice dissent of any kind.

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VII

While the Arusha Declaration cannot be separated from Nyerere personally—indeed he has been responsible for its promulgation and the subsequent elaboration of its themes—it would be a mistake to view the Declaration merely as a personal statement. The political élite of Tanzania has remained relatively unified in support of Arusha and in fact the formulation has been a force for unity—in part because it creates an élan among the leaders and in part because it responds to felt needs in the population. In other words, Nyerere has been successful so far in creating an ideology for development in accordance with political and social goals widely held in Tanzania. The Arusha formulations should be seen in relation to practicing politicians who are trying to stay in power as they harness social forces to their goals. The widening gaps in Tanzanian society threaten Nyerere and the present TANU leadership just as in other parts of Africa.

Arusha then is not an exercise in ideology-making for its own sake or the acting out of one man's ideas. The function of the Arusha Declaration is to legitimize rule and to come to terms with conditions which are going to persist for some time. Arusha also provides a vision of a different and better future and it gives guidelines for achieving it.

Some TANU people believe that it was the absence of clear ideological direction which made it impossible in the past to exert strong central control; people literally did not know what they were supposed to do, either in superior or subordinate positions. Now the answers to What Is To Be Done are given in Arusha.

Of course, there have been large gaps between ideas and implementation. But it would be wrong to minimize the significance of Arusha and the events of the past two years in Tanzania. A national leadership has examined the critical issues of development in Africa and has announced steps to meet them. Concrete measures have been incorporated in an ideology of development. Tanzania's leaders have recognized that Africa must change and that change must be directed rather than merely reacted to. To control change rather than be carried away by it is more than a noble idea; it is a practical necessity for those who rule.

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SUCCESS STORY IN SOUTH KOREA

By Emerson Chapin

IT was only a few years ago that South Korea, wracked by poverty, political chaos and popular discontent, was widely regarded as a sinkhole of American aid. Now this small, ruggedly anti-communist country enjoys relative political stability and is making impressive economic progress. It has become one of the success stories of the United States assistance program. How did this startling reversal come about?

Officials familiar with South Korea's history since the war with the communist North insist that the ingredients for success had been there for a long time, however obscured they may have been in the dark days of the early 1960s. They are convinced that the apparent miracle is genuine and likely to continue, although as Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy has pointed out: "While Korea's achievements are considerable, its major problems require that they be kept in perspective."

Economic growth was at the rate of 7.6 percent annually over the 1962–67 period, with an 8.4 percent rise in 1967 and a surprising 13.1 percent for 1968, but it started from a very low base. The living standard is perceptibly rising, as indicated by the sale of new homes, television sets, refrigerators, more food and better clothes; but per capita income is still not much above $140 a year, deep pockets of poverty exist and the gap between urban and rural income has been growing. Although considerable progress has been made toward democracy, the overriding need for stability and order and the government's vigilant anti-communist policy lay a heavy hand across certain sectors of society. However, to those familiar with the spirit of defeatism that so long prevailed among the Korean people, the key element is a new feeling of self-reliance and self-assurance that has begun to pervade the country. "We can do it ourselves" has become the motto for a people who long were inclined to ask: "How can we ever succeed?"

The United States helped to pave the way by patient investment which kept this war-shattered nation supplied with food and other necessities, laid an infrastructure in a land almost devoid of natural resources, created educational opportunities, built several layers of experienced administrative personnel and ended

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Korea's international isolation. Political stability, painfully attained under the Park Chung Hee government after a period of crisis and strife, established a climate in which businessmen and others could look to the future, inflation could be checked and coördinated planning begun. Once the watershed was passed, momentum built up rapidly. Austerity and hard work paid off. Three years ago, the United States aid mission was expanding; now it is being rapidly reduced.

An unintended tribute to South Korea's progress is the intensified campaign of harassment and terror carried on since late 1966 by Kim Il Sung's North Korean régime. Early in this decade, the Pyongyang government may well have felt it could afford to wait patiently until the South fell like ripe fruit into its hands. They can take this for granted no longer. The communist government, itself now in economic difficulties, has carried out a bristling rearmament program and Kim asserts that he intends to reunify the peninsula, by force if necessary, before the end of 1970.

The attempted raid on the Presidential mansion in Seoul by a carefully trained team of 31 North Korean agents in January of last year, closely followed by the seizure of the United States intelligence ship *Pueblo,* brought to world attention the intensification of the military confrontation that began when six American soldiers were deliberately slain from ambush by communist infiltrators during the visit of President Johnson in November 1966. The extent to which American military strength in Korea had been depleted because of priorities for Viet Nam was revealed during the *Pueblo* crisis. The modernization of South Korea's large forces had also long been lagging. Now that situation has been to a large extent corrected and the United Nations Command has repeatedly warned the North Koreans that their campaign of provocation and terror could have dire consequences. There is now little doubt that any overt North Korean attack across the demilitarized zone could provoke general war. Indeed many South Korean generals appear to hope that the North's provocations may provide an excuse for "hot pursuit all the way to the Yalu River." Officially, Seoul's objective is to build up the nation's economic and political strength until, in President Park's words last October, "it cannot be curbed at all and will overflow into North Korea, thus becoming a current for national unification."

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II

That the Koreans are a tough, resilient people is attested by their preservation of a national identity and culture despite incursions over the centuries by the Mongols, Manchurians and Chinese. Japanese, Chinese and Russian armies fought over Korean soil, and from the turn of this century until 1945 Japan exercised a stern occupation rule that sought to stamp out national feelings and traditions. After World War II the country was cut in half, without reference to the wishes of its own people. The arbitrary division along the 38th Parallel separated the more industrialized North, with most of the country's natural resources, from the densely populated, largely agricultural South.

The savage war that raged for three years after the North Korean attack in June 1950 caused more than 800,000 military and civilian casualties among South Koreans, left property losses estimated at $3 billion and made 25 percent of the population homeless. In addition, the communists carried off 6,000 technicians and industrial managers to work in the North. An already poor country was made much poorer.

Even without the effects of the war, the South Koreans had major handicaps to overcome. Years of Japanese occupation had left a majority of the people illiterate in their own language. Subordination of native Koreans in the colonial régime meant that there were few trained and experienced administrators. But Japanese repression, instead of crushing Korean nationalism, stirred only a more intense patriotic feeling, channeled into oppositionist activity. Those who became Korea's leaders after 1945 had been in exile or had devoted themselves to resistance and had little experience in the positive aspects of governing. This experience, coupled with the outspoken, often contentious Korean character, meant that in the long reconstruction period much of the national energy was spent in political feuding and infighting.

Since the Panmunjom armistice settlement of 1953, the United States has provided more than $3.6 billion in aid to Korea. This has been supplemented by funds from international aid programs and private charitable enterprises. In the immediate postwar period, emphasis necessarily was on relief—feeding people, and clothing and sheltering them—and on the repair of war damage. With this went efforts to lay the foundation for eventual economic and industrial development.

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By 1957 much of the war damage had been repaired; the economic growth rate averaged 5.3 percent annually from 1954 to 1957. But as the régime of the aging President Syngman Rhee became a prey to corruption, repression and mismanagement, this rate dropped to 3.6 percent in the 1958–61 period and was largely nullified by the rapid rise in population. Discontent and poverty pushed the nation to the point of student revolution (1960) and the subsequent bloodless coup of 1961, in which a military junta dominated by Major-General Park Chung Hee displaced the inefficient and fumbling civil government headed by Dr. John M. Chang. Meanwhile, despite the political instability, the aid program was slowly achieving results, and in 1962, having concluded that a base had been constructed for an independent South Korean economy, the United States shifted emphasis. It selected five major areas of development designed to push the country toward an eventual self-supporting economy. These five priority areas were power, mining, transport and communications, key industries, and investment and agricultural credit.

Much of the credit for what has happened since then must go to the strong, stubbornly determined leadership of President Park. With the best of intentions but impeded by a lack of civil administrative and technical experience, his junta inaugurated an ambitious five-year economic plan in 1962. Initially this faltered and many of its projects had to be abandoned or deferred. The new régime also found itself embroiled in a number of scandals. Pressed by the United States, General Park converted his military régime into a nominally civilian government by general elections in 1963 and enlisted the aid and experience of many of the old-line politicians and bureaucrats who had previously been denounced and purged. Before the new administration could gather strength it drifted dangerously close to a crisis point in 1964, when economic deprivation and pent-up frustrations seemed to be pushing the populace toward revolution. But President Park refused to yield and stamped down hard on the activities of the students and intellectual dissidents; the crisis passed, a period of political stability followed, and a number of favorable elements finally coalesced to provide the long-awaited turn upward. Progress has been at an accelerating rate since then.

Contributing factors, in addition to American help in building an industrial base, were the mood of stability following the establishment of strong political rule and the resulting feeling in the

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government as well as business that they could plan ahead. Control of what had threatened to become runaway inflation in 1963 and 1964, and the gradual elimination of distortions in the economy, brought long-needed incentives into play. Savings were encouraged. The opportunity to make money has increasingly attracted the large-scale foreign investment needed for industrial development.

American officials almost uniformly profess admiration for the native energy and talent of the Koreans. "We had to find several layers of technicians in government and develop an additional layer of competence in industry," said one high-ranking American in Seoul. "We could provide equipment but we had to wait for competence in personnel to develop. Now they've got competence. There's plenty of native initiative, and an almost kinetic energy, but without financing there was no way to apply their talents."

Finally, there was a general willingness to accept American aid at face value and welcome American assistance as well intentioned. South Koreans are anti-communist and in general pro-American, no matter what occasional frictions arise. Unlike some other Asian nations, the Seoul government did not accept American aid resentfully, looking uneasily for strings that might be attached.

That the economic and industrial spurt has continued unabated into this year despite North Korean threats and subversion is attributable to President Park's decision to press ahead resolutely on the economic front even while coöperating with the United States in taking strong measures for military security. There is no doubt that one aim of the Pyongyang government has been to create insecurity in the South, hinder economic planning and frighten off foreign investment. To some extent, its threats have succeeded in stirring uneasy feelings and fears among both the urban and rural populace. But the President has told the people that continuing the drive for prosperity is equally as important as military preparedness in thwarting the communists. In addition to promising that South Korea would repulse all aggression, he has warned that "if North Korea triggers an all-out attack on the South, we should counterattack immediately and take this opportunity to achieve national reunification, thus resolving, on our own initiative, the national tragedy of territorial division."

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The possibility of a South Korean "over-reaction" to Northern provocations is one of the prospects that troubles the United Nations Command in Seoul. This Command, under an American officer, General Charles H. Bonesteel 3d, has jurisdiction over the Republic of Korea forces in Korea, 550,000 strong, as well as the U.S. Eighth Army, about 50,000 strong. It has been the aim of the United States military to resist firmly all North Korean attempts to stir up trouble, but otherwise to "cool" the situation and maintain first priority for Viet Nam.

There have been periodic clashes with the North during what has become the world's longest military armistice. The Command nevertheless tended for many years to maintain a fairly relaxed attitude along the 155-mile-long demilitarized zone. Not so now. In years past it was assumed that the communists would not risk a general war, and American troops performing onerous and often dangerous duty in the front line dubbed Korea "the forgotten front." Now, however, the actions of Kim Il Sung have led some observers to believe that he might indeed be tempted to try to unify the country by force. "It isn't enough to analyze his intentions: we have to make our plans on the basis of his known capability," one American officer said. That capability is strong.

The North Koreans have 350,000 men at or close to the front line, with 8 divisions along the demilitarized zone and 10 in reserve. There is a Red Guard militia of 1.2 million men to back them up. The air force has 500 jet aircraft, including probably 60 MIG-21s operating from underground hangars. The navy is thought to have 186 ships, including four submarines and 60 high-speed torpedo boats. There are known to be 66 surface-to-air missile sites. The army is said to have about 900 Soviet-built tanks and adequate artillery. Americans and South Koreans have the highest professional respect for the combat ability of these tough, highly trained and disciplined fighting men.

Since 1966 the North Koreans have stressed the training of guerrilla forces, according to the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency, which has played a leading role in anti-guerrilla operations. Units of 500 men have been established, each led by a major-general, each assigned to a specific province in the South. The men have undergone actual combat training in the demilitarized zone. The number of men available for infiltration missions into the South has recently been put at 30,000 to 40,000 by American officials. In December, Kim Il Sung tightened his mil-

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itary control, purging his long-time Defense Minister, General Kim Chang Pong, and installing General Choi Hyon, generally regarded as the North's leading guerrilla warfare specialist.

The United Nations Command reported 543 serious incidents in the demilitarized zone in 1968, compared with 445 in the previous year. According to a South Korean spokesman, a total of 172 North Korean infiltrators were killed out of 1,087 who attempted to cross the line; most of the rest were presumed to have been driven back into the North. About 160 other agents and guerrillas were killed below the truce zone. The U.N. forces suffered more than 150 casualties. The resolution of the *Pueblo* incident, with North Korea returning the 82 surviving crewmen after accepting an already repudiated "apology" from the United States, had no apparent effect in alleviating the state of open confrontation. In a "1968 summary" speech at a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission, Major-General Gilbert H. Woodward of the United States declared that "Communist North Korea has made 1968 the bloodiest year in Korea since 1953" and charged that its aggressive activity "involved assassination, terror, cold-blooded murder, kidnapping, mutilation and brutal attacks against U.N. Command personnel."

Between October 30 and November 2, the North Koreans put ashore 120 agents from high-speed boats along the mountainous east coast area in what was believed to be a bold effort to lay a basis for an eventual campaign of guerrilla warfare on the Viet Nam model. By January 10, a total of 110 of these men had been killed and 7 captured, but the South Koreans were compelled to mobilize 40,000 regular soldiers and militiamen and initiate a large-scale security program to protect farm families from terrorism in the remote rural region. President Park has predicted that Pyongyang will increase its infiltration of guerrillas and agents, and U.S. analysts have expressed concern over what they believe may become a program of subversion patterned on that pursued by the Hanoi régime in South Viet Nam in the late 1950s prior to the outbreak of open warfare in Viet Nam.

But there are important differences between South Viet Nam and South Korea. Northern agents usually find themselves conspicuous and are quickly detected when they appear either in cities or in rural areas of the South. A system of high rewards for reporting enemy agents and severe penalties for concealing them has proved extremely effective: even family members re-

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turning to their old homes from the North after years of separation usually are turned in to the authorities. The Seoul government has announced that it has broken several large rings of agents, including one that operated on the big island of Cheju, fifty miles off the southern tip of the peninsula. Both Korean and American officials are convinced that the people of the South, with memories of the war years, will remain hostile to overtures from northern agents, but there is some nervousness about how the population would react to a widespread campaign of terror throughout the countryside.

In the rugged country north of Seoul, American and South Korean troops maintain a state of extreme alert. Since early 1968, defenses have been reinforced, all positions heavily sandbagged and another American brigade (from the Seventh Division) moved north of the broad Imjin River. A chain-link fence, electrified in many places, has been erected along much of the 155-mile line, backed up with minefields, tank traps and explosive charges. Electronic detection equipment has been brought in to slow the infiltration; bloodhounds also are used. A defense in depth, with new strongpoints constructed between the front line and the bustling city of Seoul, only 30 miles away, affirms the military's determination to prevent any repetition of 1950, when invading forces reached the capital in little more than a day. A ring of Hawk missiles has been installed around Seoul, which is only three-and-a-half minutes' jet time from the border.

Last summer there was considerable concern that the militant rulers in Pyongyang, misinterpreting the lack of a military response to the *Pueblo* seizure and the raid against the Presidential mansion, might stage an "Israeli-type" offensive in a chosen sector, bite off a chunk of territory, then call a halt and await the reaction, knowing that the United States, heavily committed in Viet Nam, wishes to avoid a serious involvement in Korea. This worry was strongest among South Korean staff officers, who lack much of the advanced equipment of the U.S. divisions, and whose men in the rainy season must often spend a disproportionate amount of time in maintenance and repair of installations, roads and bridges rather than in combat training. High officials in Korea believe that war came very close in January 1968, when success in the attempt to assassinate President Park might well have prompted the South Koreans to march north; nor do they discount the continuing danger.

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However, General Bonesteel has kept his forces under strict orders to avoid escalation, and spokesmen in the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom regularly convey stern warnings to the communists that force will be met with force. The Seoul government feels that Pyongyang could not desire full-scale war in present circumstances, since this would be suicidal without outside help. The North Koreans could hardly want intervention again by Chinese forces. As for the Soviet Union, it must now be exercising whatever restraining influence it can on them; and however reckless they may be, this influence must be considerable since they rely on Moscow for supplies and weapons.

The South Korean armed forces are the third largest in the non-communist world. They include a 540,000-man army, a strong air force, a small but effective naval component and a 2 million-member militia force. The army has 19 active divisions, including the two serving in Viet Nam, and 10 in reserve. Its quality and capability are highly regarded by American advisers and its contingent in Viet Nam has demonstrated its toughness. However, low pay for its largely drafted servicemen, limited food rations and shortages of modern weapons and equipment raise complaints from top officers. The air force has more than 300 modern planes, including F-84s and F-86s and the F-5 Freedom Fighter. But delivery of F-4C Phantom jets from the United States, originally scheduled for 1968, has been postponed until probably the middle of 1969. Air defenses have been dramatically strengthened, however, by missiles and by a rapid build-up of American air power following the *Pueblo* incident. U.S. supersonic fighters are now dispersed at five major bases, many of them in concrete revetments.

High officials in Seoul, still uncertain over the motives for the *Pueblo* seizure and the raid on the President's Blue House, feel that in the long run these actions backfired by stimulating the strong reinforcement of South Korea's defenses. While they hope to keep the military situation damped down, they believe that in a combat situation they can cope with whatever forces the North Koreans may launch against them.

III

A rapid increase in foreign investment indicates that there is considerable international confidence in South Korea's military security, though some businessmen believe the current rate of

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investment might be several times as high if the threat of trouble from the North could be eliminated. A special mission from private American industry, commissioned by President Johnson and led by George W. Ball, visited South Korea in the spring of 1967 and submitted a very favorable report. It noted the attractions of an investment law that welcomes 100 percent foreign ownership and permits repatriation of capital and profits on a liberal schedule.

In the first half of 1968, Ford decided to assemble cars and trucks in Korea, Caterpillar and International Harvester decided on long-term credit extensions, and Baldwin pianos was going into production. National Distilleries outlined a program to produce synthetic alcohol from petrochemicals and Union Oil of California contracted for a joint project to build a big thermal power plant near Seoul. Plans progressed for a large integrated iron and steel mill and for a large petrochemical complex with participation by seven important U.S. companies. A country that five years ago had to import all refined petroleum products now has a second major refinery in operation, with construction of a third and fourth under way. Total foreign capital projects approved by the government from 1962 to 1968 had reached 113 by late December with $91.5 million involved. U.S. investors head the list, with Japanese second.

Exports, which amounted to only $32 million in 1960, rose at an average of 42 percent annually during the First Five Year Plan. Last year's goal of $500 million was slightly exceeded. The target for this year is $700 million and that for 1970 is $1 billion. Exports of plywood and textiles to the United States head the list. Industrial production has soared, tax collections rose about 50 percent last year, and unemployment and under-employment have been substantially reduced from the dangerously high levels of a few years ago. Wholesale prices showed an increase of 7.1 percent in 1968, slightly exceeding the 6 percent that the government had set as a desirable limit. The policy of liberalized imports was reversed somewhat, checks being put on such luxury items as air-conditioners, television sets and refrigerators, in a move to slow consumption and improve foreign payment balances. The Economic Planning Minister, Park Choong Hoon, has noted that the nation's imports were approaching $1 billion annually, making it about 20th among the world's markets.

Taking account of the lag in agricultural development, the

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government reached a fundamental decision in October to raise the official price paid to farmers for rice deliveries by 17 percent, thus encouraging greater production, raising farm incomes and shifting consumption to other grains. Diversification of farming, livestock breeding, off-season farm projects and agrobusiness ventures are being promoted and the government has recently invested in seed research to improve plant strains.

The Second Five Year Plan, which began in 1967, has already been revised upward, since most of its goals appeared attainable at least a year ahead of schedule; and the foreign-investment goal was almost attained last year. Marked improvement in living standards is projected. South Korea is expected to be self-sufficient in food-grain production and free of reliance on grant aid from the United States by 1971. The revised estimates indicate that the growth rate will average 10 percent annually and international trade will reach three times the 1965 rate. Education will be broadened and improved and science and technology, hitherto neglected, will get more help. Perhaps most important, the growth of population, which pushed the crowded land past the 30-million mark this year, is beginning to be stemmed by a government-supported family-planning program. The rate of increase has been cut in five years from 3 percent to 2.4 percent; plans call for a decline to 2 percent by 1971 and hope is voiced for reaching 1 percent by 1986.

Many economic hazards remain. Chief among them is inflation as government budgets rise almost 50 percent a year and the amount of money in circulation soars. American advisers see danger in the tendency of the newly confident Korean officials to attempt too much too fast. Some projects, such as the Seoul-Pusan superhighway, the petrochemical complex or the integrated steel mill may be more a matter of national prestige than sound economic ventures under present conditions. The economic atmosphere is heady in Seoul these days, and Americans hope Korean planners will not be carried away by their enthusiasm. Nevertheless there is rejoicing over the new mood that has replaced the defeatism of years past.

Corruption has been almost a way of life in Korea, as in many underdeveloped countries, and eliminating it is an arduous process. At the grassroots level, underpaid civil servants are vulnerable to temptations of many sorts, and underpaid teachers have been prone to accept favors from parents for advancing individ-

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ual pupils in the highly competitive educational system. The Park government, like its predecessors, has periodically been rocked by scandal, although the President himself is free of any suspicion. Recently the government, under opposition pressure, has acknowledged gross profiteering by big business monopolies and companies assisted by the government in attracting foreign investment: investigations are in progress. These incidents have not shaken the faith of the governing Democratic-Republican Party in its policy of promoting big business and industry as the fastest means of spurring economic development.

IV

Any estimate of the degree of democratization in South Korea will depend on the standard one sets. For reasons not of their own making, the Koreans were late starters. Democracy was largely discredited in the late 1950s under Dr. Rhee and in the 1960–61 period when an elected government proved incapable of effective rule. Now, eight years after the military coup, the President and the 175 members of the National Assembly, chosen at four-year intervals, are the only elective officials; all other posts, national and local, are filled by appointment. All political organizations are right of center and a prominent politician has remarked that it will be many years before the country can afford the luxury of any organized left-of-center activity. The left-wing movement, by its squabbling and factionalism, has gravely impaired its own prospects and many of its members have joined the parties of the right. In general, politics are more a matter of personality than ideology—and Korean personalities are strong.

In many sectors the harsh hand of repression has been felt: the far-reaching network of intelligence agents is reported to have compiled extensive dossiers on several million people, particularly intellectuals and student leaders. The groups that led the student opposition to the treaty with Japan a few years ago have been effectively broken up, and professors who lost their jobs then (many of them are back in teaching posts) are not expressing their views publicly. The universities are administered by educators who have shown themselves friendly to the Park régime. Opposition politicians who have spoken too boldly about the personal lives of the governing hierarchy or who view communism less than harshly have sometimes been imprisoned—a situation that has not always damaged their popularity.

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Nevertheless, foreigners who go to Korea expecting to find a repressive police state are likely to be pleasantly surprised. Politicians are outspoken and election campaigns have been waged with considerable heat. There is little doubt, in fact, that if his opponents had been able to submerge their differences and wage a united campaign, Park Chung Hee would have been defeated in his first Presidential race in 1963. Newspapers tend to be generally critical of the government—critical of almost everything, it sometimes seems—reflecting the tradition of resistance that dates back to the Japanese occupation. National Assembly debates are often stormy and sometimes violent, for oppositionists there, at least, have a public platform where they cannot be muzzled.

Though various ministers have come and gone, the Cabinet headed by Premier Chung Il Kwon has preserved an unusual continuity. Mr. Chung, former Chief of Staff during the Korean War and later Ambassador in Washington, has held office for five years. Though the Park government is nominally civilian, seven of the ministers are retired generals and 25 other former generals are members of the National Assembly. Twelve of South Korea's 29 ambassadors abroad are former high military men and three-fourths of the state-run enterprises and companies supported by government investment have retired generals as their presidents.

For some time attention has been focused on the Presidential election of 1971, when President Park reaches the end of the eight years which he is constitutionally permitted to serve. Fears are being voiced that the President may find it advisable to amend the Constitution or suspend it under a declaration of emergency in order to continue his leadership and prevent a disastrous struggle for power. After having initially denied any intention of seeking a constitutional amendment, leaders of the government party have begun this year to talk publicly about such a step as a means of assuring "public stability." Dr. Yu Chin Oh, the brilliant constitutional scholar and former university president who has been leading the opposition New Democratic Party, stresses that independent South Korea has not yet had a normal constitutional transfer of power and declares that a legal succession is the very essence of the democratic process. Following the 1967 general elections, which prompted some well-grounded charges of fraud and rigging, the government party now holds a little less than two-thirds of the Assembly seats, but with the

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support of 12 independents it has adequate strength to force through an amendment. The consequences might be grave.

There is also speculation about the plans and prospects of Kim Jong Pil, 43 years of age, long President Park's right-hand man, who as a lieutenant-colonel provided the directing force in the 1961 coup, served as the initial head of the South Korean CIA, then organized the Democratic-Republican Party as the vehicle for the changeover to civil rule. He went into political exile twice when his rivals seemed to have the upper hand, and last May, finding his position again being eroded, resigned from the party chairmanship and declared himself finished with politics forever. Few politicians take this declaration seriously. Whether the President might designate him as his successor, and whether this would precipitate a destructive political struggle, are already topics of keen interest in Seoul.

Much of the new confidence so plainly evident reflects South Korea's improved international standing. The normalization treaty with Japan, finally pushed through after 13 years of off-and-on negotiations with the old enemy, went far toward removing a national inferiority complex. It opened the door to $800 million in grant, loan and investment aid from Japan over a 10-year period, eased long-standing mistrust and brought two complementary economies into possibly fruitful relations. The difficult decision to send troops to Viet Nam and their impressive performance there has given South Koreans a feeling that they are now playing an important role in the international containment of communism while repaying a debt to the allied nations that came to their aid in 1950.

South Korea has also ended her long international isolation by seeking a significant role in regional and international affairs. It was largely Korean initiative that brought about the nine-nation conference in Seoul in 1966 which gave birth to the Asian-Pacific Council (ASPAC), and South Korea has continued to play a prominent role in this organization, advocating recently that its members, except for Japan, be linked in a collective security grouping as envisioned by President Nixon. Koreans provided the initial impetus for the 1966 Manila Conference. President Park, Premier Chung and other officials have traveled widely in Asia, seeking to make their country and their policies better known. South Korean missions have been dispatched on long tours through Asia, Africa and South America to promote good

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will and offset the diplomatic efforts of the Pyongyang régime, backed by the communist bloc, in the continuing contest for support among United Nations members.

Reunification remains the overwhelming national goal, and the Republic of Korea—the only Korean government recognized by the international organization—remains committed to the United Nations formula for reunification: nationwide elections under U.N. supervision. Though the annual debate on the "Korean question" at the United Nations attracted little outside attention, it long remained a vital matter for the South Koreans, an indicator of the degree of international support for their régime against the intensified communist offensive. When the item finally was removed from automatic annual consideration on the Assembly agenda last year, the voting indicated that South Korea retained substantial majority support.

The demarcation line running near the 38th Parallel in Korea is probably the most tightly closed border in the world and there presently seems little prospect of loosening it. After two decades of living with this barrier, the South Koreans have achieved a remarkable degree of political stability and economic growth; they probably have not yet reached the point where they can hold on to one without the other.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By John G. Stoessinger

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Henry L. Roberts, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union; John C. Campbell, Middle East, North Africa; Howard Linton, Asia; Joseph A. Ellis, Latin America; Frank Wolf, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

POLITICS AND SOCIETY. By Robert M. MacIver; edited by David Spitz. New York: Atherton Press, 1969, 571 p. $11.50.

Forty essays, seven of them never before published, provide a splendid panorama of MacIver's mind over a period of nearly sixty years.

DEMOCRACY AND TOTALITARIANISM. By Raymond Aron. New York: Praeger, 1969, 262 p. $7.50.

The French Fourth Republic and the Soviet system serve as models in this fertile and imaginative study in comparisons. (Originally published in France in 1965.)

THE POLITICS OF FORCE: BARGAINING DURING INTERNATIONAL CRISES. By Oran R. Young. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the Center of International Studies), 1969, 438 p. $12.50.

An excellent analysis of bargaining under international crisis conditions, making fine use of case materials. Conceptually indebted to Schelling but also breaks new ground.

SYSTEMS, STATES, DIPLOMACY AND RULES. By J. W. Burton. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968, 251 p. $7.00.

A brave attempt to relate systems theory to contemporary international relations. Only partially successful but refreshingly free of jargon.

PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE SECRETARIES-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. VOLUME I: TRYGVE LIE, 1946–1953. Edited by Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, 535 p. $15.00.

The selection of documents by the editors shows sensitivity and a sense of history. The evolution of Trygve Lie's conception of the Secretary-Generalship emerges clearly from these public papers covering a seven-year span.

THE ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Karl W. Deutsch. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968, 214 p. $5.95 (Paper, $2.95).

A highly sophisticated introduction to international relations. The author makes discriminating use of quantitative data, communications, conflict and games theory.

NEW APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Edited by Morton A. Kaplan. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968, 518 p. $10.00.

Fourteen essays strung together in a highly uneven symposium, with a strong mathematical bent.

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THE STUDY OF POLICY FORMATION. Edited by Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gergen. New York: Free Press, 1968, 392 p. $9.95.

Ten social scientists, mostly of the behavioral persuasion, explore the policy-making process in their respective fields.

CONFESSIONS OF A DISLOYAL EUROPEAN. By Jan Myrdal. New York: Pantheon Books, 1968, 201 p. $4.95.

An Ingmar Bergmanesque odyssey, guilt-ridden, angry and hauntingly evocative.

END OF AN ILLUSION. By James Avery Joyce. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969, 274 p. $8.95.

"The alliance system has had its day," the author argues, not very convincingly. In the 1970s, the peace must be built primarily through the United Nations.

STUDENTS AND POLITICS IN DEVELOPING NATIONS. Edited by Donald K. Emmerson. New York: Praeger, 1968, 444 p. $9.50.

The editor skillfully blends together eleven essays on student politics in eleven different countries. He concludes that student politics, though "the art of the impossible," nevertheless indicates fresh directions for the polity.

TOWARDS A GLOBAL FEDERALISM. By William O. Douglas. New York: New York University Press, 1968, 177 p. $7.95.

A passionate plea for a world rule of law by an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Edited by Elisabeth T. Crawford and Albert D. Biderman. New York: Wiley, 1969, 333 p. $11.95.

A somewhat labored effort by 23 scholars to develop a "sociology of social science."

NONRECOGNITION AND TREATY RELATIONS. By B. R. Bot. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1968, 286 p. $10.00.

A useful monograph with a heavy legal emphasis.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

NAVAL POLICY BETWEEN THE WARS. I: THE PERIOD OF ANGLO-AMERICAN ANTAGONISM, 1919–1929. By Stephen Roskill. London: Collins, 1968, 638 p. 70/.

A first-rate account of British naval policy after World War I with emphasis on the Anglo-American competition for mastery of the seas after the Washington Conference of 1921–22.

CHEMICAL WARFARE: A STUDY IN RESTRAINTS. By Frederic J. Brown. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, 355 p. $9.00.

The definitive study of the policy of international restraint in the use of poison gas after World War I.

SCIENTISTS IN POLITICS: THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS MOVEMENT, 1945–46. By Donald A. Strickland. Lafayette: Purdue University Studies, 1968, 149 p. $4.95.

The Atomic Scientists Movement tries to deal with the collision between science and human meaning after the war by "engaging" in the political process. A fine monograph.

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SOFT UNDERBELLY: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN CONTROVERSY OVER THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN 1939–1945. By Trumbull Higgins. New York: Macmillan, 1968, 275 p. $6.95.

A balanced explanation of the reasons for the British determination to divert the Allies from an invasion of France to a land offensive in the Mediterranean during World War II.

THE GREAT AIR WAR. By Aaron Norman. New York: Macmillan, 1968, 558 p. $10.00.

The romantic and personal stories of the great air aces of World War I. Fast-paced and well-researched. Particularly good on Richthofen.

THE CIVILIZING MISSION: A HISTORY OF THE ITALO-ETHIOPIAN WAR OF 1935–1936. By A. J. Barker. New York: Dial Press, 1968, 383 p. $7.50.

An excellent popular history of the Italo-Ethiopian war by a British soldier-historian.

THE MILITARY INTERVENES. Edited by Henry Bienen. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968, 175 p. $7.00.

Six social scientists examine the role of the military in the modernization process in selected developing countries.

GUERRILLA WARFARE AND MARXISM. Edited by William J. Pomeroy. New York: International Publishers, 1968, 336 p. $5.95.

Selections from the writings of several strategists of revolutionary warfare.

General: Economic and Social

THE WORLD AFTER KEYNES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE ECONOMIC ORDER. By Eric Roll. New York: Praeger, 1968, 193 p. $5.50.

A former professor who spent several decades in government service and is now a banker, Sir Eric Roll has written an exceptionally interesting book. He surveys the state of economic thought but puts his emphasis on the problems of present and future policy. The book is comprehensive, dealing with domestic issues that are common to many governments, but it is for Sir Eric's analysis and judgment on international affairs, informed by his great experience, that the book will be chiefly valued.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CENTRAL PLANNING. Edited by Alan A. Brown and Egon Neuberger. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968, 455 p. $13.50.

Some 25 economists, most of them specialists on Russia, China or Eastern Europe, have combined forces to make this book a major contribution to the understanding of the interplay of foreign trade, planning and centralized control in the communist economies. Theory, model-building, the testing of hypotheses that is frustrated by lack of data and the imaginative use of statistics to infer unstated policies are among the arts represented.

A FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION. Edited by Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband. New York: New York University Press, 1968, 239 p. $7.95.

This group of studies is generally favorable to the idea of a Free Trade Association centering on the North Atlantic. Several papers inevitably overlap similar work done in Britain and Canada but the two main contributions (by the editors) are new in their emphasis on political aspects and the implications of the proposal for the American economy.

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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS. By Robert A. Mundell. New York: Macmillan, 1968, 332 p. $9.95.

An outstanding younger economist has collected and adapted his papers to make a substantial treatise that is largely theoretical.

INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. By Erik Lundberg. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, 433 p. $7.50.

A leading Swedish economist who is now president of the International Economic Association buttresses a general treatment of economic instability in the inter-war and postwar periods and its relation to growth with chapters on Britain, Sweden, the Netherlands, Japan and relations between Canada and the United States.

FINANCE AND WORLD POWER: A POLITICAL COMMENTARY. By George K. Young. London: Nelson, 1968, 221 p. 45/.

Some good passages on the central theme, but mostly the author's somewhat opinionated views of a number of current issues.

THE WORLD OF GOLD. By Timothy Green. New York: Walker, 1968, 242 p. $5.95.

Producing, buying, selling and smuggling gold can be a rather romantic business if facts and stories are allowed to outweigh the problems of the international monetary system.

ECONOMICS OF TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT. Edited by James D. Theberge. New York: Wiley, 1968, 545 p. $9.95.

Well-selected readings intelligently organized.

SOCIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. By Elisabeth Tamedly. Geneva: Université de Genève, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, 1968, 299 p.

The history of ideas, theory and present practice are subjected to an analysis that stresses the conflict between economic and state interest and the lack of a rational basis for resolving it.

The United States

A NEW FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. By Hans J. Morgenthau. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1969, 252 p. $6.95 (Paper, $2.75).

This book addresses itself boldly to a reëxamination of five basic issues confronting American foreign policy: The Atlantic Alliance, communism, the uncommitted nations, nuclear power and the problem of national priorities. A provocative broad-brush treatment.

THE STRENGTH OF GOVERNMENT. By McGeorge Bundy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, 113 p. $3.75.

These 1968 Godkin lectures are a reasoned plea for strength in government at the national, state and local levels. The author urges maximum political participation in order to ensure that such strength serves the cause of freedom.

THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. By Robert F. Kennedy. New York: Norton, 1969, 224 p. $5.50.

Some new insights are added to the political and military record of the Cuban

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missile confrontation. The late Senator also adds a personal and philosophical dimension which reveals the human essence of both the man and the crisis.

WAR AND ORDER: REFLECTIONS ON VIETNAM AND HISTORY. By George Liska. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research), 1968, 115 p. $2.45 (Paper).

A challenging sequel to the author's "Imperial America," reflecting upon the larger historical significance of Viet Nam.

NATION OR EMPIRE? THE DEBATE OVER AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Robert W. Tucker. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research), 1968, 160 p. $2.75 (Paper).

In this cogently reasoned essay, the author concludes that an imperial American foreign policy would lead to further Viet Nams.

DEMOCRAT AND DIPLOMAT: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM E. DODD. By Robert Dallek. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 415 p. $8.50.

This is the moving story, told in a scholarly and workmanlike manner, of the encounter between a Wilsonian liberal and the Nazis. Dodd was President Roosevelt's Ambassador to Germany from 1933 to 1938.

REPUBLICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1921–1933. By L. Ethan Ellis. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1968, 404 p. $10.00.

A sympathetic and balanced appraisal of the "back to normalcy" period in American foreign policy.

ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION. By Birch Bayh. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968, 372 p. $7.50.

The Indiana Senator recounts in lively prose his crucial role in the passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in February 1967.

ROOSEVELT AND WILLKIE. By Warren Moscow. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968, 210 p. $6.95.

In this story of the 1940 contest, the author concludes that Willkie's campaign to win the nomination was superbly skillful but that his election campaign was inept.

THE CASE AGAINST CONGRESS. By Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968, 473 p. $5.95.

Just about all the dirt that's fit to print about Congress appears in these pages. Should be read together with "Profiles in Courage" to restore a sense of balance.

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF W. E. B. DU BOIS. New York: International Publishers, 1968, 448 p. $10.00.

This autobiography, written at the age of ninety, is a must for readers interested in the stormy career of the first black leader with a world view.

IN OUR TIME. By Paul H. Douglas. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968, 228 p. $4.95.

Several hard-hitting essays on tax loopholes, the oil shale treasure, lending practices and problems of poverty, by the former Senator from Illinois.

NO EASY VICTORIES. By John W. Gardner; edited by Helen Rowan. New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 177 p. $4.95.

The Chairman of the Urban Coalition speaks out thoughtfully on issues of public policy.

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EISENHOWER: THE PRESIDENT NOBODY KNEW. By Arthur Larson. New York: Scribner, 1968, 210 p. $5.95.

The most competent defense of the Eisenhower Presidency to date.

THE BRAINS TRUST. By R. G. Tugwell. New York: Viking, 1968, 538 p. $10.00.

This valuable personal narrative throws much light on Roosevelt's campaign for the Presidency in 1932. Contains many striking aperçus on "Roosevelt's way."

THE GUARANTEED SOCIETY. By Leonard Baker. New York: Macmillan, 1968, 276 p. $6.95.

A scathing polemic against government "giveaway" programs.

ANYTHING BUT THE TRUTH: THE CREDIBILITY GAP—HOW THE NEWS IS MANAGED IN WASHINGTON. By William McGaffin and Erwin Knoll. New York: Putnam, 1968, 250 p. $5.95.

A somewhat sensationalist account of news management in Washington during the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.

A HISTORIAN'S PROGRESS. By Roy F. Nichols. New York: Knopf, 1968, 308 p. $6.95.

The author of "The Invention of the American Political Parties" writes with much wisdom about his lifelong discovery of history.

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY: CONTROVERSIES AND ANALYSIS. By Ronald I. Rubin. New York: Praeger, 1968. 251 p. $12.50.

The author explores the role of the USIA in the American political system.

TRIUMPH AND TURMOIL: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF OUR TIME. By Edgar Ansel Mowrer. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1968, 454 p. $10.00.

A reporter's rather rambling description of the main watersheds of our time, marked by a strong anti-Kennedy bias.

The Western Hemisphere

LATIN AMERICAN RADICALISM: A DOCUMENTARY REPORT ON LEFT AND NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS. Edited by Irving Louis Horowitz and others. New York: Random House, 1969, 653 p. $10.00.

In this careful compilation of representative writings, the unifying theme is the inevitability of revolution in Latin America. The diversity of opinion, ranging from Christian Democratic to Maoist views, emphasizes the pluralistic nature of the Left. Introductory essays by the editors are included, but no biographical notes on the contributors.

ZAPATA AND THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION. By John Womack, Jr. New York: Knopf, 1969, 435 p. $10.00.

A penetrating, scholarly and warmly written study of Zapata, the man and the times. Supplemented with documents and bibliography.

PATTERNS OF CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA. By James L. Payne. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, 358 p. $10.00.

An examination of the attitudes which motivate politicians in Colombia. American norms provide the criteria for the author's assessments.

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NATIONALISM IN BRAZIL: A HISTORICAL SURVEY. By E. Bradford Burns. New York: Praeger, 1968, 158 p. $5.50.

A thoughtful study of Brazilian nationalism—from its origins through twentieth-century developments, strengthened with a critical bibliographical essay.

ELECTRIC POWER IN BRAZIL: ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR. By Judith Tendler. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, 264 p. $10.00.

In this scholarly study, the author examines the means by which the Brazilian Government successfully resolved a sensitive political issue, through public ownership and development of the previously foreign-dominated electric industry. Extended bibliography.

PORTUGAL AND BRAZIL IN TRANSITION. Edited by Raymond S. Sayers. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1968, 367 p. $11.00.

A potpourri—the result of papers and discussions drawn from the 1966 Colloquium of Luso-Brazilian Studies. Focus is on present and future trends, the framework being "the world the Portuguese created."

THE BRAZILIAN CAPITAL GOODS INDUSTRY, 1929–1964. By Nathaniel H. Leff. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, 186 p. $5.50.

A detailed, technical examination, stressing the impact which this sector of the economy has had upon Brazil's overall industrialization process. (Prepared for the Center for International Affairs and the Center for Studies in Education and Development, Harvard University.)

EL PARTIDO DEMÓCRATA CRISTIANO CHILENO. By George W. Grayson, Jr. Buenos Aires: Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, 1968, 517 p.

A eulogistic account of the Christian Democratic Party—its origins and development. The author views the movement as offering a positive alternative to Castroism's threat in the hemisphere.

THE POLITICS OF EXILE: PARAGUAY'S FEBRERISTA PARTY. By Paul H. Lewis. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968, 209 p. $6.00.

Based upon interviews with Paraguayan exiles in Argentina, this is an able behavioral analysis of contemporary Paraguayan politics. While internal struggles and long years in exile have weakened the Febrerista movement, the author concludes that, given the "modernist attitudes" of its members, the party "will probably continue to play an important role in the nation's politics, either in legality or in exile."

THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF URUGUAY: PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT POLICY. By Russell H. Brannon. New York: Praeger, 1968, 366 p. $15.00.

In this factual study, responsibility for Uruguay's present difficulty is attributed to governmental policies which traditionally have favored urban rather than rural sectors.

CASTRO, DEBRAY CONTRE LE MARXISME-LÉNINISME: LETTRES A UN AMI VÉNÉZUÉLIEN. By Antoine G. Petit. Paris: Laffont, 1968, 206 p. Fr. 8.

A Haitian exile, with personal experiences in both Cuba and China, denies the validity of viewing the Cuban revolution in Maoist terms. He also rejects Castroism as a possible model for contemporary Latin America.

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FIDEL CASTRO. By Enrique Meneses. New York: Taplinger, 1968, 238 p. $6.95.

An assessment of Castroism by a journalist for *Paris Match* who was in the Sierra Maestra from December 1957 through March 1958.

Western Europe

A PEACE POLICY FOR EUROPE. By Willy Brandt. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969, 225 p. $5.95.

Germany's Foreign Minister argues his policy of détente, especially in relation to the East. Originally written for a German audience, his exposition deserves a smoother translation.

EUROPA-FÖDERATIONSPLÄNE DER WIDERSTANDSBEWEGUNGEN 1940–1945. Edited by Walter Lipgens. Munich: Oldenbourg (for the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik), 1968, 547 p. DM. 70.

A German scholar, working on the origins of European union, presents a carefully selected collection of the plans and hopes for a united Europe drawn up by the leading Resistance movements in Hitler's Europe.

THE COMMON MARKET: THE CONFLICT OF THEORY AND PRACTICE. By Stephen Holt. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1967, 207 p. 30/. (New York: International Publications Service, distributors, $7.50.)

Among the strong points of this book are its detailed treatment of some of the decision-making procedures inside the Community, the make-up of its staff, functional representation and the federal and non-federal elements in its organization. Among the weak points are a lack of political background and the datedness of some passages.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY. By W. H. Balekjian. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1968, 356 p. $8.00.

A detailed summary by country of laws on exchange control, taxation, the treatment of foreign-owned firms and related matters, plus a few general chapters.

THE FALL OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 1918–1968. By Colin Cross. New York: Coward-McCann, 1969, 359 p. $8.95.

The last half-century of Empire, depicted with a fine eye for the telling detail of social history. Written by a young British journalist, with verve and detachment.

BRITAIN SINCE 1918. By Bentley B. Gilbert. New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 206 p. $5.95.

A critical history of Britain's domestic and foreign policies. A feat of compression.

THE AMERICAN TAKE-OVER OF BRITAIN. By James McMillan and Bernard Harris. New York: Hart, 1968, 252 p. $5.95.

A somewhat breathless plea by two British journalists that Britain ward off American commercial domination. "The status of a cringing satellite does not become England." A sensationalist variation on Servan-Schreiber.

CHURCHILL AND THE MONTGOMERY MYTH. By R. W. Thompson. New York: M. Evans (distributed in association with Lippincott), 1968, 276 p. $5.95.

An effort to peel myth from man, to the detriment of the latter.

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WEST INDIAN MIGRATION TO BRITAIN: A SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY. By Ceri Peach. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1968, 122 p. $4.25.

A thorough and suggestive study of the causes and social consequences of West Indian migration, which was due not so much to native conditions but to "the expansion of the British economy [which] has created gaps at the lower end of the occupational and residential ladder to which West Indian and other coloured immigrants have been drawn in as a replacement population."

MODERN SCOTLAND: THE NATION SINCE 1870. By James G. Kellas. New York: Praeger, 1968, 284 p. $6.50.

A timely study of Scottish society, emphasizing the continued separate identity of the Scottish nation. By a Glasgow don.

THE NEW FRENCH REVOLUTION. By John Ardagh. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 501 p. $8.95.

A fine study of contemporary French society and of its postwar leap to modernity. The exceptionally well-informed British author covers all facets of French life, neglecting only politics and de Gaulle as having been studied to excess. Enjoyable and important.

LA RÉVOLUTION INTROUVABLE: RÉFLEXIONS SUR LES ÉVÉNEMENTS DE MAI. By Raymond Aron. Paris: Fayard, 1968, 187 p. Fr. 15.

Aron was one of the few intellectuals in France who openly proclaimed his hostility to what he called the "revolutionary carnival" of the students last May. Appalled by his colleagues' facile admiration for the young, and worried by what they welcomed, "the fragility of the modern order," Aron entered the fray with controversial articles, here reprinted. A voice well worth pondering—and not only in France.

DE GAULLE AND HIS FRANCE: A PSYCHOPOLITICAL AND HISTORICAL PORTRAIT. By Jacques de Launay. New York: Julian Press, 1968, 316 p. $7.50.

This mélange is to true biography what a political cipher is to de Gaulle.

THE IDES OF MAY: THE DEFEAT OF FRANCE, MAY–JUNE 1940. By John Williams. New York: Knopf, 1968, 385 p. $7.95.

A dramatic recital of the sudden collapse of French political and military leadership in the spring of 1940.

THE RESISTANCE VERSUS VICHY: THE PURGE OF COLLABORATORS IN LIBERATED FRANCE. By Peter Novick. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, 245 p. $7.50.

The origins, procedures and consequences of the purge, intended as the necessary prelude to a purer France. An analysis embodying painstaking research and written with a felicitous combination of judiciousness, insight and passion.

ANTI-MEMOIRS. By André Malraux. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968, 420 p. $8.95.

In this first of four projected volumes, Malraux uses the episodes of his rich life as illustrations or signposts of the human condition. Of appeal alike to the philosophically and politically minded. (French original noted here April 1968.)

GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION: BONN BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. By Karl Kaiser. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 153 p. $1.95 (Paper).

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A compact and highly intelligent essay on Bonn's new outlook. The author, a young German political scientist at home on both sides of the Atlantic, stresses German flexibility. He wrote before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia once again altered the picture.

WAS SOLL AUS DEUTSCHLAND WERDEN? Edited by Leonhard Froese with Eike Gerken. Munich: Goldmann, 1968, 295 p. DM. 19.80.

Fourteen essays, mostly by prominent but "non-Establishment" figures, on the need for new departures in German policies.

REFORMPARTEI UND AUSSENPOLITIK. By Abraham Ashkenasi. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1968, 220 p. DM. 25.

An illuminating study of the conflicts within the Social Democratic Party concerning foreign policy, set against the background of its political stance at home.

GESICHTSPUNKTE EINES DEUTSCHEN. By Rainer Barzel. Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1968, 291 p. DM. 20.

A leading member of the C.D.U. discusses a range of problems, from the prospects for Europe to the seriousness of student unrest.

LA QUESTION DU TYROL DU SUD: UN PROBLÈME DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL. By Alain Fenet. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1968, 369 p. Fr. 43.90.

An historical and juridical inquiry into the fate of a disputed territory, called Alto Adige by the Italians who annexed it fifty years ago. The author acknowledges grounds for Austrian grievances.

ITALY. By Muriel Grindrod. New York: Praeger, 1968, 260 p. $7.00.

A compact and readable survey of modern Italy, with particular attention to developments after 1945.

DIE KRISE DES LIBERALEN SYSTEMS UND DIE FASCHISTISCHEN BEWEGUNGEN. By Ernst Nolte. Munich: Piper, 1968, 475 p. DM. 35.

After his much-acclaimed theoretical analysis of Fascism, Nolte now turns to an examination of the historical conditions which favored its rise. He also gives brief summaries of every Fascist movement in Europe.

FRANCO: THE MAN AND HIS NATION. By George Hills. New York: Macmillan, 1968, 464 p. $7.95.

Another self-consciously dispassionate biography of the generalissimo turned statesman, based on research and extensive interviews with Franco and his close associates. Much useful emphasis on Franco's career before 1936.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

SURVEY OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE: A COMMENTARY AND EXTRACTS FROM THE RECENT POLEMICS, 1963–1967. By John Gittings. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1968, 410 p. $11.75.

A useful selection of some 138 Soviet and Chinese documents dealing with further progress along the via dolorosa between 1963 and 1967.

THE ARMS RACE AND SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. By Walter C. Clemens, Jr. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1968, 335 p. $7.50 (Paper, $2.85).

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An effort to get at the possible relationship between the issue of nuclear arms control and the crisis in Sino-Soviet relations.

POWER IN THE KREMLIN: FROM KHRUSHCHEV TO KOSYGIN. By Michel Tatu. New York: Viking, 1969, 570 p. $10.00.

A translation of an important study, by a French correspondent for *Le Monde*, of the Soviet leadership in the 1960s. (French edition noted here October 1967).

THE 900 DAYS: THE SIEGE OF LENINGRAD. By Harrison E. Salisbury. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 635 p. $10.00.

An extensive and fascinating account of the classic siege, based on a wide range of Soviet sources and concluding with a chapter on the Leningrad Affair. Some may feel that there is a bit too much straining for local color and the revealing detail, but the work as a whole is most impressive.

WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1917 TO 1930. By Antony C. Sutton. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1968, 381 p. $10.00.

An extensive empirical presentation and analysis of the role of foreign concessions and technological transfers in the development of the Soviet economy during its first decade.

COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN THE U.S.S.R.: 1917–1967. By T. H. Rigby. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, 573 p. $15.00.

A comprehensive and exceedingly thorough history and analysis of "recruitment to the Soviet Communist Party and the composition of the party" by a leading authority on the subject.

THE FALL OF KHRUSHCHEV. By William Hyland and Richard Wallace Shryock. New York: Funk, 1968, 209 p. $4.95.

An effort, only moderately successful, to trace the decline and fall of Nikita Sergeievich in the two years following the Cuban missile crisis.

THE UNREDEEMED: ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE SOVIET UNION. Edited by Ronald I. Rubin. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968, 316 p. $10.00.

A selection of essays dealing with the recent vicissitudes of Soviet Jewry, including the impact of international tensions.

SOCIAL CHANGE IN SOVIET RUSSIA. By Alex Inkeles. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, 475 p. $12.50.

A collection of essays over the last two decades by a leading American student of Soviet society.

SOVIET TRANSPORT EXPERIENCE: ITS LESSONS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES. By Holland Hunter. Washington: Brookings Institution, Transport Research Program, 1968, 194 p. $6.00.

An able study of Soviet railway policy and its rather impressive achievements. Much of this experience is relevant to the transportation problems of other countries.

ENCOUNTERS WITH LENIN. By Nikolay Valentinov (N. V. Volsky). New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 273 p. $7.00.

A welcome translation of the memoirs, first published in Russian in New York in 1953, of the author's association and eventual break with Lenin in the years before 1914.

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PROMINENT PERSONALITIES IN THE USSR. Compiled by the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.; edited by Edward L. Crowley and others. Metuchen (N.J.): Scarecrow Press, 1968, 792 p. $35.00.

In effect an updated and augmented edition of the "Who's Who in the USSR" previously prepared by the Institute.

SEESAW: CULTURAL LIFE IN EASTERN EUROPE. By Yorick Blumenfeld. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968, 276 p. $5.95.

A journalist's report on the highly interesting cultural ferment in Eastern Europe in the 1960s—in the arts, cinema, theater and politics—and on the efforts to stifle or contain it.

FINLAND: CREATION AND CONSTRUCTION. Edited by Hillar Kallas and Sylvie Nickels. New York: Praeger, 1968, 366 p. $7.50.

A general survey of the country, its people and culture by a number of specialists.

RES BALTICA. Edited by Adolf Sprudzs and Armins Rusis. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1968, 303 p. Gldrs. 36.

Essays in English on Baltic affairs, in memory of the late Latvian statesman, Alfred Bilmanis.

BALKAN TRIANGLE: BIRTH AND DECLINE OF AN ALLIANCE ACROSS IDEOLOGICAL BOUNDARIES. By John O. Iatrides. The Hague: Mouton, 1968, 211 p. Gldrs. 35.

A monograph centering on the Pact of Coöperation and the military alliance concluded in 1953 and 1954 among Jugoslavia, Greece and Turkey.

THE NAZIS IN THE BALKANS: A CASE STUDY OF TOTALITARIAN POLITICS. By Dietrich Orlow. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968, 235 p. $7.50.

A study of the role of a subordinate Nazi agency, the *Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft*, in formulating plans and policies for the Balkans.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNIST YUGOSLAVIA, 1947–1964. By Joseph T. Bombelles. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1968, 219 p. $5.90 (Paper, $1.80).

Details of Jugoslavia's effort to work out its own methods in applying socialism in the 1950s and 1960s.

INFORMATION HUNGARY. Edited by Ferenc Erdei. New York: Pergamon Press, 1968, 1,144 p. $30.00.

An ambitious and informative work of reference on nearly all aspects of Hungarian life, culture and history, though flawed by a regrettable if understandable political tendentiousness. It is the second volume in the Countries of the World Information Series, under the general editorship of Robert Maxwell.

MODERN GREECE. By John Campbell and Philip Sherrard. New York: Praeger, 1968, 426 p. $9.00.

A concise but informative survey of Greek history since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Nearly half the volume is devoted to events since 1948.

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THE ECONOMY OF GREECE, 1944–66. By Wray O. Candilis. New York: Praeger, 1968, 238 p. $15.00.

A somewhat technical analysis, with much statistical data.

The Middle East

MIDDLE EAST POLITICS: THE MILITARY DIMENSION. By J. C. Hurewitz. New York: Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1969, 553 p. $11.50 (Paper, $3.95).

A penetrating inquiry into a popular but often misunderstood subject. The narrative covers each country separately, from Morocco to Afghanistan, noting regional patterns but not indulging in over-generalization. The "politics" of the title are both domestic and international, and the author devotes special attention to the arms races, military aid programs and the interaction of great-power and local interest.

THE BIG POWERS AND THE PRESENT CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by Samuel Merlin. Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1968, 201 p. $6.00.

Record of a colloquium held in December 1967, with brief presentations by distinguished panelists (including Richard H. Nolte, Cecil Hourani and General E. L. M. Burns) and a general discussion reported verbatim. Drastic editing would have helped.

DUELL IM MITTELMEER: MOSKAU GREIFT NACH DEM NAHEN UND DEM MITTLEREN OSTEN. By Christoph von Imhoff. Freiburg: Rombach, 1968, 434 p. DM. 24.

A generally successful attempt by a seasoned journalist who knows the area to place recent developments in the Middle East in the framework of great-power relationships. Solid information is combined with informed speculation, concluding with a dozen well-reasoned if not always proven "lessons" of the six-day war.

REBELS IN THE RIF: ABD EL KRIM AND THE RIF REBELLION. By David S. Woolman. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968, 257 p. $6.95.

The Berber rebellion in Spanish Morocco in the 1920s was a classic example of guerrilla war, successful until France joined Spain to put it down with overwhelming force. This is the most accurate and detailed account of it to appear.

EGYPT SINCE THE REVOLUTION. Edited by P. J. Vatikiotis. New York: Praeger, 1968, 195 p. $6.95.

Most of the contributions to this symposium covering economics, politics and culture represent original research or analysis and are well worth reading. Several of the authors are Egyptians (including Khaled Mohieddin); the others are recognized Western scholars.

LAWYERS, THE RULE OF LAW AND LIBERALISM IN MODERN EGYPT. By Farhat J. Ziadeh. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1968, 177 p. $7.00 (Paper, $2.70).

A study of the major public role played by Western-minded Egyptian lawyers until their relegation to the status of legal technician after the 1952 revolution.

DE GAULLE, ISRAËL ET LES JUIFS. By Raymond Aron. Paris: Plon, 1968, 186 p. Fr. 15.50.

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A collection of Aron's articles, written during the six-day war and here republished, with some earlier pieces on Israel, and a long, poignant preface, analyzing and criticizing de Gaulle's description of the "élitist" Jewish people. By it, he writes, de Gaulle "opened a new period in Jewish history and perhaps in the history of anti-Semitism." De Gaulle seems determined to prove Aron right.

LIGHT ON ISRAEL. By Maurice Samuel. New York: Knopf, 1968, 212 p. $4.95.

An admittedly partisan and personal book by a strong Zionist, none the less instructive in its discussion of Israel, the Arab-Israel problem and world Jewry.

THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF CHAIM WEIZMANN. Edited by Leonard Stein in Collaboration with Gedalia Yogev. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 447 p. $8.75.

The opening volume, "Summer 1885–29 October 1902," of a series that will cover Weizmann's long career takes him up to age 28, by which time he was already strongly identified with the Zionist movement.

A HISTORY OF THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN ISRAEL. By Harry Viteles. London: Vallentine, Mitchell, 1968, 2 v. 3 Gns. each.

Two more volumes, "Book Four: Co-Operative Smallholders Settlements (The Moshav Movement)" (405 p.) and "Book Five: Workers, Producers, Transportation and Service Co-Operatives" (414 p.), in a comprehensive study of coöperatives previously noted here July 1967 and April 1968.

ARABIEN NACH DER STUNDE NULL. By Louis Barcata. Vienna: Molden, 1968, 383 p. Schillings 124.

A veteran Austrian journalist's report on attitudes and conditions in thirteen Arab states since the six-day war. Often superficial but studded with a number of interesting interviews.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REGIONAL COOPERATION: KUWAIT. By Ragaei El Mallakh. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, 265 p. $7.75.

A comprehensive examination of this oil-rich Arab nation's economy, rapid domestic development and the regional impact of its aid and investment policies, admirably supplementing the World Bank's report of 1965.

LES RELATIONS TURCO-SOVIÉTIQUES ET LA QUESTION DES DÉTROITS. By Feridun Cemal Erkin. Ankara: Basnur Matbaasi, 1968, 540 p. L.T. 50.

A substantial contribution by a former Foreign Minister of Turkey in the little-known field of Turkish-Soviet relations, concentrating on the crisis of 1945–1946.

PERSIAN KINGSHIP IN TRANSITION. By E. A. Bayne. New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1968, 288 p. $7.50.

An analysis of twenty years of the Shah's reign, based on frank dialogue between author and king. The chapter on "The Strains of Foreign Policy" throws a revealing light on Iran's international role as the Shah has conceived and pursued it.

South and Southeast Asia

THE CHALLENGE OF WORLD POLITICS IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Werner Levi. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968, 184 p. $4.95 (Paper, $2.45).

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The élite groups formulating Southern Asia's foreign policy and how they have been forced to exchange their idealism for traditional tools of international politics. Problems of nationalism, regionalism and nonalignment get the emphasis.

A HISTORY OF MODERN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By John Bastin and Harry J. Benda. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968, 214 p. $5.95 (Paper, $2.45).

A broad interpretative account of the process of Western colonialism in Southeast Asia from the arrival of the Portuguese to the withdrawal of Western powers and establishment of the independent Southeast Asian governments.

INDIA AND WORLD POLITICS: KRISHNA MENON'S VIEW OF THE WORLD. By Michael Brecher. New York: Praeger, 1968, 390 p. $10.00.

Krishna Menon on 21 varying themes as recorded from taped interviews together with an analysis of his views and their impact on India's foreign policy.

INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN CAMBODIA, LAOS, AND VIETNAM 1947–1964. By D. R. SarDesai. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968, 336 p. $10.00.

An analysis of India's attitude toward former Indochina, its diplomatic role and its performance as chairman-country of the International Control Commission. Terminal point is mid-1964.

TOWARDS THE INTEGRATION OF INDIAN STATES, 1919–1947. By Urmila Phadnis. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1968, 297 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $6.50.)

Events and forces important to the merger of 600-odd Princely States into the Indian Union, the factors which facilitated matters and the impact of integration on the States themselves.

ORIGINS OF TROTSKYISM IN CEYLON: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE LANKA SAMA SAMAJA PARTY, 1935–1942. By George Jan Lerski. Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1968, 288 p. $7.50 (Paper, $2.85).

How the Trotskyite movement in Ceylon, in its first ten years, grew from a small group of young London-educated radicals to become a formidable political force. By a former chairman of the Polish Social Democratic Youth in Lwów.

DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS OF PAKISTAN. By Ole David Koht Norbye. New York: Humanities Press, 1968, 336 p. $6.75.

Identification, evaluation and description of the nature of structural alterations in the Pakistani economy during the last years with projections to 1985 which, the author predicts, will see immense changes in all major sectors.

THE LONG CHARADE. By Richard Critchfield. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968, 400 p. $6.95.

How political subversion has placed administrative control of South Viet Nam in the hands of what the writer believes is a ruthless, self-serving group of generals and politicians whose actions often in fact further the interests of Hanoi. This Washington *Evening Star* correspondent covered the war in Viet Nam from May 1964 to November 1967.

THE MILITARY HALF: AN ACCOUNT OF DESTRUCTION IN QUANG NGAI AND QUANG TIN. By Jonathan Schell. New York: Knopf, 1968, 212 p. $4.95.

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A keen-eyed Harvard graduate, opposed to American policy in Viet Nam, observes the destruction by the Americans of a rural area in South Viet Nam. A sincere, exceptionally well-written account, originally published in *The New Yorker.*

HO CHI MINH, DERNIÈRE CHANCE: LA CONFÉRENCE FRANCO-VIETNAMIENNE DE FONTAINEBLEAU, JUILLET 1946. By Henri Azeau. Paris: Flammarion, 1968, 310 p. Fr. 16.

An important work detailing, with background and other explanatory data, meetings of the delegates of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and of France, intended to formalize the preliminary convention signed at Hanoi March 6, 1946.

HANOI. By Mary McCarthy. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968, 134 p. $2.45 (Paper).

Interesting reports on a 1968 visit to North Viet Nam, favorably comparing urban and rural conditions to those in South Viet Nam. Caustic and sometimes sarcastic in its criticism of the United States. Preceded by a rebuttal to Diana Trilling's comments on the author's "Viet Nam" (1967). Mostly previously published in *The New York Review of Books.*

NORTH VIETNAM: A DOCUMENTARY. By John Gerassi. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968, 200 p. $5.00.

An eyewitness account of a visit to North Viet Nam in late 1967, during which the author collected documents to back up his story of the nature of the war and extent of destruction. Controversial.

THE RICE INDUSTRY OF BURMA 1852–1940. By Cheng Siok-Hwa. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1968, 307 p. (New York: Oxford University Press, $12.50.)

Mrs. Cheng concludes that the prewar setup of Burma's rice industry, though benefiting non-Burmese most, was far more efficient and successful than it is today.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IN MALAYSIA: REALITY AND THE BELIEFS OF AN ELITE. By James C. Scott. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, 302 p. $8.75.

The nature, extent and sources of democratic beliefs among Malaysians, as derived from seventeen Malaysian civil servants who were interviewed.

East Asia and Pacific Ocean

CHINA: THE REMEMBERED LIFE. By Paul Frillmann and Graham Peck. Boston: Houghton, 1968, 291 p. $5.95.

Mr. Frillmann went to China in 1936 as a Lutheran missionary and stayed on, first as wartime chaplain and soldier, then as peacetime State Department aide until 1953. A lively, informative account as written down by Mr. Peck, himself an old China hand and superb raconteur.

AGREEMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949–1967. Edited by Douglas M. Johnston and Hungdah Chiu. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, 286 p. $12.50.

A valuable treaty calendar documenting all official and semi-official exchanges of international legal commitments involving the People's Republic up to September 30, 1967.

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CHINA IN THE THROES OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: AN EYE WITNESS REPORT. By Louis Barcata. New York: Hart, 1968, 299 p. $8.95.

An Austrian correspondent, visitor to China in 1967, reports on causes of the power struggle and its major exponents, how the United States and the U.S.S.R. are regarded, and other key issues. Supporting documentation is taken from the Moscow-Peking diplomatic correspondence, some texts of which are reproduced in full.

COMMUNIST CHINESE AIR POWER. By Richard M. Bueschel. New York: Praeger, 1968, 238 p. $6.95.

Divided about equally between a historical survey of the growth of China's air strength since 1925 and brief notes on some 100 indigenous and foreign aircraft types which have been in use in communist China.

COMMUNISM AND CHINA: IDEOLOGY IN FLUX. By Benjamin I. Schwartz. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968, 254 p. $5.95.

Historical documentation of the emerging scene in communist China from a collection of the author's writings over the last thirteen years, showing the evolution of China in terms of its internal development and of its relations with the communist world.

HISTOIRE DU PARTI COMMUNISTE CHINOIS (1921–1949). By Jacques Guillermaz. Paris: Payot, 1968, 450 p. Fr. 45.35.

A detailed, well-documented account of the bitter struggles of the Chinese Communist Party from its origins up to the founding of the People's Republic of China. Future volumes will continue the story.

THE MANDATE OF HEAVEN: RECORD OF A CIVIL WAR, CHINA 1945–49. By John F. Melby. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968, 313 p. $10.00.

A Foreign Service officer goes back to his personal letters and diaries to tell of his Chinese assignment during the critical years from Japan's defeat to the founding of the People's Republic of China. His important book is documented largely from "United States Relations with China," of which he was a principal author.

THE MODERN HISTORY OF MONGOLIA. By C. R. Bawden. New York: Praeger, 1968, 460 p. $11.50.

Mongol society as it was from 1691 (final submission to the Manchus) to 1911 (the Revolution) and the major dynamic course of events since. The main object is to show the extent to which the Mongol Revolution was a result of native growth and to what extent it reflected the interests of the U.S.S.R.

JAPAN: CULTURE, EDUCATION, AND CHANGE IN TWO COMMUNITIES. By Theodore Brameld. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968, 316 p. $7.50.

The dynamics of recent cultural changes, with special concern for the theory and practice of education as an inextricable part of culture, as observed in two subcultural communities of people of socially low levels of affluence and status: one of fishermen, the other of pariahs.

REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY: CHALLENGE AND TESTING IN JAPAN. By E. Wight Bakke. Hamden (Conn.): Archon Books, 1968, 343 p. $10.00.

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A Yale economist studies the exportability of American democracy into Japan and its significance for national development there.

KOREA: DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL. By John Kie-chiang Oh. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968, 240 p. $7.95.

Political patterns and governmental systems and processes in the development of Western democracy in South Korea, mostly from 1948 to 1963, with a postscript on the 1967 presidential elections.

Africa

THE INFLUENCE OF ISLAM UPON AFRICA. By J. Spencer Trimingham. New York: Praeger, 1968, 159 p. $5.00.

The foremost authority on the subject has written a small but fascinating volume on the process by which Islam spread and the ways in which its norms and practices have gradually come to affect the character of social life in Africa. The author's most recent post was as visiting professor at the American University at Beirut.

THE DEMOGRAPHY OF TROPICAL AFRICA. By William Brass and others. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, 539 p. $15.00.

A group of demographers, all formerly at the Office of Population Research at Princeton University, have collaborated on a comprehensive volume containing a wealth of statistical data. Included are a series of general essays as well as a number of country studies.

POPULATION AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN TROPICAL AFRICA. By Robert F. Stevenson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, 306 p. $10.00.

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THE AFRICAN PHENOMENON. By Abdul A. Said. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968, 194 p. $5.30.

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WEST AFRICA UNDER COLONIAL RULE. By Michael Crowder. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968, 540 p. $10.00.

The author, one of the foremost historians interested in West Africa, now Director of African Studies at the University of Ife, has written a book of interest to specialists and generalists alike.

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TOWARDS FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE IN A DEVELOPING ECONOMY. By R. A. Sowelem. New York: Humanities Press, 1968, 329 p. $9.50.

The establishment, impact and experience of the central banking system in the former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is the subject of this analysis by a University of Leeds economist. The period covered is 1952–1963.

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Limited to Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi, this work by a historian at the University of Rhodesia is largely a description of the major institutional developments of the colonial period, with little analysis of their significance.

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The courage of the eight South Africans whose resistance to apartheid is retold here in short essays is beyond question. The question is whether the stories of men like Mandela, Sobukwe, Scott, Brutus and Paton should not be retold in less brief form.

A SHORT HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA. By Leo Marquard. New York: Praeger, 1968, 272 p. $6.50.

The President of the South African Institute of Race Relations has revised his general history, originally published in 1955, with additional material in the final chapter covering developments up to 1967.

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By Donald Wasson

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